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Abstract

Othered Ambitions:
The Conflation of Villainy and Homosexuality in 20th Century American Media

By: Sherard Harrington
University of New Hampshire
April 2022

This work sets out to examine the ways in which homosexuality and villainy have been conflated
throughout the 20th Century in American media, and the ways in which that conflation has been
reinforced and challenged. My observations about the villainous connotations of homosexuality
hold despite the ways in which the boundaries of homosexuality have changed throughout the
century. A homosexual is anyone who experiences romantic or amorous affection for someone
who presents with the same gender presentation and/or who experiences attraction aversion for
those who present with the opposite gender presentation. A villain breaks the law seeking to
restructure society or to continue to question the moral expectations of that society; they appear
disaffected to a greater degree, and their animosity towards society is less understood because
that animosity points to the systemic injustices in power structures that that society benefits from
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obfuscating; homosexualized villains seek to destroy or upend societies that have admonished
them for their homosexuality, the impetus of which cannot be understood without
acknowledging that the society they are attacking is rigidly heterosexual—a power structure that
their society has hidden.
The Talented Mr. Ripley by Patricia Highsmith, published in 1955, is a novel that
epitomizes the conflation of homosexuality and villainy. It remains unclear to readers whether
Tom Ripley is villainous because he is harboring the secret of his homosexuality. Highsmith’s
novel is a psychological thriller in which Tom Ripley poses as a friend of Dickie Greenleaf to
receive funds to travel to Europe to bring Dickie back to his parents in America, Tom’s
homoerotic attraction to Dickie and his lavish lifestyle derail this mission, causing Tom to
murder Dickie and assume his identity. In this chapter, I perform close readings of Highsmith’s
novel to examine the ways in which gender fatalism, homosocial desire, and cruel optimism
permeate the text. Gender fatalism, homosocial desire, and cruel optimism are utilized to
reposition the novel as well as two film remakes of the novel, Purple Noon (also known as Plein
Soleil) and The Talented Mr. Ripley to create excellent examples of homosexualized villainy.
Another Country by James Baldwin and Vanishing Rooms by Melvin Dixon depict a
continuation of the conflation of villainy and homosexuality while layering conceptions of race
as othered and vilifying as well. African-American literature in the 20th Century describes Black
experiences that are tangled with issues of racial inequality that grew from racial structures
developed in the 19th and 18th centuries to explain, affirm, and uphold a society whose top
echelon benefitted from the ideologies of white supremacy, and are therefore extensions or
prodigies of slave narratives. In Another Country, Rufus’ disaffection by society speaks to his
homosexualized villainy, while Dixon’s response novel Vanishing Rooms portrays Jesse’s
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disinheritance from Metro. In this chapter, I examine the ways in which insult and
(hetero)sexualized spaces shape the rejection and disaffection of characters, who then become
more susceptible to vilification.
I examine three graphic narratives that demonstrate a literary awareness of the conflation
of homosexuality and villainy: My Friend Dahmer by Derf Backderf, 8-Bit Theater by Brian
Clevinger, and My Favorite Thing is Monsters by Emil Ferris. With these three, one may see an
illustrated trajectory of homosexualized villainy questioned and ultimately separated. The
literary trope of the conflation of homosexuality and villainy is so pervasive it crossed medium
boundaries into graphic narratives and video games, yet graphic narratives more apparently
embraced the separation of villainy and homosexuality. My Friend Dahmer by Derf Backderf
attempts to absolve homosexual serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer of his homosexuality as an impetus
for murder but fails to consider the (heterosexual) societal pressure placed on Dahmer which he
then internalizes; 8-Bit Theater by Brian Clevinger portrays an affable homosexual villain
thereby complicating the readers’ relationship with villainy and viciousness; and My Favorite
Thing is Monsters by Emil Ferris presents homosexual saviors who are monsters but who are not
monstruous. These three narratives navigate conceptions of homosexuality and villainy that
complicate the traditional trope of conflation.
Finally, I consider the ways in which a film can be framed as homosexual by examining
marketing, the concept of the auteur, and the intended audience. I examine two paradigms of
homosexuality in film: homosexual spaces through the trope of road trips across natural
landscapes, and literal villains in 1960s-1990s Disney films. I argue that the trope of road
tripping creates a sense of adventure, propelling the plot, through removing homosexual
characters from homosexually-friendly urbanscapes and transplanting them onto suburban- and
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ruralscapes. A byproduct of this trope is that gender performance that does not match a person’s
sex is seen as unnatural in more bucolic settings. An examination of Disney villains in late 20th
century films demonstrates the ways in which ambitious individuals who overperform or blur
their gender identity are quickly and unequivocally villainized in films that simultaneously
establish hetero-romantic relationships as normal and desirable for children.
This dissertation examines some of many examples of the conflation of villainy and
homosexuality in 20th century American media. The conflation makes it difficult for readers to
identify homosexual role models. Further areas of study include Margaret Atwood’s The
Handmaid’s Tale and its subsequent graphic novel and television series, as well as Bret Easton
Ellis’ American Psycho, and subsequent film. This is a rich subject area that invites further
analyzation.

1

Introduction

This work sets out to examine the ways in which homosexuality and villainy have been conflated
throughout the 20th Century in American media, and the ways in which that conflation has been
reinforced. My observations about the villainous connotations of homosexuality hold despite the
ways in which the boundaries of homosexuality have changed throughout the century. For the
purposes of this work, a homosexual is anyone who experiences romantic or amorous affection
for someone who presents with the same gender presentation and/or who experiences attraction
aversion for those who present with the opposite gender presentation. This includes figures in
literature and film who clearly form homosexual bonds with one another, and also others who
form homosocial bonds which avoid censure by by audiences that might find actual
homosexuality too appalling for portrayal. To give a sense of how nuanced this identity can grow
to be, Griffin writes:
Historical research suggests that men and women now recognized as homosexual
understood their sexuality differently in their own time. […] The term
“homosexuality” itself was only beginning to make its way out of the medical
texts and into the larger public consciousness. Historian George Chauncey points
out that in urban America at the beginning of the twentieth century, men who had
sex with other men did not consider themselves all part of one category. One
group self-identified as “fairies,” effeminate men who tended to take the
“submissive” role in sex (although not always). On the other hand, many men
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self-identified as “queers,” more conventionally masculine men who nonetheless
did not consider themselves “normal” because of their sexual object choice
(showing that this term has also chanced meaning over time). There was even a
third category—the “normal” men, or “trade,” who engaged in sex with other men
but did not self-identify as somehow outside the hegemonic norm because they
maintained the dominant penetrative role in sex. (76-7)
Griffin identifies homosexuality with men as he embeds his research in George Chauncey’s
work, which examines sexuality in the Progressive Era, when the zeitgeist of female sexuality
was still embedded in the Victorian Era repressed notion that female sexuality did not exist
outside of the (heterosexual) male gaze, if at all. My work recognizes that the term homosexual
has a cold, clinical connotation which is nevertheless comparatively better than the many names
of insult that have been affixed to homosexuals throughout the years—some of which have been
reclaimed. I also consider the societal structures of gender, and the societal structure of sexuality,
but opt to consider together female and male homosexuals in spite of a context in which white
heteronormative patriarchal society continues to value male identities. There are, I argue,
benefits for political advocacy in understanding female and male homosexuals together. In this, I
follow Jasbir Puar who illustrates the ways in which white homosexuals have in navigated a
white heteronormative patriarchal society more impactfully than those homosexuals who also
identify with a racial minority. Differences among homosexuals exist. As bell hooks notes, white
American women have had victories in fighting for gender equality that were unavailable to
African-American women. Despite its many limitations, advocacy work for homosexuals as if
they were a coherent group has served to elevate all. I note this even as I also examine racial,
gendered, and class intersections that operate in the material examined here.
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The definition of a villain is as nuanced as that of homosexuality. A villain is not an
outlaw, who is more aptly a miscreant or bandit who breaks the law, generally to survive and
ultimately with the intention of reentering society with their ill-gotten gains. Similar to mafiosos
(racialized as white) and gangs (racialized as minorities), outlaws are extralegal, operating
outside of the bounds of society but always with the eventual expectation of rejoining that
society. Monetary gains are their driving force, through which they may gain access to society’s
excess. A villain has been rejected from the community. A villain breaks the law seeking to
restructure society or to continue to question the moral expectations of that society; they appear
disaffected to a greater degree, and their animosity towards society is less understood because
that animosity points to the systemic injustices in power structures that that society benefits from
obfuscating; homosexualized villains seek to destroy or upend societies that have admonished
them for their homosexuality, the impetus of which cannot be understood without
acknowledging that the society they are attacking is rigidly heterosexual—a power structure that
their society has hidden. A villain knows societal hierarchal boundaries, understands them, and
rejects them; it is a willful defiance. Further, whereas outlaws are more often understood as real
disaffected straight white men, connected to a place (usually the American southwest), villains
are more often understood as stateless imaginary characters. Puar considers the ways in which
the foreigner is homosexualized and characterized as a terrorist, writing, “[…] the terrorist is also
a priori constituted as stateless, lacking national legitimization and national boundaries. In the
political imagination, the terrorist serves as the monstruous excess of the nation-state,” which
remains true of the villain (99). “It is not that we must engage in the practice of excavating the
queer terrorist, or queering the terrorist,” Puar writes, identifying the impossible separation of
queerness and terrorism; “rather, queerness is always already installed in the project of naming
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the terrorist; the terrorist does not appear as such without the concurrent entrance of perversion,
deviance” (xxxii). Put simply, Goodrum writes, “In a genre where the protagonists are often seen
as ‘intent on retaining the status quo,’ as Matthew Wolf-Meyer argues, changing societal
structures is problematic,” maintaining the perverse deviance of the antagonist, who is likely a
queer villain (6). Villainy is a slippery affectation that identifies everything that the protagonist is
not, or is not reaching towards, which is usually a reward in the shape of money, fame, or an
attractive female trophy.
Gender and villainy is a fascinating study of power and inequality. While I group male
and female homosexuals together, women have long been removed from ideological conceptions
of villainy in ways that reflect the desires and affect of a patriarchal society. Even in the Malleus
Maleficarum, witches are not themselves demons, but are in the service of demons or the devil
and are at best, therefore, demonic. In the story of Adam and Eve, Eve is the not the villain, but
the recipient of a serpent’s treachery; Helen of Troy lacked the agency and therefore the capacity
of duplicitousness found in spy/courtesan/prostitute Mata Hari, whose danger to society and
nationhood is directly tied to her promiscuity; Princess Peach, in early iterations of the video
game Super Mario Brothers was devoid of agency—she neither aided in her kidnapping out of a
malicious boredom nor worked to aid in her own recovery. Her sole identity was “reward” for
Mario by virtue of the video game player. If unhappiness with the status quo of a patriarchal
society acts as a threshold for villainhood, why are there not hordes of villains, gendered female?
Ngai in Ugly Feelings writes:
Though both feminism and the patriarchal culture that is its constitutive outside
have played roles in strengthening the association between emotion and women,
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the weight placed on this association also creates nervousness, with “women’s
feelings” imagined as always easily prone to turning ugly. (33)
As owners or expressers of easily turned ugly feelings, women are a disaffected group in society.
However, the same patriarchal society has coded their feelings differently from that of villains, in
that patriarchal society removes women’s agency by making women objects of desire. In other
words, villains are unwanted. Women, as objects of desire, are precluded from joining most
villainous communities; even homosexual women, for whom it could be said stand as
competitors for heteronormative male audiences in the quest to “rescue the girl” have, through
the erasure of their agency within their own sexual desires, continue to act as an object of sexual
desire in spite of their sexual disinterest in heterosexual relations. Men are encouraged to find
lesbian porn sexually gratifying by removing the agency of the participants, who if given agency
might find this male interloping gaze sexually undesirable. Women have traditionally become
villainous through their lack of sexual appeal to a male audience. Their entrance to villainhood
has been marked by warts, poor posture, advanced age, greying hair. The object of their desire is
youth. Their villainy is made by a patriarchal society that values women who are young (i.e.
capable of childbirth) and devalues women who are old (i.e. no longer capable of producing
heirs). If society valued women for more than their physicality, then these hag-like witches
would not traverse the countryside poisoning princesses or stealing their voices or youthful
appearances to ensnare a male suitor. As such, there is a distinction between villains gendered
female and villains gendered male: a female villain is the opposite of a female “hero” in that she
is prepared to harm another woman, children, or small animals in order to achieve her ultimate
goal of continuing to be objectified for her physical attributes, whereas male villains range from
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competing with the hero to gain a female suitor’s hand, to the wanton destruction of society at
large. The spectrum of villainy is made more expansive for men.
Minority identities are another notable intersection with villainy in that they are more
easily conflated. The treatment of minority identities is synonymous with the treatment of
villains. A villain lives outside of the social structure, and therefore—like immigrants or
minority identities who have traveled to no longer be subjugated—are never really from “here,”
and carry with them the mark of a foreigner or outsider to the established society through
language or clothing and therefore continue to be subjugated. Neither heroes nor villains are
frequently presented with friends or family, but for very different reasons: heroes leave their
homes and families in search of adventure or find themselves parentless and that absence acts as
a catalyst and reasoning for beginning a hero’s journey, whereas villains arrive rejected from
their families, as the possibility of insult due to their identity is perpetually present. It is the same
emotional harm and possibility of insult that prevents villains from establishing long lasting
emotional connections with anyone—they are always alone, reinforcing the anomaly of their
unhappiness with the white heteronormative patriarchal society. To be black, therefore, is to be
policed more by society for expected villainous activity.
Villains act in a willful defiance to a white heteronormative patriarchal society; they
understand their own displacement by this society and instead of accepting their demoted status
in society, they use their ambitions to challenge it. Ignored until demanding to be seen, villains
represent a willfulness in a disaffected and forgotten group of society. Ahmed’s conception of an
actualized individual who resists patriarchal heteronormative structures is that of a feminist
killjoy. A feminist killjoy is in many ways villainous in that they are ostracized, deemed
unhappy, and work to change society in ways that do not benefit those already in power. While
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cisgendered heteronormative white men represent lawful goodness—as they are the ones whose
predecessors have written the laws and benefit the most directly from the perpetuity of those
laws—a feminist killjoy represents a neutral goodness or a true neutral affectation in that they
question the existence of these laws, and work to uphold equitable ones while simultaneously
working to dismantle the inequitable ones. A villain, however, represents a darker identity; they
are neutrally or chaotically evil, which is to say that they pursue evilness and their rational is not
always understood by the law abiding protagonist. They can be seen as beyond reason. Villains
are neither public nor private until they demand to be seen, announcing their presence, and when
they are seen they are dispossessed.
Villainy is not an identity that is created or bestowed overnight. A repetition of
disaffection is required to achieve the status of villain. Because laws in America were written by
white straight men to maintain power already held by white straight men, villains in the eyes of
the lawful are individuals who must circumvent or defy the laws written to oppress them in order
to live, to thrive or to survive. This ranges from acts of civil disobedience to those of malignant
and deadly intent. A sex worker is made villainous. Martin Luther King, Jr. is made villainous. A
woman who rebuffs a sexual advance is made villainous; a man who practices a non-Christian
religion can be made villainous—the list of identities who live outside of the systemic
protections afforded to the small ruling class is extensive, but this is historically not uncommon.
The ratio of slaves to slave owners in the antebellum Carolinas offers a small insight into this
ability. But what generally makes a villain is not one action, but rather a series of actions that are
unlawful; a lifetime of dedication to working against the systemic structures that benefit the
status quo perpetuated by a white patriarchy that has deemed itself lawful, just, and desirable. To
be a villain is to be experienced in nefarious deeds over time.
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A villain challenges the status quo. Understood as troublemakers, a villain demands a
change in society. Feminists quickly became villains at the end of the 20th Century in America by
demanding the structural overhaul of the American patriarchal society; so too did leaders of the
LGBTQIA+ movement, and leaders of the Civil Rights movement, because they required what
appeared to be the wanton destruction of a society engrained in a sexist, heteronormative, and
racist hierarchy that protected and uplifted the cisgendered white heterosexual man, who more
often than not finds himself to be the “knight in shining armor,” or the hero. Whether or not one
is prepared to read horror in this change often relates to how vested one is in the power attributed
to that hero compared to how much power that hero would have to relinquish or share
afterwards. Villainy, therefore, often depends on perspective, but is almost always identifiable by
a refusal to accept the society that has rejected them.
I use affect, gender, queer, trauma and postcolonial literary theorists to read The Talented
Mr. Ripley by Patricia Highsmith, Another Country by James Baldwin, Vanishing Rooms by
Melvin Dixon, My Friend Dahmer by Derf Backderf, 8-Bit Theater by Brian Clevinger, and My
Favorite Thing is Monsters by Emil Ferris. Queer and gender theorists have much to say about
the structures that continue to reinforce societal imbalances based on sex, gender, and sexuality; I
found their intersections with race, nationality, and spatial understandings indispensable. I also
analyze these readings with an affect theory lens; what becomes paramount with these villainous
characters is not who they are but how they are perceived by other characters. This difference is
that of affect. Didier Eribon’s Insult and the Making of the Gay Self examines the ways in which
alienating insults affect both homosexual and racial minority communities, leaving a lasting
effect on individuals’ lives. Eribon identifies the necessity for homosexuals to grapple with “the
closet,” or deciding whether or not to self-identify their sexuality to the people in their lives. By
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having this decision to make, with every passing stranger or acquaintance, homosexuals gain a
public perception of secrecy when they chose not to reveal their homosexuality—even though
they may risk physical harm by choosing to reveal their homosexuality—that moves them closer
to villainy. Sara Ahmed’s Living a Feminist Life illuminates the power structures surrounding
gender but also race and sexuality by showcasing the invisible structures of society that
inherently benefit some at the expense of others and incentivize some trajectories while
punishing others; an expert on affect, Sara Ahmed has made a career out of explaining the forces
between objects and the ways in which those forces create effects in society, known as affect,
writing “the unhappy queer is made unhappy by the world that reads queers as unhappy” (43).
By understanding the ways in which homosexuality is perceived, and by studying that
perception, Ahmed brings to light the implied structures of society and allows the reader to see
how heterosexuality can be rewarded and homosexuality punished. Lauren Berlant’s conception
of cruel optimism is vital in this work; cruel optimism is a desire or orientation towards a person
or object that is unhealthy because the person or object is unobtainable or will soon be lost. A
crush on someone who does not return those romantic feelings and who, it is known, would
never return those feelings would be a form of cruel optimism. Several characters in these
literary works develop those feelings for same-sex partners whose potential rejections cause
these characters murder them. Being attracted to individuals these characters already plan to kill
is a severe form of cruel optimism. Jasbir Puar’s Terrorist Assemblages examines the ways in
which national discourse enters these conceptions, particularly those of race and sexuality; her
examination of the queer terrorist in nation building rhetoric informs the way in which the
homosexual villain becomes characterized in literature. Ann Cvetkovich’s An Archive of
Feelings and Kathryn Bond Stockton’s Black Bottom, Black Shame create trauma informed

10
lenses with which to read characters and their presentation to others in the works and to the
reader themselves, as does W. J. T. Mitchell’s Picture Theory prove fruitful in locating the slave
narrative in the American consciousness. Adrienne Rich, Eve Kofosky Sedgewick, and Judith
Butler’s ideological contributions have shaped this work in ways explicit and implicit.
In Chapter 1, I examine the conflation of homosexuality and villainy in Patricia
Highsmith’s novel The Talented Mr. Ripley and the films the novel later inspired, Purple Noon
directed by René Clément and The Talented Mr. Ripley directed by Anthony Minghella.
Highsmith’s novel follows Tom Ripley as he lands in Europe under false pretenses with the
mission to bring Dickie Greenleaf back to the United States, but due to his homosocial desire for
Dickie represented in his cruelly optimistic attachment for him, he murders him instead and
attempts to assume his identity. The films that follow the novel struggle with ways to represent
Tom’s and Dickie’s sexuality on camera—Clément heterosexualizes Tom’s desire, while
Minghella does not. Highsmith, homosexual herself, conflates Tom’s homosexuality with his
villainous activities. Tom’s homosexuality does not self-actualize; rather he remains in a sphere
of homosocial desire, illuminating Eribon’s statement that, “it is an insurmountable paradox: the
gay man who decides to speak openly leaves himself open to ironic remarks or condescension, or
sometimes to rebuffs, whereas the gay man who prefers to remain silent finds himself in an
uncomfortable, impossible situation” (54). Highsmith invites the reader to acknowledge Tom’s
villainy but to also sympathize with him—a challenge that left Clément and Minghella searching
for ways to make Dickie unsympathetic.
In Chapter 2, I examine race and sexuality in James Baldwin’s Another Country as well
as Melvin Dixon’s Vanishing Rooms. Baldwin’s novel examines Rufus’ rejection from society,
which he in turn internalizes and turns to suicide, marking the focal point around which other
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characters, Ida, Vivaldo, Eric, and Cass, navigate. Baldwin highlights racial, gender, and sexual
power structures that privilege some while insulting others, leading to precarious outcomes for
those at the bottom of the power structure. Dixon’s novel acts as a response to Baldwin’s. Set
more than a decade later, Dixon reexamines the intersections of race, gender, and sexuality only
to discover that the same forms of structures and structure sanctioned violence remained in spite
of hard won social equality advancements. The novel follows an interracial homosexual couple,
Jesse and Metro, as well as Jesse’s friend and dance partner Ruella as they absorb and never truly
relinquish the insults affronted them by others in power. Baldwin and Dixon further exemplify
the ways in which constructions of public and private spaces continue to benefit identities that
are above insult, namely whiteness, maleness, and heterosexuality, leading characters who are
incapable of accessing these realms of power into a willfulness that further alienates them from
societal acceptance. Due to the nature of insults and the ability to be insulted, the conflation of
villainy and homosexuality essentially remains.
In Chapter 3, I examine the separation of homosexuality and villainy in three graphic
narratives: My Friend Dahmer by Derf Backderf, 8-Bit Theater by Brian Clevinger, and My
Favorite Thing is Monsters by Emil Ferris. With these three graphic narratives, readers can
pinpoint the authors’ grappling with the trope of conflating homosexuality and villainy and these
authors attempt with varying degrees of success to separate them. This chapter shows that this
literary trope is so powerful that it transcends medium boundaries. My Friend Dahmer by
Backderf recounts his high school years with serial killer and homosexual Jeffrey Dahmer,
providing Backderf ample opportunity to conflate homosexuality with villainy—Backderf
attempts to separate them, however he continues to show that the society Dahmer is raised in
remains staunchly homophobic. That homophobia encouraged heterosexuality and made
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homosexuality punishable by violence. For Dahmer, learning and exhibiting that violence against
homosexuals becomes not only possible but also sanctioned. Backderf claims that Dahmer’s
homosexuality is not what makes him kill, but Backderf overlooks the compulsory
heterosexuality that encouraged the cruel optimism that Dahmer associates with his own
sexuality. Homosexuality is not why Dahmer kills, Backderf argues, but Backderf does not offer
any other explanation. I argue that an unexamined reason is homosexuality’s affect; Dahmer’s
same-sex attraction, which is horrendous in his strictly heterosexual society, causes him to kill
the objects of his affection. In the interests of Chapter 3, only the first 200 episodes of webcomic
8-Bit Theater by Clevinger are examined. In 8-Bit Theater, video game monsters erode the vice
associated with villainy before the reader is introduced to homosexual villain Garland, whose
evil plans are substantially more considerate than malevolent, creating an atmosphere of farce.
Clevinger fills the conflict in the plot with evil intent by the kidnapped Princess Sara, who
exhibits an active and dynamic role in opposition to the objectified heterosexual reward
princesses video games had presented for years; Hemovich writes, “gender stereotyping and
misogynistic undertones have a long-standing tradition in video game culture,” which Clevinger
sets about challenging (207). By displaying an overtly homosexual yet ineffectual villain,
Clevinger further chips away at the ideological conflation of the two, while also elevating an
intelligent and purposefully malicious female villain who fights patriarchy rather than
heteronormativity. Finally, My Favorite Thing is Monsters by Ferris examines a homosexual
protagonist who—along with some other main characters in the work—are graphically depicted
as anthropomorphized monsters, demanding that the reader reexamine stereotypes of monster
creatures and the roles that they play in society’s imaginary. Providing the reader with a
homosexual protagonist who nevertheless exhibits villainous and monstruous features allows
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readers to question the ways in which these various roles and identities orient themselves
towards and away from each other. In Ferris’ work, I also examine a secondary character who is
also homosexual and who is depicted as a longstanding homoeroticized monster, Frankenstein.
The literary works in this chapter challenge the conflation of villainy and homosexuality by
complicating understandings of villainy and by introducing elements of monstrosity, which echo
the statelessness of villains by including the physical human body. Chapter 3 invites questions of
a villain’s otherness to not only be national but to also be physical.
In Chapter 4, I examine setting and homosexuality in films To Wong Foo, Thanks for
Everything, Julie Newmar; Priscilla, Queen of the Desert; and Boys on the Side, as well as
homosexual villainy in Disney films The Little Mermaid, Aladdin, and 101 Dalmatians. I
consider the role of the auteur and how this older ideology benefits queer identifications of films,
but does not prevent queer readings of films, which I have preferred throughout this work in
relation to films (e.g., Purple Noon, The Talented Mr. Ripley, and My Friend Dahmer) and print.
Then I examine homosexual migrations to urbanscapes—Eribon reminds us that, “the city was
always considered by conservative discourse as an exemplary place of perdition, the cauldron of
sexual freedom, and thus of the corruption of bodies and souls”—and how this creates cinematic
conflict by taking homosexuals out of the city and interacting with more conservative
communities in what have been referred to as “road trip” films (43). Finally, I examine the
association of heterosexuality with nature and natural interactions as well as its supernatural
occurrences that propel the plot in Disney films, and the overperformance of gender in villains
that lends to their homosexual readings. The overt representation of heteroromantic desire in
films that are publicly presented as lacking sexuality speaks to Lauren Berlant’s public/private
heterosexual division examined in depth in Chapter 2; Martin and Kazyak write of Disney
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characters, “[they] frequently defy their parents, their culture, or their very selves to embrace a
hetero-romantic love that is transformative, powerful, and (literally) magical. At the same time,
these accounts are sometimes held in tension with or constructed by understandings of the
naturalness of heterosexuality” (324).
My work is meant to highlight the ways in which homosexuality has been vilified
throughout the 20th Century in order to inform the reader of contemporary tropes that may seek
to perpetuate this conflation. Understanding the way(s) in which a culture discourages
homosexuality arms readers with a capacity to question or challenge narratives that perpetuate
this conflation. Maahen Ahmed writes, “monsters have an unprecedently strong presence in
contemporary life, with fictional and real monsters (usually humans engaging in monstrous acts
such as serial killing […]) being prominent in the media, permeating public discourse as well as
culture,” and although homosexuality is no longer considered monstruous by a larger percentage
of the American nation, those ties occasionally remain (5). Puar writes, “Hate crimes against
gays and lesbians are still rationalized through these very same terms: is not the expression of ‘a
socially appropriate emotion in socially inappropriate ways’ the crux of the ‘gay panic’
defense?” to which one must ask, what is a socially appropriate emotion to homosexuals (45)?
How does affect effect them? Villains are people too, and should come from a range of identity
markers; however, when a villain continues to be overrepresented with an identity marker, it
becomes a cultural question of why.
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1. Sexuality and Villainy in Patricia Highsmith’s The Talented Mr.
Ripley

Every gay man starts off learning to lie. – Didier Eribon

The Talented Mr. Ripley by Patricia Highsmith, published in 1955, is a novel that epitomizes the
conflation of homosexuality and villainy. It remains unclear to readers whether Tom Ripley is
villainous because he is harboring the secret of his homosexuality. Highsmith’s novel is a
psychological thriller where Tom Ripley poses as a friend of Dickie Greenleaf to receive funds
to travel to Europe to bring Dickie back to his parents in America, Tom’s homosexuality and
homoerotic attraction to Dickie and Dickie’s lavish lifestyle derail this simple mission, causing
Tom to murder Dickie and assume his identity. In this chapter, I perform close readings of
Highsmith’s novel to examine the ways in which gender fatalism, homosocial desire, and cruel
optimism permeate the text. Gender fatalism, or the projected outcome of an individual based on
their gender identity, allows Tom and Dickie a freedom, safety, and credibility that is denied to
Dickie’s love interest, Marge. Homosocial desire, or a deep albeit not necessarily sexual
attraction to a person of the same gender, allows Tom more space to hide his homosexual
attraction to Dickie; and cruel optimism, or an attraction to a person or object that can never be
healthily achieved or maintained explains Tom’s motive for murdering and assuming Dickie’s
identity. These concepts reverberate and echo into two film remakes of the novel, Purple Noon
(also known as Plein Soleil) directed by René Clément in 1960 and The Talented Mr. Ripley
directed by Anthony Minghella in 1999. Clément’s film attempts to omit Tom’s homosexuality
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entirely, but in so doing increases the homosocial desire between Tom and Dickie, while
Minghella’s film portrays a Tom whose cruel optimism is homosexual desire, thereby moving
closer to the novel and to the conflation of homosexuality and villainy.

Flowers and Mirrors: Surfacings of Tom’s Homosexuality
The scenes wherein Dickie confronts Tom about his homosexuality demonstrate Tom’s
positionality as an outsider who may lose his connection to Dickie if he is honest about his
attractions. Attaching Tom’s homosexuality to the dangers of disownment, Highsmith presents a
Tom aligned with queer villainy whose feelings of shame and rejection may overcome him and
become feelings more severe than guilt caused by homicide. A close reading of Dickie catching
Tom wearing his clothing is one scene that examines affect, gesture, and cruel optimism in a way
that positions Tom as wanting Dickie even though this desire is dangerous and leads to Dickie’s
eventual death. Highsmith writes:
He went up to Dickie’s room and paced around for a few moments, his hands in
his pockets. He wondered when Dickie was coming back? Or was he going to
stay and make an afternoon of it, really take her to bed with him? He jerked
Dickie’s closet door open and looked in. There was a freshly pressed, newlooking grey flannel suit that he had never seen Dickie wearing. Tom took it out.
He took off his knee-length shorts and put on the grey flannel trousers. He put on
a pair of Dickie’s shoes. Then he opened the bottom drawer of the chest and took
out a clean blue-and-white striped shirt.
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He chose a dark-blue silk tie and knotted it carefully. The suit fitted him.
He re-parted his hair and put the part a little more to one side, the way Dickie
wore his. (78)
The reader sees Tom’s obsession with Dickie, and as Dickie is unavailable and unobtainable,
Tom reaches into Dickie’s closet not for Dickie’s most commonly worn items, but for a freshly
pressed, new-looking suit and clean shirt out of the bottom drawer. Tom is imitating Dickie, in
this passage, but more meaningfully he is caricaturizing him through a mimicking gestural and
sartorial proximity. Highsmith continues:
“Marge, you must understand that I don’t love you,” Tom said into the
mirror in Dickie’s voice, with Dickie’s higher pitch on the emphasized words,
with the little growl in his throat at the end of the phrase that could be pleasant or
unpleasant, intimate or cool, according to Dickie’s mood. “Marge, stop it!” Tom
turned suddenly and made a grab in the air as if he were seizing Marge’s throat.
He shook her, twisted her, while she sank lower and lower, until at last he left her,
limp, on the floor. He was panting. He wiped his forehead the way Dickie did,
reached for a handkerchief and, not finding any, got one from Dickie’s top
drawer, then resumed in front of the mirror. Even his parted lips looked like
Dickie’s lips when he was out of breath from swimming, drawn down a little from
his lower teeth. “You know why I had to do that,” he said, still breathlessly,
addressing Marge, though he watched himself in the mirror. “You were
interfering between Tom and me—No, not that! But there is a bond between us!”
He turned, stepped over the imaginary body, and went stealthily to the
window. He could see, beyond the bend of the road, the blurred slant of the steps
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that went up to Marge’s house level. Dickie was not on the steps or on the parts of
the road that he could see. Maybe they were sleeping together, Tom thought with
a tighter twist of disgust in his throat. He imagined it, awkward, clumsy,
unsatisfactory for Dickie, and Marge loving it. She’d love it even if he tortured
her! (78-9)
This scene is an apex in this novel. Perhaps this allows Tom to enter the fantasy which follows:
to end Dickie’s relationship with Marge—to end Marge’s actual existence—and reaffirm
Dickie’s relationship with Tom. In Highsmith’s novel, Tom wants Marge dead, in this
imaginary, and he wants her to know before she passes that Dickie does not love her. Further, her
death at the imagined hands of Dickie absolves Dickie of her demise; “you know why I had to do
that,” Tom gestures in Dickie’s likeness, removing blame from Dickie and placing it onto Marge
in one swift movement of gender fatalism—reexamined later in this chapter—because of
Marge’s identity and positionality as a woman in a patriarchal society, her death by Dickie would
be her fault for not maintaining his emotional wellbeing and happiness. (It must be said, to the
imagined satisfaction of Tom). Through Tom’s perspective, Marge’s existence revolves entirely
around Dickie’s, and therefore Tom feels comfortable gesturing her death as he pretends to be
Dickie. Gibbs writes:
Gesture, then, is “a ‘material carrier’ that helps bring meaning into existence.” So
sympathetic modes of communication not only persist alongside linguistic modes:
they also inhabit and actively shape them. These are not rudimentary, infantile, or
so-called primitive modes of communication: rather, they are the essential
prerequisites for, and working collaborators with, verbal communication. They
are not noise in the system: they are part and parcel of it. (Gibbs 199)
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Tom coopts Dickie’s gestures as a part of his verbal communication to himself, in which he
plays both parts—Dickie the speaker, and Tom the audience—in order to hear what he wants
Dickie to say and to see what he wants Dickie to do, which includes the insult and erasure of
Dickie’s love interest, Marge.
Tom’s wearing of Dickie’s clothing demonstrates a complex, psychological attachment
that simultaneously pleases and displeases himself. Tom’s private theatrics exhibit his true
desires, and suggest his inability to achieve them. Highsmith continues:
Tom darted back to the closet again and took a hat from the top shelf. It was a
little grey Tyrolian hat with a green-and-white feather in the brim. He put it on
rakishly. It surprised him how much he looked like Dickie with the top part of his
head covered. Really it was only his darker hair that was very different from
Dickie. Otherwise, his nose—or at least its general form—his narrow jaw, his
eyebrows if he held them right—
“What are you doing?”
Tom whirled around. Dickie was in the doorway. (79)
As Tom reaches for Dickie’s clothing, one must consider Ahmed’s words, “to experience an
object as being affective or sensational is to be directed not only toward an object, but to
‘whatever’ is around that object, which includes what is behind the object, the conditions of its
arrival. What is around an object can become happy,” which presents an understanding of Tom’s
obsession with Dickie’s things (“Happy Objects” 33). Tom does not want Dickie’s signet ring or
his shirts or his shoes or his hat because they signify wealth or because Tom is a kleptomaniac
who desires to own or store objects for the sake of owning or storing objects; Tom’s desire
towards these items represents the conduction through the items’ proximity to Dickie, which in
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turn makes acquiring of those objects a happy occurrence. Dickie is a source or object of
happiness for Tom, and in Dickie’s absence, Tom orients himself to whatever is around Dickie—
rather notably, Dickie’s clothing. Tom’s imitation of Dickie through wearing his clothing brings
him even closer to filling the absence left by Dickie; Stockton writes:
Cloth and skin touch on each other’s meanings since each is a surface—with an
intense, complex, and variable coding attached to it—that may be the object of
prejudice, violence, attraction, and invective. Each may be physically marked
with a wound (torn cloth, torn skin) and each can elicit psychic wounds (selfloathing, for example) because of the shame it seems to carry. Each can also, in
certain contexts, elicit pride—or sexual attraction and aesthetic delight. That is,
there is beauty. (40)
Dickie’s clothing is neither torn nor tattered, but is pristine and unworn, suggesting an intact
wholesomeness or pride that Tom is lacking and seeks to complete through this action of
metamorphosis. Dickie’s clothing may be read as beautiful to Tom, whose attraction to Dickie
spills out onto his belongings. Tom “loved possessions, not masses of them, but a select few that
he did not part with. They gave a man self-respect,” Highsmith offers, making clear that Tom
receives feelings (here, of self-esteem) from objects (249). Shannon writes, “Tom’s desire for
objects transcends simple avarice, taking the form of a fetishism that defines his very sense of
self. As soon as he has Dickie’s things, he gladly engages in the ‘annihilation’ of Tom Ripley.
His own personality is less significant to him than that which he finds in Dickie’s possessions”
(24). Tom does not explicitly desire objects that move him closer to wealth; he desires objects
that explicitly move him closer to Dickie and further away from himself. Gibbs writes, “mimicry
may represent the desire to disguise what one is (an animal avoids its predators; an Internet
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predator pretends to be a teenager), or the desire to become something else (a human infant
identifies with its parents). It can mean either homage or hostility; it might signify sympathy,
seduction, deception, defense, or aggression” (193). In the case of Tom, all of Gibbs’ suggestions
appear as truths in an iridescence of emotions; Tom sympathizes with, seduces, and deceives
Dickie. He is defensive of Dickie and defensive towards Dickie. Tom wishes to disguise himself
and develop a new identity as close to Dickie’s as possible—so close that no one may tell the
difference—suggesting the happiness of Dickie’s persona and the unhappiness of Tom’s.
Shannon writes, “Tom’s sexual longing is reserved for the objects he associates with Dickie and
an American dream he feels has been denied him; these objects fulfill his need for love,
friendship, and personal identity” (26). However, this longing is inherently futile; Ahmed
cautions, “happiness can arrive in a moment and be lost by virtue of its recognition” (“Happy
Objects” 33). Tom sees a version of Dickie in the mirror, and this pleases him, but it must
simultaneously displease him as he lives with the fact that he is not, nor will ever be Dickie—a
fact that he attempts to challenge by subsuming Dickie’s identity—and he alone, in his own
clothing representing himself and his own identity, is not (and cannot become, in this
(heterosexual) society) reason enough for happiness. Tom cannot be happy with himself or his
life, so he reaches for Dickie’s and acts like someone else, only to discover that this reaching
exacerbates the unhappiness Tom feels with himself because it is a reaching for something that
does not belong to him and will not accept him. Berlant refers to this phenomenon as “cruel
optimism.” Berlant writes:
“Cruel optimism” names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of
possibility whose realization is discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy,
or too possible, and toxic. What’s cruel about these attachments, and not merely
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inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well
endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence
threatens their well-being; because whatever the content of the attachment is, the
continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject’s
sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the
world. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which
is enacted in the subject’s desire to temporize an experience of the loss of an
object or scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. Cruel optimism
is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object in advance
of its loss. (94)
Tom’s obsession with Dickie may be defined as cruel optimism because Dickie would not have
entertained Tom’s advances provided his (hetero)sexuality and relationship with Marge, and in
the event that he would have entertained Tom’s advances, no overt relationship would have been
possible while Dickie continued to entertain Marge. At best, Dickie would have offered Tom a
covert affair; an unfulfilled relationship ripe with shame, which would have been toxic for Tom,
Dickie, and Marge. In Dickie’s murder, Tom maintains a clear and problematic attachment in
advance of Dickie’s death, maintained even after the event—the thrill of The Talented Mr. Ripley
is not in Dickie’s murder but in how long it will take for Tom to be caught, if ever. Shannon
writes, “Tom ends the novel, not in the ‘nightmare’ Minghella’s stage directions indicate, but
‘not suspected at all’ and even convinces the Greenleaf family to accept him as Dickie’s heir,”
noting that this shift makes Highsmith’s novel in a particular way more avante-garde than
Minghella’s eponymous 1999 film (21). Even within Tom’s imagination when he is caught
dressing up as Dickie, their attachment is cruelly optimistic as Tom cannot imagine a social
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situation imaginary or otherwise in which Dickie openly promotes their homosexual relationship;
Tom, as Dickie, exclaims to Marge, “No, not that! But there is a bond between us,” in reference
to homosexuality (Highsmith 79). Instead, Tom—who is controlling the narrative—offers Dickie
verbiage to suggest the impossible, the sheer fantasy, and the toxic possibility of their
relationship as an emphatic, yet unnamable bond. This scene of Tom wearing Dickie’s clothing
in a mimicking gesture meant to soothe Tom’s rejection as Dickie abandons him to spend time
with Marge doing unspeakable things in Tom’s mind leads to the surfacing Tom’s cruel
optimism of Dickie.
This scene carries with it an additional sociocultural layer of homosexual villainy in
Tom’s subsummation of Dickie’s persona. By toxically identifying as Dickie, Tom spearheads a
legacy of homosexual, parasitic maladaptives in American culture, whose sociopathy in using,
consuming, or discarding American men highlight their threat to society. Hannibal Lecter, in the
1991 five-time Oscar award winning film Silence of the Lambs, is another homosexual murderer
who, in describing another homosexual murderer to an aspiring female investigator, states, “we
begin by coveting what we see every day.” The homosexual characters in Silence of the Lambs
and Tom in The Talented Mr. Ripley exhibit cruel optimism in their desire to transform into
someone else. This transformation may appear logical or natural for the homosexual, as when
Alison Bechdel covets the gestures of a lesbian in a diner when she is still a child in the graphic
memoir Fun Home but toxic to conforming to a heterosexual society, which is Bechdel’s father’s
wish for her. Gibbs writes, “mimetic knowledge may be the earliest form of knowledge of both
self and other, as the infant researchers Meltzoff and Moore suggest, and this is a knowledge
made possible by the work of feeling,” which is only alluded to by Tom through the insulting
relative Aunt Dottie; rather, Tom is purposefully obscure about his childhood which is a
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necessity for his grift to work, but mimetic knowledge allows Tom to hide his true feelings, for a
time (196). The reader establishes Tom’s feelings through his mimetic knowledge and the
pensive, pansy, pensée of Highsmith’s third person close narration of Tom.
The secret of Tom’s homosexuality is a significant driver to Tom’s motives in The
Talented Mr. Ripley. Because Tom cannot be public with his homosexuality, the energy he
commits to hiding this part of his identity consumes him, and the moments in which he fails to
hide his homosexuality cause anger and bitterness in him. Eribon writes, “in any case, one thing
that characterizes a gay man is that he is a person who, one day or another, is confronted by a
decision to tell or not to tell what he is. A heterosexual man will not need to do this, being
presupposed by the world to be what he is,” summating a primary difference between
homosexuals and heterosexuals in a society that privileges heterosexuality and discourages
homosexuality; heterosexuals may arrive in a novel, film, or into a room without the burden of a
secret whose exposure may result in physical violence or ostracization, or with a requirement of
proof of their identity (52). Ahmed writes, “when you are heterosexual you might not be asked to
explain how you became heterosexual. When you come out as lesbian, gay, or bisexual, you
might be asked to give an account of yourself,” illustrating the ease of heterosexual living as
compared to the perpetual questioning habitual to homosexuality in a heterosexual culture
(Living 121). Ahmed furthers this point when she writes, “Gill Valentine shows how the
‘heterosexualisation’ of public spaces such as streets is naturalized by the repetition of different
forms of heterosexual conduct (images on billboards, music played, displays of heterosexual
intimacy, etc.), a process that often goes unnoticed by heterosexual subjects,” demonstrating a
heterosexualizing of public spaces, which permeates into private spaces (Living 123). When Tom
is discovered in Dickie’s clothing, a transgression that speaks to his homosexual attraction to
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Dickie in the privacy of Dickie’s dressing room, Dickie’s response is embedded in the notion
that homosexuality may not be tolerated in private spaces as well. Eribon continues, “let us go
even a bit further. The gay man who is obliged (or who chooses) to attempt to hide what he is
can never be sure that the person from whom he is hiding this ‘secret’ does not know it anyway,
or at least suspect it, while pretending to know nothing,” suggesting that the dangerous secret of
one’s homosexuality is not only at perpetual risk of becoming known, but that it may already
have been surmised (53). This causes a homosexual who maintains the masquerade of
heterosexuality to hold on to this masquerade even if its ruse has fooled no one but the
homosexual themself, consequently internalizing their denial of their own identity. Immediately
after Dickie has caught Tom in his clothes, Tom moves to confront Dickie to smooth over their
relationship. Dickie, just as within his death scene on the Pipistrello, is in a state of undress and
wishes Tom to copy him. Highsmith writes:
“Dickie, I’m sorry if it—”
The violent slam of the door cut him off. Dickie began opening his shirt
scowling, just as he would have if Tom had not been there, because this was his
room, and what was Tom doing in it? Tom stood petrified with fear.
“I wish you’d get out my clothes,” Dickie said.
Tom started undressing, his fingers clumsy with his mortification, his
shock, because up until now Dickie had always said wear this and wear that that
belonged to him. Dickie would never say it again.
Dickie looked at Tom’s feet. “Shoes, too? Are you crazy?”
“No.” Tom tried to pull himself together as he hung up the suit, then he
asked, “Did you make it up with Marge?”
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“Marge and I are fine,” Dickie snapped in a way that shut Tom out from
them. “Another thing I want to say, but clearly,” he said, looking at Tom, “I’m not
queer. I don’t know if you have the idea that I am or not.”
“Queer?” Tom smiled faintly. “I never thought you were queer.”
Dickie started to say something else, and didn’t. He straightened up, the
ribs showing in his dark chest. “Well, Marge thinks you are.”
“Why?” Tom felt the blood go out of his face. He kicked off Dickie’s
second shoe feebly, and set the pair in the closet. “Why should she? What’ve I
ever done?” He felt faint. Nobody ever said it outright to him, not in this way.
“It’s just the way you act,” Dickie said in a growling tone, and went out of
the door. (79-80)
This scene reaffirms the readers’ questioning of Tom’s heterosexuality—“nobody ever it said it
outright to him, not in this way”—by underlining the frequency of the suspicions, and it is the
moment in the novel in which Tom is made aware that he has been outed. The “outing,” or
revealing of Tom’s homosexuality, is as significant of a moment if not more than Tom’s
exposure mimicking Dickie. Tom’s most closely guarded secret is now made explicit; he does
not deny it, but is desperate to understand what gave this secret away. Trask writes, “Tom does
not readily grasp that acting itself connotes queerness […]. Acting in general is inseparable from
queerness, Highsmith implies,” reminding the reader that, in a white heteronormative patriarchal
society, any effort towards announcing whiteness, straightness, or maleness is already an
admission of absence; straight men do not have closets from which to be outed and therefore
have no clear reason to act (604). This is why Dickie can embody such nonchalance so as to
appear nearly asexual in the novel; Straayer writes, “it must be noted that Greenleaf’s
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heterosexuality is subdued in the novel, so much so that it remains in question. That Greenleaf is
very private about his (hetero)sexuality, that he is latently homosexual, and that he is nearly
asexual are all plausible conclusions” (121). The danger of Tom’s homosexuality is not within
the homosexuality itself, but in others’ reactions towards it, including Dickie. Eribon writes,
“mistakes can have painful consequences. The experience of physical violence or the obsessive
awareness of its threat are so common in gay lives that they are mentioned in almost every
autobiography and in numerous novels with gay male characters,” highlighting what is at stake
for homosexual characters who cannot successfully hide their identity, or expend the continuous
emotional or intellectual energy required to understand whether or not their homosexuality is
known or has been discovered, and whether that revelation decreases their safety, at any given
moment (18). Soloman, writing of women who cross dress as men—also known as butches—
states:
Making aggression or toughness or chivalry or rebelliousness their histrionic own,
butches reveal the arbitrariness with which traits are said to belong to men. Rather
than copying some “original” image of masculinity, butches point to the
embarrassing fact that there is no such thing; masculinity is an artifice no matter
who performs it. (37)
While Tom is gendered male, his sexuality is different than Dickie’s, and his dressing as Dickie
reminds him that his affluent and privileged (heterosexual) lifestyle is an artifice. Dickie begins
by reifying his heterosexuality, and after Tom affirms it, Dickie accuses Tom of homosexuality
through a third party and exits the room after growling at him, creating for homosexual readers a
Chekov’s Gun that would foretell of violence later in the novel. Now that Tom’s secret about his
homosexuality is out, the real threat has been announced, creating a secondary subplot thrill
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throughout Highsmith’s novel of when or if Tom will be publicly discovered. Highsmith
maintains those consequences, but subverts the danger so that it is Dickie who ultimately
becomes the victim of violence; Tom shoots first. Tom is not a white, heterosexual man, but is
rather a white, homosexual man and therefore lacks the total privilege in society that is inherent
in Dickie, who may claim all three markers of societal influence. When Tom imagines himself as
Dickie killing Marge, he explains to her why she needs to die, but he watches himself when he is
addressing her. The violence he imagines inflicting upon her is similarly the violence he inflicts
upon himself, or is aware subconsciously that he may be or might become an identical victim of
Dickie’s whims. However, he cannot admit to himself or even fathom an imaginary in which he
and Dickie may be open about their homosexuality to a third party. Tom’s necessary lies about
his homosexuality in order to navigate a heterosexual world extend to his own psyche. The idea
of homosexuality is so abhorrent to Tom that he will not even allow himself to think it, in the
privacy of his thoughts. Instead, what exists in his imaginary is Dickie sleeping with Marge;
heterosexuality can be imagined in the privacy of his thoughts, whereas homosexuality cannot
(Highsmith 79). And in this menagerie, Dickie is unpleasable and Marge accepting of anything,
further emphasizing the patriarchal divide in which Dickie has the availability of displeasure—
the power to be displeased—in a sexual congress with Marge, again, heightened in the films in a
way that is obscured in the novel. This toxic thought within this toxic imagination that is a result
of the cruel optimism of Tom’s obsession with Dickie is too much to bear for Tom, and he
returns to his mimicry. Highsmith creates a pomp and circumstance in which Tom is now
wearing feathered attire in his preening and peacocking game of mimicking Dickie.
In fact, the mirroring of Tom and Dickie presents itself earlier in the novel. Tom becomes
aware of how alike he and Dickie could be before this pivotal scene. After meeting Freddie,
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whom Tom finds physically hideous, but while still galivanting around Rome, Highsmith
introduces the similarity of Tom and Dickie as though one were viewing a reflection of themself
in the other; Highsmith writes:
They sat slumped in the carrozza, each with a sandalled food propped on a knee,
and it seemed to Tom that he was looking in a mirror when he looked at Dickie’s
leg and his propped foot beside him. They were the same height, and very much
the same weight, Dickie perhaps a bit heavier, and they wore the same size
bathrobe, socks, and probably shirts.
Dickie even said, “Thank you, Mr. Greenleaf,” when Tom paid the
carrozza driver. Tom felt a little weird. (63; 67)
Dickie, acknowledging the likeness that Tom bears in resemblance to himself, makes Tom feel
“a little weird,” and readers are once more left to speculate about the source of that weirdness:
flattery, sarcastic jest, or a penetrative understanding of Tom’s capacity to assume other’s
identities. Greven, considering masculinity in film, writes:
One of the most interesting consequences of the double-protagonist split is the
positioning of one apparently normative male character as a diegetic spectator of
male beauty who, as the audience surrogate, is also a symbolic spectator. The
alternate protagonist—in his pining for the main protagonist and in the manner in
which he chafes against male dominion, often figured as the main protagonist’s
heady display of narcissistic omnipotence and concomitant efforts to maintain this
reign—occupies the position of repressed homosexual voyeur, as Paul Willemen
and Steven Neale put it. (33-4)
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The similarity is applicable in Highsmith’s text between Dickie, the normative male character,
and Tom, the diegetic spectator of male beauty—“perhaps a bit heavier”—and repressed
homosexual voyeur, in contrast to Freddie in whom Tom may find no beauty. Highsmith writes,
“Tom thought he was hideous. Tom hated red hair, especially this kind of carrot-red hair with
white skin and freckles. […] He was also overweight,” all of which Tom takes in while Freddie
is discussing skiing with Dickie in the Italian alps, which readers may understand as Tom’s
physical homosexual repulsion towards Freddie—finding him sexually unattractive—or as a
furthering of Tom’s jealousness of Dickie’s life; Dickie’s easy friendships and the trips to the
Alps that his affluence can so easily provide (63-4). Tom is attracted to Dickie, whom he is able
to mirror, but repulsed by Freddie, whom he may not. Straayer writes, “According to Purple
Noon [also known as Plein Soleil], class is natural and unchangeable, located in certain people,
not in their possessions,” of which Freddie has none in neither films nor novel (118). Freddie has
little or no possessions and he appears to have no class, to Tom, in spite of his affluence. “Even
though Tom obtains Greenleaf’s money,” Straayer continues, “he can never assume his class.
Hence the novel and film produce different discourses about both class identity and (repressed)
homosexuality” (118). However, Tom’s attraction to materials remain dependent upon the
person(s) whom possess them and not the reverse. Tom is attracted to Dickie’s items because
they remind him of Dickie, who by proxy remind Tom of himself.
In a scene laden with Tom’s shame and Dickie’s intellectual and conservative
upbringing, Tom confirms his homosexuality in a public space by his attraction to men who have
very little material possessions at all. By creating a setting in which a group of men may see and
be seen—particularly with Tom as object and voyeur—with Dickie as witness to it all,
Highsmith allows a multiplicity of identities, societal expectations, and affectations to surface.
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Tom and Dickie have left Italy for a quick getaway, boarding a train to Cannes, France at the
request of Tom, where they are on the beach together watching an acrobatic practice the
following morning. Highsmith writes:
“They must be professionals,” Tom said. “They’re all in the same yellow Gstrings.”
Tom watched with interest as a human pyramid began building, feet
braced on bulging thighs, hands gripping forearms. He could hear their “Allez!”
and their “Un – deux!”
“Look!” Tom said. “There goes the top!” He stood still to watch the
smallest one, a boy of about seventeen, as he was boosted to the shoulders of the
center man in the three top men. He stood poised, his arms open, as if receiving
applause. “Bravo!” Tom shouted.
The boy smiled at Tom before he leapt down, lithe as a tiger.
Tom looked at Dickie. Dickie was looking at a couple of men sitting
nearby on the beach.
“Ten thousand saw I at a glance, nodding their heads in sprightly dance,”
Dickie said sourly to Tom.
It startled Tom, then he felt that sharp thrust of shame, the same shame he
had felt in Mongibello when Dickie had said, Marge thinks you are. All right,
Tom thought, the acrobats were fairies. Maybe Cannes was full of fairies. So
what? Tom’s fists were clenched tight in his trousers pockets. He remembered
Aunt Dottie’s taunt: Sissy! He’s a sissy from the ground up. Just like his father!
Dickie stood with his arms folded, looking out at the ocean. Tom deliberately kept
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himself from even glancing at the acrobats again, though they were certainly more
amusing to watch than the ocean. “Are you going in?” Tom asked, boldly
unbuttoning his shirt, though the water suddenly looked cold as hell.
“I don’t think so,” Dickie said. “Why don’t you stay here and watch the
acrobats? I’m going back.” He turned and started back before Tom could answer.
Tom buttoned his clothes hastily, watching Dickie as he walked
diagonally away, away from the acrobats, though the next stairs up to the
sidewalk were twice as far as the stairs nearer the acrobats. Damn him anyway,
Tom thought. Did he have to act so damned aloof and superior all the time?
You’d think he’d never seen a pansy! (98-9)
Tom begins by noting the clothing of the acrobats, and to himself takes stock of their physical
attributes. Enamored with their feat, he commends them, which catches their attention, and they
reciprocate. Dickie, whose ideological perception of Tom has shifted so that he now resees what
Tom sees through an overt homosexual lens, views Tom applauding foreign men in scant
clothing, and as Dickie further includes in this panorama men who are sitting grouped together
nearby, assumes the entire scene to have the affect of homosexuality. It becomes clear that
Dickie detests homosexuals, and he sours at their public display; it also becomes clear that Tom
has internalized the disgust that Dickie displays towards the men at the beach and the acrobats
and applies it to how Dickie envisions himself—if Dickie is to act derisively towards these men,
then so too will he act derisively towards Tom if and when Tom is ready to identify himself as a
homosexual to Dickie. What further complicates this passage is that, in defense of his own
homosexuality, Tom argues to himself that it is Dickie’s aloofness and superiority that force him
to disavow homosexuality, thereby equating homosexuality and its acceptance with Others, in
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this moment, working class individuals, in a scene further complicated by foreign identity;
whether all of these men are homosexual or simply French is indistinguishable in Highsmith’s
novel.
Here, Highsmith provides Dickie with almost enough to offer plausible deniability. A
reader could almost argue that Dickie’s aloofness and superiority have nothing to do with Tom’s
homosexuality, which later adds to the ambiguous motivation of Dickie’s murder. Dickie’s upper
class upbringing is clear in his citation of the poem “I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud” by William
Wordsworth, which references an overabundance of wild daffodils—narcissus
pseudonarcissus—Wordsworth encounters while walking with his sister in the Lake Distract of
England. Daffodils are renowned for their golden yellow color, and Dickie’s reference to the
poem and to daffodils arrive in memory from the yellow of the acrobats’ G-strings, moving in
sprightly dance; it’s possible but unlikely that Dickie’s statement was not meant to shame Tom,
but was rather a remnant from a sophisticated life that Dickie wished to leave behind by
absconding to Europe, ironically siphoning his parents’ wealth to do so. And/or, it may be a
reference to the narcissistic vanity of the acrobats and other men on the beach in more revealing
clothing than Dickie would care to see in a scene of homosocial masculinity that transgresses
homosexuality. Greven writes to reconsider “narcissism as a potentially defiant, resistant, and
even joyously heady mode of masculine performance that masochism is only right to emulate,
embrace and join; indeed, narcissism may be preferable to masochism as a mode of queer
masculine performance,” further queering the scene (33). Dickie’s heterosexuality comes with
the privilege of not searching for homosexual connections in the world, and may more easily
remove himself from the scene, whereas Tom’s homosexuality require him to do his due
diligence of emotional labor to see if these acrobats were in the same category as himself, or to
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become attuned to moments in which he might reveal himself as non-heterosexual. Tom lingers.
Trask reminds the reader that it is Tom’s failure that anchors this passage, writing:
It is Tom who unwittingly “outs” himself on the beach in Cannes when he shouts
“bravo” to a band of acrobats, attired (like Tom earlier in the novel) in “yellow Gstrings,” while Dickie calls them as he sees them, or rather implies their
homosexuality in the simultaneously erudite and juvenile rhyme he misquotes
from, “I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud.” […] His “coldly” haut-bourgeois
“distaste” for what Tom refers to as the “fairies” seems so pervasive that he
cannot bring himself to say the word, only to gesture toward it via a peculiar
detour through Romanticism. In Wordsworth’s poem, of course, “Ten thousand”
refers not to fairies but to daffodils. Either Tom does not know the poem and thus
mistakes the referent or he fills in the referent with the only term he can intuit. In
any event he implicates himself in both a class and a sexual transgression. He is
not schooled enough to know Wordsworth; he is all too familiar with fairies.
(602)
Because homosexuality is a restricted topic, Tom must expend the emotional and intellectual
labor to decipher Dickie’s true intention, which is coded through the affluence of Romantic era
poetry. And what is the emotion Tom feels then? Shame. Shame for being associated with
homosexuality. Thifault writes, “on some level, the event that leads Ripley to decide to murder
Dickie is the ‘shame’ he feels when Dickie implies that Ripley has a sexual interest in watching a
group of male acrobats in G-strings” (317). Tom proceeds to relive, internally, three other insults
that have stuck to him because of his homosexuality, thereby creating that shame. First, Marge’s
overt suggestion of his queerness via Dickie to which Tom becomes defensive, and second, Tom
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takes Dickie’s negative affectation about the men around him as homosexual and applies it to the
acrobats, referring to them as fairies—a 19th Century insult that associates men not only with
femininity but further implies procreative deviousness, as fairies are gendered female but lack
maternity. Tom then remembers a third; Aunt Dottie’s insult, sissy, which is a diminutive of a
diminutive whose root exists in familial ties—sister becomes sis becomes sissy—and by insisting
upon a lineage of sissiness, Tom’s Aunt Dottie others his father as an incapable family member,
and thereby suggests that homosexuality might be genetic. Aunt Dottie’s assertion gives space
for Tom’s mimicry of someone else’s homosexuality—his father’s—which erodes the patriarchal
lineage by virtue of homosexuality becoming disparaging. Finally, Tom states, “you’d think he’d
never seen a pansy,” a fourth accusation of homosexuality from the French pensée, or “thought,”
in the past tense, feminine reflexive of “to think,” from which the eponymous flower gets its
name: a pansy is a flower for lovers who cannot be together, and so these lovers may see this
flower in remembrance of their love that could not coexist in the same time, place, culture, or
societal expectation. This final additional insult further refers to homosexuals as thinkers or
introverts, rather than doers or extroverts, in a heterosexualized society just before Tom does
something bigly, i.e., desperately and caustically hypermasculine: before he murders Dickie.
Straayer writes of this scene, “The suddenness of this shift from inward guilt to outward anger is
typical of Tom. Soon after the incident with the acrobats, Tom quickly proceeds from fantasizing
to enacting murder” (123).
The conflation of villainy and homosexuality in The Talented Mr. Ripley is possible
because of Tom’s secret and fear of being outed by Dickie, which may appear as a repression,
but is better understood with the terms acceptance and denial. By holding onto the “secret” of his
homosexuality, Tom becomes willing to murder for the presumed appearance of heterosexuality,
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which does not arrive with insult, providing a clear example of the conflation of homosexuality
and villainy. Straayer notes that, “as long as Tom is Greenleaf, he does not have to worry about
being called a sissy,” pointing to the societal acceptance that Tom slowly gains at the end of the
novel, wherein he is even able to maintain Dickie’s wealth and ties with the Greenleaf family
(126). Trask writes:
Because her “fond[ness] of coincidences” and her sense that “the only good parts
of a book are the explanations that are left out” lead Highsmith to disregard
realism’s implicit yet emphatic demand for causality, it has been hard for critics to
locate the motives in her novels without resorting to the “real” history of postwar
America’s repressive conformism and its consequent psychic toll. Tom Ripley
thus kills because he cannot express himself in healthier ways. (594)
Highsmith, no stranger to internalized homophobia, complicates the reading of Tom (and
Dickie)’s motivations; there are no simple answers with this psychological thriller, however
meaning-making is still possible. It may be that conceptualizing repression isn’t. Gordon writes:
The problem is that “repressed” is precisely what Ripley’s homosexuality is not.
For “repressed” is a word from the lexicon of neurosis and neither Ripley nor the
writing that incarnates him is neurotic. To attempt to read the strange stories of
Tom Ripley by the terms of neurosis is to miss entirely the radical importance of
Patricia Highsmith. The psychological maneuver that both leads Ripley to murder
and saves him from guilt is not neurotic repression but the maneuvers of the other
grand category of the Freudian insight: psychotic denial. (18)
However, Gordon’s examination precludes the fact that it is others who discover Tom’s secret
that ultimately lead to their death—not Tom’s repression or denial of his homosexuality but the
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repression of homosexuality writ large by others. This more closely aligns with Gordon’s
revelation; others shame Tom for his homosexuality, which Tom then denies. The result,
however, remains death—the maintenance of Tom’s deep, dark (homosexual) secret is what lays
his foundation as a conning villain, for which other (homosexual) individuals who hold secrets
may follow.

Heterosexual Male Power and Gender Fatalism
While a homosexual dominating or performing violence against affluent men is what makes
characters like Tom Ripley so dangerous in the American national imaginary because it moves
against the pre-established social hierarchy in which men have positioned themselves as
perpetuators and not receptors of violence (excluding warfare), violence against women, people
of color, and/or the less economically affluent have remained de rigueur. The death of Dickie
Greenleaf, a young, rich, white American man moves against the social narrative that has
allowed the countless deaths of individuals real and fictitious, particularly women, to propel a
narrative. Highsmith crafts Dickie to be the victim rather than the hero, and this paradigm shift is
what gives The Talented Mr. Ripley its draw. Thifault, considering Highsmith’s work as an echo
of Edgar Allen Poe’s The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket, writes, “both texts pose
and depose rather simple symbolisms (black or queer = danger), asking us to read the
contradictions as evidence of an experimental, ironic, self-referential strategy or as the product of
casually inconsistent plotting in a narrative more focused on immediate sensationalism” (317).
Critics have lauded Highsmith’s ability to make Tom, a shifty homosexual conman, the
sympathetic hero that the reader hopes for and invests in to see whether or not he will escape
punishment for his deeds caused by cruel optimism and his homosocial desire for Dickie, but
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seldom do critics examine how Highsmith suggests a fragility to white heterosexual masculinity
(white or male = safety) by making Dickie the victim in a subversion of gender fatalism; the fact
of which is overshadowed in the subsequent films Purple Noon (1960) and The Talented Mr.
Ripley (1999) by Dickie’s abuse of Marge.
Gender fatalism is a societal construct that implies that one’s gender, typically male or
female, leads to future societal outcomes based on that gender. If one is gendered male, one has a
future full of power and promise, aggression and dominance (if successful) whereas if one is
gendered female, one has a future full of nurturing, caring, and demurring to those gendered
male, including becoming the recipient of violence dependent upon the (un)happiness of those
gendered male in her life. Ahmed writes of feminism and violence based on gender; the “you” of
which is gendered female:
Indeed, if you do not modify your behavior in accordance, if you are not careful
and cautious, you can be made responsible for the violence directed toward you
(look at what you were drinking, look at what you were wearing, look at where
you were, look look). You can be made responsible whether or not you have
modified your behavior in accordance, because gender fatalism has already
explained the violence directed against you as forgivable and inevitable. (Living
26)
Gender fatalism may lead to abuse, culminating in death. In films Purple Noon and The Talented
Mr. Ripley, Dickie uses women in a way that is absent or obfuscated in the novel that speaks
directly to the conception of gender fatalism. In Highsmith’s work, the relationship between
Dickie and Marge is understood from Tom’s perspective, who is increasingly jealous of Dickie,
but this relationship speaks very little of this social construct. Highsmith writes, “Marge was in
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love with Dickie, Tom thought, but Dickie couldn’t have been more indifferent to her if she had
been the fifty-year-old Italian maid sitting there,” and “the Dickie-Marge relationship was
evidently just what he had supposed it to be at first, Tom thought. Marge was much fonder of
Dickie than Dickie was of her” (50; 71 emphases mine). Dickie’s attraction to Marge repulses
Tom, and he prefers to avoid it; “what disgusted him,” Highsmith writes, “was the big bulge of
her behind in the peasant skirt below Dickie’s arm that circled her waist. And Dickie—! Tom
really wouldn’t have believed it possible of Dickie!” (77). In this hyphenated absence exists
Dickie’s desire for Marge, which Tom does not or cannot process; Marge has, as the novel
progressed, moved from “healthy” to “ha[ving] a good figure, if one liked the rather solid type”
to this big bulged posterior that disgusts Tom (Highsmith 19; 48; 77). Throughout the novel,
Dickie is cordial, if not caring, to Marge in a way that does not suggest his need to express
superiority over her; her independence as a writer keeps her from depending on Dickie,
emotionally or otherwise (Highsmith 54). Marge is, however, worried about their trip to Rome,
which converts into anger, and this angst about Dickie and Tom’s carefree or careless party
lifestyle could be understood as her playing a small part of a nurturing role (Highsmith 70).
However, Highsmith’s Marge is not the receiver of substantial abuse that she is portrayed to be
in the films. In Purple Noon, Dickie (Maurice Ronet) regularly and violently physically assaults
Marge (Marie Laforêt); Dickie drags Marge across rooms and physically cages her on his boat—
he ignores her displeasure and discomfort especially when it comes to his own sexual
gratification, all of which is understood as forgivable for Dickie and inevitable for Marge. Marge
appears resigned to the abrasive nature of Dickie in large part due to this gender fatalism. And
Clément, the director of Purple Noon, prepares the viewer for this ill treatment early in the film
with the foreshadowing of how Dickie and Tom treat a woman whom they pick up on the street
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and offer a ride around town with; they openly fondle her breasts/physically assault her, and then
discard her at her destination; a precursor that in Purple Noon both announces Dickie’s penchant
for self-centered heteronormative masculine debauchery and announces Tom’s heterosexuality,
making his obsession with Dickie fraternal rather than homosexual to a 1960s film audience. In
Highsmith’s novel, this scene of Roman street life debauchery is queer coded, which Clément
sought to revise. Highsmith writes:
[Dickie and Tom] walked with their arms around each other’s shoulders, singing,
and around a dark corner they somehow bumped into a girl and knocked her
down. They lifted her up, apologizing, and offered to escort her home. She
protested, they insisted, one on either side of her. […] Dickie got a taxi. Dickie
and Tom sat very properly on the jump seats with their arms folded like a couple
of footmen, and Dickie talked to her and made her laugh. Tom could understand
nearly everything Dickie said. They helped the girl out in a little street that looked
like Naples again, and she said, “Grazie tante!” and shook hands with both of
them, then vanished into an absolutely black doorway.
“Did you hear that?” Dickie said. “She said we were the nicest Americans
she’d ever met!”
“You know what most crummy Americans would do in a case like that—
rape her,” Tom said.
“Now where are we?” Dickie asked, turning completely around.
[…]
“It’s worth it to see a nice girl home, isn’t it?” Dickie asked, staggering a
little.
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“Sure it is. I like girls,” Tom said protestingly. “But it’s just as well Marge
isn’t here tonight. We never could have seen that girl home with Marge with us.”
“Oh, I don’t know,” Dickie said thoughtfully, looking down at his
weaving feet. “Marge isn’t—”
“I only mean, if Marge was here, we’d be worrying about a hotel for the
night. We’d be in the damned hotel, probably. We wouldn’t be seeing half of
Rome!”
“That’s right!” Dickie swung an arm around his shoulder. (67-8)
Although Tom understands nearly everything Dickie says in Italian, which he is studying as the
novel progresses, I argue that he is perhaps alarmed at being outed as homosexual by this
stranger in his inebriated and paranoid state; “grazie tante” translates to “Thank you very much,”
in Italian, but “tante” is a reference to homosexuals and therefore potential insult in French—
“aunt” (Highsmith 63). His carousing shoulder-to-shoulder in the late Italian night (not daylight
as in Purple Noon) with Dickie is an example of homosocial desire with homosexual undertones,
and the acknowledgement of this idea moves Tom to threats of sexual violence to reassert his
masculine and heterosexual role in society, which Dickie ignores. Tom is masquerading as
heterosexual and fears his ruse has fooled no one. For good measure, he reminds Dickie that he
likes girls, said in protest—however, Tom’s queer acting (acting queer) is lost or unregistered on
Dickie throughout the conversation. Rather, Dickie cautiously defends Marge from Tom’s subtle
insults, but acquiesces that he wouldn’t have been able to have this adventure with Tom if Marge
were also there with them, enacting a nurturing and sensible persona among the trio. Shannon
writes of Clément’s rewriting of this scene:
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Highsmith’s novel […] confuse[s] filmmakers, as Clement’s Plein Soleil jettisons
any trace of Tom’s homosexuality. In fact, in a strange bid to remove all hints of
homoeroticism, one scene depicts Dickie and Tom involved in a mini-ménage a
trois, both ravishing the same woman at once in what is, ironically, the most
homoerotic scene in the film. In Plein Soleil, Tom’s motivation is simple greed,
and the film ends with Tom’s capture and a restoration of order that neither
Highsmith’s nor Minghella’s Ripley entirely allows. (19)
However, the homosocial bond between Dickie and Tom is more complicated than this. Straayer
applies Sedgwick’s term to this moment, writing:
In the film Purple Noon, homosexuality remains subtextual, coded primarily (but
not entirely) through triangles involving the two men and a woman. For example,
early in the film Tom and Greenleaf are visiting Rome. During a game of
pretending to be blind, Greenleaf induces a woman to join them. They take her on
a buggy ride during which she is positioned between them as they both kiss and
fondle her. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has argued that such triangulation is an
instance of “homosocial desire” in which the desire of two (assumed
heterosexual) men for each other is exchanged through a woman. (116)
By attempting to remove or obfuscate the sexual tension between Tom and Dickie that acts as a
driving force and occasional flash point for Tom in Highsmith’s novel, Clément’s Purple Noon
reaches for heteronormativity but paradoxically becomes queerer, as it—like Tom in
Highsmith’s novel—protests too much. Minghella’s film demonstrates the slipping of Tom’s
façade that unequivocally reveals his homosexuality to the viewer, while Clément’s film
amplifies scenes of male bravado to such a fevered pitch that they become parody. Nevertheless,

43
Clément’s portrayal of gender fatalism reminds viewers of the realities of male privilege and
female inequality for which millions of individuals would fight against in later years. The
intersection of homosocial desire and male gender fatalism allow Tom to find Dickie, exhibit a
socially unacceptable attraction to him, and contribute to his grandiose belief that he can
successfully assume his identity after Dickie’s death.
In the 1999 film The Talented Mr. Ripley directed by Minghella, Dickie (Jude Law)
projects emotional violence onto Marge (Gwyneth Paltrow) rather than the physical violence
seen in Purple Noon. Marge warns Tom (Leonardo DiCaprio), stating, “the thing with Dickie—
it’s like the sun shines on you and it’s glorious, then he forgets you and it’s very, very cold,”
which arrives with a precursor; upon introduction to Tom on an Italian beach, she says, “And be
careful of the sun. Your gray’s in danger of turning a little pink,” in reference to Tom’s
whiteness that reveals his foreignness in the exotic locale of Italy where those of affluence spend
their winters luxuriating in the sun. Understood as an interaction of levity, this is Marge
announcing Tom as out of place with the sunbathing upper class—a signal that she can see
through his façade—but in this joke is also a warning about the dangers of the sun; a metaphor
for life with Dickie. This advice, unheeded, fails to keep Tom from being burned by Dickie.
Dickie’s power as a pseudo sun-god like figure is not unusual; as a wealthy, young, heterosexual
white man, Dickie has been groomed to seize and exert power while other lives orbit around him.
Rich writes of gender fatalism:
Kathleen Gough lists eight characteristics of male power in archaic and
contemporary societies which I would like to use as a framework: “men’s ability
to deny women sexuality or to force it upon them; to command or exploit their
labor to control their produce; to control or rob them of their children; to confine
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them physically and prevent their movement; to use them as objects in male
transactions; to cramp their creativeness; or to withhold from them large areas of
the society’s knowledge and cultural attainments.” (638)
Dickie, in the films, exerts this power over Marge. And Marge feels this pressure from other men
in her life in the novel; for example, Marge converts to Catholicism for a former boyfriend,
suggesting her compliance with the expectations of her gender in an unequal society—a pressure
that is nonexistent for Dickie (Highsmith 61). Both Purple Noon and The Talented Mr. Ripley
take this further by featuring a scene absent in the novel wherein Dickie, Tom, and Marge are on
Dickie’s boat, the Pipistrello (the winged mammal known as the bat, in English), and
immediately succeeding an argument between Marge and Dickie, Dickie decides to—in his
view—cheer Marge up through a sexual advance, irrespective of Marge’s desires and Tom’s
presence. In both films, Dickie takes Marge below deck under the presumption of privacy, and in
both films Tom voyeuristically watches from up above on the exterior of the boat; in The
Talented Mr. Ripley Tom’s act of voyeurism is itself subject to voyeurism by Fred (Philip
Seymour Hoffman), who builds a case of suspicion early on about Tom’s homoerotic
motivations as he watches Tom watching Dickie. In Purple Noon it is Dickie who acknowledges
Tom’s view of himself. The viewers are meant to understand this peeping Tom (the phrase of
which predates the novel) moment as a character flaw of Tom Ripley, who is obsessed with
Dickie and is incapable of looking away. Less overtly, this scene in both films operates under
Gough’s characteristic of using women as objects in male transactions; Tom’s wanting to watch
Dickie is overshadowed by Dickie wanting to be watched. Shannon considers this scene from the
perspective of Marge, writing, “This Marge is an independent and self-assured 1990s woman,
sexually confident enough to make love to her boyfriend below deck on Dickie’s boat while two
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male acquaintances (Tom Ripley and Freddie Miles) wait above. Such a sexually confident
woman […] is more a creature of the 1990s than the 1950s” (20). Rather, Dickie in these films is
telegraphing his ability to have sex with a woman, anywhere, at any time, as a reminder to Tom
(and Fred) that he is powerful and sexually desirable. “Minghella even feels it necessary to
invent the pregnant Italian mistress, as if viewers could possibly mistake Dickie’s love scene
with Gwyneth Paltrow’s Marge as anything less than wholly (and wholesomely) heterosexual,”
Shannon writes, although after the mistress becomes pregnant she commits suicide—viewers are
left to discern that in this society, by refusing to marry her (betrothed, as Dickie is, to Marge)
Dickie has provided this woman with a scarlet letter from which she may never recover (20).
This serves to tarnish Dickie’s character, whose selfish actions in Minghella’s film assist in the
viewer’s sympathy towards Tom, while simultaneously speaking to the dangers of
heterosexuality for women, where Marge’s out of wedlock sexual coupling with Dickie is
wholesome but this nameless Italian mistress’ is not. If Straayer might be remembered for
coining the term, “Tom is a psychopath” (in reference to Tom’s panicked and presumptuous
murder of Freddie in Highsmith’s novel), in relation to the film iterations, I assert that Dickie is a
cad, and this is meant to distance viewers from Dickie’s normative protagonist male beauty
(127).
That Dickie’s heterosexuality needs to be affirmed on screen speaks to Highsmith’s
subtextual display of Dickie’s sexuality in the novel. Dickie’s unquestionable (hetero)sexuality
paired with Tom’s perpetually in question (homo)sexuality has caused great consternation in
Dickie’s portrayals in film and analysis of his sexuality in Highsmith’s work. Shannon writes:
In Highsmith’s novel, there is very little indication that Dickie is romantically
involved with Marge, or any woman. Dickie rejects the idea of a sexual
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relationship between Marge and himself outright, calling the notion “silly.” […]
While Tom is clearly not a disinterested observer of this relationship, nothing
substantial ever comes of [Dickie and Marge’s interactions]. […] In fact, the
novel’s Marge even suspects at one point that Dickie is homosexual. (20)
Shannon is referencing Marge’s letter to Dickie; Marge pens a missive to Dickie after his
disappearance (death) in the novel, having taken his absence as rejection. Marge writes, “Why
don’t you admit that you can’t live without your little chum? I’m only sorry, old boy, that you
didn’t have the courage to tell me this before and outright” (Highsmith 181 emphasis original).
“Outright” is the word Highsmith uses when Dickie confronts Tom about his homosexuality
(“Nobody ever said it outright to him” (80)). However, I argue that Marge doesn’t actually
believe Dickie is homosexual, but is instead trying to get a rise out of him to get him to respond
to her. Marge continues, “What do you think I am, a small-town hick who doesn’t know about
such things? You’re the one who’s acting small-town! At any rate, I hope my telling you what
you hadn’t the courage to tell me relieves your conscience a little bit and lets you hold your head
up. There’s nothing like being proud of the person you love, is there! Didn’t we once talk about
this?” (Highsmith 181 emphasis original). Marge continues, “I’d just given you credit for a lot
more guts” (Highsmith 181). By inciting anger in Dickie, Marge is hoping to gain a response; it
is a ploy which Dickie, due to his death, cannot challenge. Tom, reading Marge’s letter over
breakfast, is gleeful at her anger rather than anxious over the implication of Dickie’s
homosexuality, and his own by proxy; “it was all he could have expected,” Highsmith writes,
“and more” (181). Dickie’s heterosexuality, rather, is so “natural” as to be beyond reasonable
approach. Tom, who has spent most of the novel apprehensive of inferences to his own
homosexuality, does not brood nor obsess when Marge accuses Dickie of being in a homosexual
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relationship with him. He does not even register it. Tom knows on some level that Dickie is
heterosexual, and does not take Marge’s accusations with any semblance of gravity. Trask
analyzes this difference as a manifestation of reader awareness and unawareness of characters
Tom and Dickie. Trask writes:
Indeed, despite their uncanny physical resemblance, Tom could not be more
unlike Dickie in one respect. Whereas Tom is always at risk of exposure (showing
up on the beach, for instance, in a “very revealing” “yellow and black G-string,”
Dickie never really gives anything important about himself away. Put different,
whereas Tom possesses a knack for conjecturing motives, Dickie is equally adept
at finessing his own. “The Italian police could never get to the bottom of Signor
Greenleaf’s emotional involvements,” Tom muses. “He hadn’t been able to
himself.” Simultaneously reminiscent of phallic prowess and schoolboy
innocence, his very name confirms the view that Highsmith means for us to take
of Dickie as both a permanent child (and thus a kind of emotional blank) and a
supremely virile adult. (601)
Dickie’s heterosexuality becomes both hyperreal and nonexistent, verifying Berlant’s point that
heterosexuality is so pervasive in cultural norms as to not appear at all, a feat that heterosexuality
benefits from. Eribon phrases it this way: “when a gay person claims to be gay, a heterosexual
person is obliged to think of him or herself as heterosexual, whereas previously there would have
been no need to ask oneself any questions about one’s identity or the social order that enables it.
That is a state of absolute privilege,” of which Dickie claims in Highsmith works and the films
that followed (54). Martin and Kazyak write, “Heteronormativity structures social life so that
heterosexuality is always assumed, expected, ordinary, and privileged. Its pervasiveness makes it
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difficult for people to imagine other ways of life” (316). As a white, heteronormative male,
Dickie moves throughout these stories wrapped in that privilege, and the people in his life (with
the exception of Freddie and his father, two other white heteronormative males) orient
themselves around him because of that (heterosexual) gender fatalism. However, Highsmith still
points to moments of masculine fragility that ultimately result in Dickie’s death.

Dickie’s Death
As with the beach scene, which verifies Tom’s homosexuality and is missing in Clément’s
Purple Noon and shortened in Minghella’s The Talented Mr. Ripley to tighten the double male
protagonist narrative and strengthen Tom’s attraction to Dickie (and later Peter Smith-Kingsley,
a minor character in the novel), and the clothing scene, which verifies Tom’s orientation towards
Dickie and Dickie’s life through Dickie’s possessions, the passage in which Tom murders Dickie
on his boat in the novel is a critical point that offers insight into Tom’s motivations and
character. A close examination of Dickie’s murder demonstrates the heightened homosocial
desire between Dickie and Tom, and Tom’s cruel optimism towards Dickie. Tom’s inability to
distinguish between initiating a romantic advance and ending Dickie’s life is a reflection of his
attraction to Dickie (and Minghella’s Smith-Kingsley) in advance of their loss—his desire is so
socially dangerous that he also feels compelled to murder those he desires. Highsmith writes:
Tom nodded, letting his understanding smile speak for him. Actually, he was
terrified. God only knew how deep the water was here. If something happened to
the boat suddenly, there wasn’t a chance in the world that they could get back to
shore, or at least that he could. But neither was there a chance that anybody could
see anything that they did here. Dickie was swerving very slightly towards the
right again, towards the long spit of fuzzy grey land, but he could have hit Dickie,
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sprung on him, or kissed him, or thrown him overboard, and nobody could have
seen him at this distance. Tom was sweating […]. He felt afraid, but it was not of
the water, it was of Dickie. He knew that he was going to do it, that he would not
stop himself now, maybe couldn’t stop himself, and that he might not succeed.
“You dare me to jump in?” Tom yelled, beginning to unbutton his jacket.
Dickie only laughed at this proposal from him […]. Tom kept on
undressing. […] “I’ll go in if you will!” Tom shouted. “Will you?” He wanted
Dickie to slow down.
“Will I? Sure!” […] “Come on,” Dickie said, nodding at Tom’s trousers
that were still on.
Tom glanced at the land. […] He picked up the oar, as casually as if he
were playing with it between his knees, and when Dickie was shoving his trousers
down, Tom lifted the oar and came down with it on the top of Dickie’s head.
(103-4)
Tom’s loneliness and aloneness is heightened in this scene, as he understands that he is not
strong enough of an open water swimmer to make it to shore on his own; he is trapped in
Dickie’s presence, whom he loves and wishes violence upon. And to overcome this feeling of
helplessness, Tom displays a bravado that backfires—as a part of his ruse in this new façade he
is presenting to Dickie to reaffirm his masculinity and therefore separate himself from his own
sexuality, he pretends as though he can swim safely in this water, and Dickie believes him. Tom
is caught in his own lie. The eroticism of this scene is clear. Highsmith, in this pivotal scene of
murder, intertwines homoeroticism, intimacy, and death; Tom murders Dickie as he is disrobing.
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In the novel, Dickie’s death is the result of Tom’s cruel optimism towards Dickie, in
which he can neither possess him nor withstand his rejection. Dickie, the object of Tom’s desire,
is not only undressing but is urging Tom to do so as well, “nodding at his trousers.” It is
precisely what Tom wants and doesn’t want; he is urging Dickie to “slow down” and he is
glancing not at Dickie’s body, but at the safety of land—Highsmith allows for this hesitation to
be read as Tom wishing for a safer environment and/or scanning the horizon for witnesses, just
as Highsmith allows readers to consider Tom’s desire for Dickie to slow down as a means for
Tom to better control what becomes the murder scene. Straayer writes, “Although I have
repeatedly characterized Tom Ripley as desiring upward mobility, the kiss-or-kill moment
described above complicates any assumption that this the reason he kills Greenleaf” (123). In
Purple Noon, however, Dickie’s death is partially the result of self-defense, as Dickie has
deposited Marge upon the shore and has turned his abusive and violent gaze onto Tom and
Tom—realizing that his options are to fight for his life or surrender and potentially drown—
chooses to fight. Clément overlays onto this a scene of gambling in which Dickie cheats to lose
to Tom, and Tom insists that he cannot be bought, making the scene one of socioeconomic status
and pride. In the 1999 film The Talented Mr. Ripley, Dickie’s death is closer to Highsmith’s
second person close narration. Shannon writes, “the film suggests that Tom Ripley’s impetuous
murderous rage is linked to society’s demand that he suppress his homosexual desire. […]
Dickie’s unmasking of Tom’s true identity is too painful for Tom to endure, and the spurned man
explodes in a blinding rage” (19). He kills Dickie because he is homosexual and cannot
withstand Dickie’s rejection.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have examined conceptions of homosexuality and heterosexuality, one
conflating with villainy and the other conflating with power for men and violence for women in
the The Talented Mr. Ripley by Patricia Highsmith and the subsequent films that it inspired,
Purple Noon by René Clément and The Talented Mr. Ripley by Anthony Minghella. Highsmith’s
homophobia and extreme attachment to her character Tom complicates a reading of this novel.
Gordon writes:
No one is better qualified than Highsmith—whose depiction of hidden
homosexuality in the foxed Fifties is still in print today—to describe Tom’s
misery; to appreciate the psychological pressure to deny homosexuality, even in
the face of a great love. It is a pressure so great that suicide is dwarfed by it. And
so is murder. (18)
Denial, repression, cruel optimism, desire, and fatalism all work to present a novel that
became immensely popular that nevertheless conflated villainy with homosexuality.
“Every gay man starts off learning to lie,” Eribon writes, not because homosexuals enjoy
or are as adept at manipulation as Tom thinks he is, but rather because, in a rigidly
heterosexual society, they had to in order to survive (100).
In closing, it is worth noting that various writers have interlocked the names of these
characters in strange and telling ways. Some have written about Tom and Greenleaf; others,
Ripley and Dickie. Some have furthered commented on Highsmith’s unusual habit of signing
autographs with Ripley’s name, creating a further coalescence not only of Tom who becomes
Dickie, but of Highsmith who becomes Tom. Trask goes as far as to psychoanalyze Dickie
Greenleaf’s full name, and the name of his boat; Trask writes, “Marge shows him Dickie’s boat,
the ‘Pipi,’ which Tom finds ‘indiscernible’ from the boats docked around it. ‘The boats looked
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very much alike, but Marge said Dickie’s boat was larger than most of them.’ While it may be
‘short for Pipistrello,’ Highsmith assures us, there is nothing diminutive about Dickie’s ‘Pipi,’”
which furthers an examination of Dickie’s not-so-latent (heterosexual) virility (601). Why
Pipistrello, Italian for bat, when Highsmith had been an infamous cat ally, and thought highly of
snails (“Machado”)? We can presume that Dickie named the boat for its ability to glide
seamlessly on the water, or for its keen sense of auto-location; and we the readers might assume
that Highsmith—in this psychological thriller—was offering a sinister hint of the macabre; an
omen of what was to pass on this winged creature of the night. I argue, rather, that it has to do
with blindness. For in The Talented Mr. Ripley, Highsmith has constructed characters who are all
cunning, intelligent, or affluent—bats who rule their class or stalk their prey—who are also
exceptionally short-sided, blind as bats. Dickie never suspected that Tom would put him in
mortal danger; Tom did not think beyond a series of short-term ruses and impulsive murders;
while Marge, the wisest of the trio, was led to believe that Dickie was still alive.

53

2. Another Country and Vanishing Rooms: Gender, Race, and Sexuality
I was brown, visibly different but with no real account of that difference; no real sense of where
it or I was coming from. I kept feeling wrong, being treated as in the wrong, but I did not know
what was wrong. Something was wrong. How to acquire the words for this something? – Sara
Ahmed

I propose the somewhat controversial notion that slave narratives as a literary concept have not
ended in America, as structural and institutional racism has not ended with the abolishment of
slavery; rather, America’s white heteronormative patriarchal society has continued to subjugate
many identities, including the Black identity, which has paved a pathway for these individuals to
more easily become villains rather than heroes. African-American literature in the 20th Century
describes Black experiences that are tangled with issues of racial inequality that grew from racial
structures developed in the 19th and 18th centuries to explain, affirm, and uphold a society whose
top echelon benefitted from the ideologies of white supremacy, and are therefore extensions or
prodigies of slave narratives. For W. J. T. Mitchell, the centrum is that of human being
commodification:
The central issue is clearly the reduction of human personhood and individuality
to the status, not just of mere instrumentality and servitude, but to commodity,
object of economic exchange. In his analysis of the fetish-character of
commodities, Marx imagines what it would be like if the commodity could speak.
The deepest answer, I suggest, is contained in the nexus of narrative, memory,
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and slavery. It is not just that the slave speaks of a time when he was a
commodity, but that his speaking itself becomes a new form of commodity. (196)
Mitchell is arguing that the slave’s ability to participate in philosophical dialogue—a shift in
expected communal contributions from proletariat physical labor—in the form of a slave
narrative that overlays the slave experience upon widely held Christian systems of morality that
overturn ideals of good and evil becomes itself a commodity that may be bought or sold, and
thereby enters a capitalistic society as something with monetary value. This is a different
perspective of slave commodification that further embedded the slave narrative into the
following generations. Cvetkovich in An Archive of Feelings approaches slavery from an almost
diametrical yet equally useful ideological perspective:
Unlike more recent trauma histories where there are still living survivors, the
history of slavery presents the challenge of a missing archive, not only because of
its generational distance but also because even in its time it was inadequately
documented, or more precisely, systematically undocumented given restrictions
on literacy for slaves, and governed subsequently by racisms that have suppressed
subaltern knowledges. This traumatic history necessarily demands unusual
strategies of representation. (38)
Instead of relying upon the fraction of slave narratives that have entered the market, Cvetkovich
is concerned with the vast amount of sociological data that has been silenced and ultimately
erased in the annals of time, thus creating a vacuum for which the restrictors—namely, a white
American ruling class—were offered an opportunity to fill. Understood together, Mitchell
suggests that the economical machine that makes slave narratives and their iterations beyond the
legal abolishment of slavery valuable thrived in the memory of slavery, while Cvetkovich raises
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the possibility that this memory is not solely or entirely predicated on Black thought, and that
Black representations of Black culture necessarily require counter-cultural depictions of itself.
Mitchell draws attention to a societal structure that benefits from reproducing its own top-down
representations of Black bodies and Black (non-)agency, while Cvetkovich urges an
understanding of this structure as perpetuating systemic racism that would require actors to fight
against this representation in order for these actors to develop any agency at all. When Baldwin
published and shed light on some subaltern knowledges of the Black community by making them
palatable to a white audience that had preconceived expectations of the Black community, he set
out to challenge and rebuild those tropes and expectations. Arguably, he was successful enough
to have his work echoed in future generations; in this chapter, Baldwin’s novel Another Country
will be discussed concurrently with a novel that responds to it thirty years later: Melvin Dixon’s
Vanishing Rooms.

Feminism in Another Country
Utilizing feminism to analyze the relationship of the women in Another Country enriches the
understandings of varied intersections of identities, which better demonstrates how certain
characters are destined to become and/or remain willful, and therefore villainous. Baldwin scripts
class, racial and gender boundaries onto the characters of Cass and Ida in order to illuminate
societal restrictions that more easily vilify some and exonerate others. Because of Baldwin’s
observations and critics of gender inequality, one may consider him to be a feminist. To define
feminism, Ahmed in Living a Feminist Life builds upon hooks’ work:
I want to take here bell hooks’s definition of feminism as “the movement to end
sexism, sexual exploitation and sexual oppression.” From this definition, we learn
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so much. Feminism is necessary because of what has not ended: sexism, sexual
exploitation, and sexual oppression. And for hooks, “sexism, sexual exploitation
and sexual oppression” cannot be separated from racism, from how the present is
shaped by colonial histories including slavery, as central to the exploitation of
labor under capitalism. (Living 5)
The parallels of gender and racial inequalities are made clear through hooks’ writing, and
Ahmed’s emphasis on the continuation of the movement suggests the continued inequalities of
these power dynamics. In Baldwin’s Ida, we see a woman who must manipulate a society that
has structured itself against her race and her gender in order to survive; her success represents a
toppling of that structured system and therefore all actions she takes toward achieving her
dreams constitute a threat to that society. Baldwin encourages the reader to compare Cass to Ida,
who are both subjugated by a patriarchal society but whose race and class differentiate one from
the other, and whose achievements and failures are received according to that structure, which
demands Cass to be a private and faithful steward to her husband’s lineage and Ida to be and
remain not private, but invisible. Baldwin explores the nuances of intersectionality within
femininity by contrasting Cass and Ida, from which one may further understand the basis of
villainy.
Cass’ corporal safety depends upon her diminutive placement within American society;
as a white woman in the 1950s, she is expected to limit herself to her home and pre-approved
social venues, or to be accompanied by an appropriate male chaperone. Cass’ life as a housewife
requires her to shield herself from the public sphere. When Cass arrives at Rufus’ funeral in a
predominately Black neighborhood, she realizes that she is without a head covering, so she
frantically searches the area for a shop that might carry something respectful for entering a
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church; a metaphorical shielding through clothing. She considers stopping someone to ask for
directions, but “she realized that she was mysteriously afraid: afraid of these people, these
streets, the chapel to which she must return” (Baldwin, Another 117). Cass experiences fear
because she does not feel connected to this neighborhood; the stark racial division plays a
significant role in her anxiety, as well as a class divide exacerbated by structural racism. The
affect of social expectations are such that her status as a middle class white woman in any Black
neighborhood becomes suspect. Her fear of transgressing this social boundary separates her from
her surroundings, which has become dangerous in her fear of the unknown—Ahmed writes, “it is
a white female body that is assumed to be vulnerable and in need of protection from others
[…whereas] a brown body is not perceived as a fragile female body” (Ahmed, Living 34). Were
Cass Black, and venturing into a white neighborhood, her fear of crossing an unspoken social
boundary would still exist, however her body would no longer be perceived as delicate. The first
interaction Cass has after registering her fear is with a Black salesclerk who approaches Cass,
wearing “a violently green dress,” which Baldwin uses to further emphasize this divide between
white and Black bodies (Another 117). This is one intersection of race and gender: Cass’s
whiteness and femininity make her appear weak and protectable, whereas this salesgirl’s
Blackness obscures the gendered femininity that otherwise would have been coded as weak and
protectable in a white heteronormative patriarchy; the salesclerk’s Blackness means that she may
be employed, on a Sunday, and prevents her the protections afforded to women like Cass.
Stockton writes, “[…] historically, Black women have often been blocked from (the bourgeois
ideal of) feminine passivity, whereas Black men have often been blocked from (the bourgeois
ideal of) masculine activity,” which Baldwin demonstrates here and for whom the concept of
masculinity is discussed later in this chapter (83). Baldwin’s emphasis on this dichotomy of
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women highlights racial disparities in America, but in so doing he later demonstrates a moment
of vilification of Black women. He brings this ideology directly to Ida when she is at dinner with
Cass and Cass muses that she does not know what one replaces a dream with; before Ida
answers, “reality,” Cass looks to Ida and sees her in a new light; Baldwin writes, “then Cass
sensed, for the first time in her life, the knowledge that Black people had of white people […]
and, for a second, she hated Ida with all her heart” (Another 357). Previously Cass was unaware
of the emotional and intellectual labor that non-white individuals have to expend in order to exist
in society, and by acknowledging this difference Cass must also recognize that Ida is external to
the white heteronormative patriarchy and is therefore an outsider and potentially dangerous by
virtue of her foreignness. Cass does not want to view Ida, because to see her would be to
recognize disparities within society, which Cass then despises. This moment reveals the ability
that Cass, who holds more societal power than Ida, has to unsee Ida as a benefit of said societal
power—a microcosm of race relations in America in which a dominant White society is not
made to recognize the minority Black society that the former subordinated. Cass’ hatred of Ida is
made possible by Ida’s identity as neither fragile nor (white and therefore not) feminine to the
bourgeoisie. Cass is further enflamed by Ida’s advantage of societal knowledge of white culture
that Cass cannot reciprocate, thereby giving Ida an advantage that Cass is without. In a speech
Baldwin gives at the University of Chicago in 1963, Baldwin says:
[…] the only people in the world who understand Americans, are what we like to
refer to as the darker brother; that’s me. And I understand you, because I’ve had
to watch you, outwit you: I changed your diapers; I served your brandy; I’ve
known what you were frightened of when you called me nigger. I had to know it,
if I were going to live. (“The Moral Responsibility of the Artist”)
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Baldwin in this speech and in his fiction emphasizes the question of race, and answers the
question of who carries the emotional burden of racial inequity; Baldwin is asserting that white
Americans enforced the social construct of race, and therefore they are the ones must make
whole the “Race Problem” that white Americans are often more comfortable relegating to
minorities as another form of outsourced (emotional/intellectual) labor; African-Americans are
made to reconcile racial inequities in America that they themselves did not create, holding
competing cultural ideals of themselves (e.g. DuBois’ Double Consciousness) to survive in
society, and risking anger and resentment by taking up space to tell one’s own story. This
additional labor and consciousness of its presence speaks to a societal imbalance that often
breeds anger and resentment at multiple ends of its spectrum: Baldwin, in this example, shows
this anger in Cass. Cass vilifies Ida for knowing how the world works and trying to succeed in it
despite her social status—the prerequisite for all villains is the refusal to “know” and therefore
accept one’s place at the bottom of a social stratum, thereby challenging the boundaries and
social strata of society itself.
When examining Ida’s positionality, one may consider Ahmed’s conception of
Willfulness, in which a character or person whose identity places them in a minority is
reprimanded or read as troublesome for demanding equity. By demanding a shift in societal
power dynamics, Ida is inherently understood as dangerous, because those in a position of power
may understand sharing power as a subtraction or negation. This demand is shocking because it
is coming from a person who is not thought to socially exist. Quoting a Zora Neale Hurston
scholar, Ahmed writes:
As James Saunders notes, “The emphasis is on ‘willful’ because for so long, so
many black women have not been considered to be in possession of their own free
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wills.” Any will is a willful will if you are not supposed to have a will of your
own. A willful will is what you will need when it is presumed you do not have a
will of your own. (Living 78)
Ida is not presumed to have a will because Ida, as a Black woman in Cass’s eyes, lacks agency.
Baldwin implies this early and often in Another Country through Cass’s objectification of Ida as
doll-like in nature—an object designed to be objectified. When Ellis approaches her and asks
what she would like to do with her life, that it must be more than becoming head waitress, Ida
responds first with bitterness, and then hesitation before declaring her will: to be a singer
(Baldwin, Another 161-2). This bitterness and seizing the opportunity to express it further
irritates Cass; Cass does not presume Ida to have the capacity for anger, and when this anger
fractures Cass’ worldview, Cass becomes hostile in retaliation. Ahmed writes:
The angry black woman can be described as a kill-joy; she may even kill feminist
joy, for example, by pointing out forms of racism within feminist politics. As
Audre Lorde describes: “When women of Color speak out of the anger that laces
so many of our contacts with white women, we are often told that we are ‘creating
a mood of helplessness,’ ‘preventing white women from getting past guilt,’ or
‘standing in the way of trusting communication and action.’” The exposure of
violence becomes the origin of violence. The black woman must let go of her
anger for the white woman to move on. (“Happy Objects” 39)
The message is clear between Cass and Ida; Ida is not allowed to bring up the inequalities she
feels because of her position in life—vis-à-vis her race—that deny her the privilege of Cass’
white femininity, namely dreaming; a privilege that Cass was unaware she possessed until Ida
drew attention to it. Cass presumed the right of affluence as natural until she truly saw someone
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who is regularly denied that right, and who dares to draw attention to it. Class and privilege are
forms of remembered forgetting; the ability to take for granted one’s advantages is desirable, and
being reminded that it is an advantage is a reminder that it may be revoked, thus stirring feelings
of anger, insecurity, and fear. This is why Cass’ emotion towards Ida is hatred; a kill joy is a
villainous character who reminds society that their gains may one day be lost by presenting
themselves as a person who has lost or been denied that privilege. The proof is in their visibility.
Cass is able to suppress Ida, but Cass herself is suppressed by patriarchy. Baldwin writes,
“[…] the world’s judgment, should it ever be necessary to face it, would condemn Cass yet more
cruelly than Ida. For Ida was not white, nor married, nor a mother. The world assumed Ida’s sins
to be natural, whereas those of Cass were perverse” (Baldwin, Another 345-6). Ida becomes a
natural villain whose slide into impropriety could be understood as inevitable, while Cass is an
unnatural one; Ida cannot fall from grace because, lacking whiteness, marital status, or children
to affirm her value as a woman, she has no grace from which to fall. While some readers may
use this opportunity to sympathize with Cass, Baldwin asks readers to sympathize all the more
with Ida, who hasn’t anything to lose. In this way, Baldwin’s attention to the intersectionality of
gender, race, and social class demonstrates a fundamental questioning of an ideological villain
pipeline that presents some characters—more often poor, racially othered, and ill-fitting within
affluent constructions of gender roles—as already destined for villainous behavior.

Achieving Happiness
Desire, and the quest of achieving that desire plays a significant role in Baldwin’s and Dixon’s
works. Desire sparks characters into action, and the inability to achieve those desires marks a
character as unfulfilled, and as a consequence those characters become undesirable themselves.
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Happiness and the appearance of happiness is one of those desires; all characters who are
unhappy are expected to reach towards happiness, and characters who cannot obtain happiness
are not emulated by the reader. However, throughout the twentieth century, what happiness
consists of ideologically reinforces an upper-middle class white heteronormative patriarchal
status quo whose affect are antithetical to some character’s sense of personal well-being; even by
achieving these goals, some characters realize that this version of happiness could never apply to
them.
Some characters appear to the reader as inherently disaffected—unhappy—or are
introduced as disaffected and whose appearance throughout the work reinforces and maintains
their lack of belonging; Rufus and Ida are two of these characters. Some characters appear to
have been in the past, present, and likely future, always unhappy. Ahmed examines the process
and flow of these affects and argues that instead of being reactionary to exterior events, people
arrive always-already in a state of complex emotions that are then read or reinforced by their
exteriors. Ahmed writes:
If bodies do not arrive in neutral, if we are always in some way or another moody,
then what we will receive as an impression will depend on our affective situation.
This second argument challenges for me Brennan’s first argument about the
atmosphere being what is “out there” getting “in”: it suggests that how we arrive,
how we enter this room or that room will affect what impressions we receive.
After all, to receive is to act. To receive an impression is to make an impression.
(“Happy Objects” 36-7)
Readers are introduced to Rufus when he is already at a low point, meandering through New
York City, where “[strangers] could scarcely bear their knowledge, nor could they have borne
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the sight of Rufus, but they knew why he was in the streets tonight, why he rode subways all
night long, why his stomach growled, why his hair was nappy, his armpits funky […]” (Baldwin,
Another 4). This kind of social rejection and lack of community plagues Rufus and reinforces the
impression he develops of other people, perhaps making it all the easier for him to form an
aggressive and abusive bond with Leona; as Rufus sees himself at the lowest stratum of society’s
hierarchy in large part due to his race, when Leona lowers herself to uplift Rufus’ ego, he
concludes that she must be worth less, and therefore worthless. Gibson writes of the positionality
of Rufus in Salvific Manhood:
When Baldwin begins Another Country, he paints a very dark picture of Rufus
and hurries the reader into a confrontation with the drummer’s abjection. Within
the first fifty pages we learn that Rufus is “one of the fallen…one of those who
had been crushed on the day, which was every day, these towers fell”; we learn
that the first character we meet, Rufus, is “entirely alone, and dying of it.” (125)
Rufus is on the edge of society, and Gibson argues that this positionality is in no small part due
to his emasculation by said society. Gibson writes that “Rufus’s newfound madness is heavily
rooted in his preoccupation with having his black manhood surveyed and regulated by a powerstripping white gaze,” which surfaces in Baldwin’s writing as several white characters with
whom Rufus interacts—including Leona and Vivaldo—referring to him as “Boy,” and through
impressing a paternal affection onto him that suggests that he is incapable of navigating the
world as a productive adult, a contributing member of society, and as an individual (121).
Ultimately, his maladaptive behavior retroactively reinforces the impression that society has of
him; he is belittled, he becomes belittled, and then he learns to belittle. He is treated as though he
is less than a human being and in turn he responds as such and then this treatment is reinforced,
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eventually leading Rufus to the conclusion that there are no redeeming qualities about himself or
others. This is a trope that Baldwin explores at great length. When Vivaldo asks Ida to meet his
family, she declines, stating that, “I know that I am not about to be bugged by any more white
jokers who still can’t figure out whether I’m human or not,” and when Vivaldo quips that she is
behaving unchristianly, she responds, “it’s the best I can do. I learned all my Christianity from
white folks,” emphasizing twice the way in which affect produces action, reaction, or inaction
(Baldwin 279). Ida doesn’t believe she will be treated kindly by Vivaldo’s family, so she
responds sourly to his suggestion, and is then read as sour. For Rufus, this is a self-fulfilling
prophecy in which he is first vilified by society, then becomes a villain in society’s eyes, and
forever remains a villain to society. Characters throughout these novels are predestined to be,
become, and remain—simultaneously—pariahs, who never achieve well-adjustment in society,
or, who never become happy.
Happiness is denied to these characters. Even though contemporary happiness is not a
neutral state of emotion, this happiness remains elusive for these characters in particular because
of their varied minority statuses and more notably because of their non-whiteness. Ahmed writes,
“happiness relates to the idea of being lucky, or favored by fortune, or being fortunate,” as a
memento that a perpetual state of happiness—they lived happily ever after—is to live illogically
on one side of Fortuna’s wheel in a contemporary etymological shift from the word’s original
root that referred to an action either positive or negative; happiness has the same origin as
happenstance or happening, which is luck blind, meaning that over time the word has dropped its
negative connotations and therefore its neutrality (“Happy Objects” 30). Happiness was a neutral
state of being, a position in which good or ill-fortune may occur, and over time it came to have a
positive affect, and to not be happy or achieve happiness meant that a character was unsettled,
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unlucky, unfortunate, or represented an omen of negativity: a harbinger of further dissatisfaction.
Unhappiness also means that a character is unable to relate to or approve of society at large, as
happiness equates to an agreement with the fortune of the status quo and unhappiness to a
desired change with the status quo. Unhappiness means that something is wrong and action must
be taken, whereas happiness encourages stasis, or even a reversal to a previous time. It is perhaps
no coincidence that whiteness and maleness transformed in the same progression as happiness;
while they were once nothing more than states of being, they have come to signify luckiness,
fortune, and the status quo. Persons without those signifiers who attempt to reach for them are
contemptuous for transgressing the state of being assigned to them by society, and those who call
attention to this system to elevate their state of being to the neutrality expressed by whiteness or
maleness are labeled as unhappy troublemakers: Cass, in not exhibiting contentedness to only
mother a clear patriarchal line for her husband is read as an unhappy troublemaker when she
initiates an affair; Ida who wishes for better societal treatment than her race and gender afford
her and a prominent career in the public sphere is read as an unhappy troublemaker; Eric and
Jesse who each attempt to navigate a domestic, homosexual relationship are unhappy
troublemakers for failing to heterosexually partner. In this way, Ahmed’s argument that
“happiness becomes proximity to whiteness,” is expanded to include other signifiers of a white
heterosexual patriarchy, and happiness incentivizes itself to encourage people to conform to
itself (Living 52). Ahmed documents this incentivization, or perpetual prearrival, of unhappiness
in the following social struggle between parent and queer child: “the father is unhappy as he
thinks the daughter will be unhappy if she is queer. The daughter is unhappy as the father is
unhappy with her being queer. The father witnesses the daughter’s unhappiness as a sign of the
truth of his position: that she will be unhappy because she is queer” (“Happy Objects” 43,
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emphasis mine). In other words, everyone wishes to be happy, but happiness is specific to a
society’s culture and values, and that society can apply societal pressure to enforce selected paths
of happiness for selected people, and discourage other paths of happiness accordingly, even
closing paths of happiness for certain groups of people indefinitely. That happiness is denied to
African-American characters in Another Country and Vanishing Rooms.
The controlling of that future happiness begins with one’s history and memory; one’s
narrative. The way in which these characters arrive unhappy and continue to remain unhappy is
due to their minority status. Saidiya Hartman writes in Lose Your Mother:
In every slave society, slave owners attempted to eradicate the slave’s memory,
that is, to erase all the evidence of an existence before slavery. This was as true in
Africa as in the Americas. A slave without a past had no life to avenge. No time
was wasted yearning for home, no recollections of a distant country slowed her
down as she tilled the soil, no image of her mother came to mind when she looked
into the face of her child. (155)
A slave has no past, and truly has no future if one conceptualizes the future as an improvement
of the present. A slave has their cultural history striped from them, and must depend upon their
slave owner’s imaginations of the future, which does not make room for the slave’s future
happiness. In Ghana, when asked about the discussion of slavery in America by a chief,
Hartman’s colleague explains, “Only the blacks were slaves […] if you are black and in
America, people know that you came to the country as a slave” (197). Hartman clarifies that race
and slavery in America is more complicated than this, but concedes that time still has not healed
the societal rupture and social stratum caused by slavery that was not erased by the abolishment
of slavery (197). In other words, slave narratives persist because the affects of slavery continue
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to circulate in America. The pursuit of happiness becomes a marker of whiteness and
heterosexual patriarchal will; those of early American slave owners. Further, happiness expresses
itself as a dominate will—everyone who moves towards happiness and therefore a willfulness to
achieve happiness within the parameters of society’s cultures and values (choosing the “correct”
path of happiness) is not recognized as willful at all; rather, attempting to redefine those
parameters in a way that does not benefit the affect of society or attempting to find an alternative
path towards happiness is understood within the negative lens of willful, or unhappy, such as the
queer daughter which Ahmed illustrates. Ahmed writes, “Marilyn Frye argues that oppression
involves the requirement that you show signs of being happy with the situation in which you find
yourself. For Frye, ‘anything but the sunniest countenance exposes us to being perceived as
mean, bitter, angry or dangerous.’ Perceptions can be sticky,” suggesting that, those who are not
destined for preestablished forms of happiness courtesy of preapproved identity markers should
withstand their truncated plight with pleasantness or risk being read as entering the room, the
street, or the novel as not merely unhappy, but also dangerous (Living 54). People who challenge
the status quo that has constructed a sense of happiness for some are understood as threatening
that happiness, and hatred or ostracization of them becomes warranted. Stickiness is the term that
Ahmed uses to examine affect’s ability to transfer from person to person, object to person, object
to object, and person to object, as well as affect’s perpetuation; with all of these characters, their
perception as unhappy and/or dangerous because of that unhappiness remains with them, and
marks them forever as rejectable from society.
To be African-American, gendered female, and/or homosexual in mid-century America
was to be villainized by society, and therefore to be denied happiness. Perceived as unhappy and
unlucky, anyone who challenged the white heteronormative patriarchal status quo that truncated
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societal affluence and the dreams of others were perceived as troublemakers who could never be
satisfied or at peace.

Setting, Insult and Social Structures
Over the course of the longue durée of the 21st century, many minority and ethnic identities have
migrated to American cities in order to increase their opportunity to find gainful employment,
establish an independent lifestyle, or to build a stronger community with like-minded
individuals. These identities include African-Americans, women, and homosexuals. Those who
are not at the top of the societal hierarchy often must travel to a place where they hope to no
longer be subjugated, and that place has historically been a metropole wherein they might at least
find a like-minded community that may increase their social safety net. The societal hierarchy
from which these minority identities emerge range in size from national to nuclear—all
attempting to escape a hostile rural or suburban landscape in which one’s rights or culture is
restricted, even within other forms of minority identities. Hartman notes, “flight was the most
common response of threatened communities everywhere. Predatory states produced migrants
and fugitives as well as slaves” (226). Eribon, in Insult and the Making of the Gay Self considers
family structures and the nuances of racial and homophobic insults:
A black youth will most likely live in a black family, and thus, to the extent that
he or she is subjected to racism, will likely be supported by his or her family
through that experience. A gay youth is rather unlikely to live in a gay or lesbian
family, and the insult and stigmatization found in the exterior world are likely to
be found in the family as well. (62)
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A black gay youth, therefore, might have familial support against racism but not against
homophobia, and may find the urbanscape in which they grew up in simultaneously inviting and
alienating. The stigmatization of being outted to one’s family and/or disowned within one’s
nuclear community is one of a myriad of reasons that homosexuals moved toward city centers,
where homosexuals can more easily construct communities that diffuse or subvert stigmatization.
The settings of James Baldwin’s works are often New York and Paris not because he did not
travel elsewhere, but because they represented those tensions of invitation and alienation. When
Eric in Another Country suggests that he and LeRoy leave the rural south, he names New York,
Chicago, and San Francisco as destinations, forecasting the stark difference between rural and
urban homosexual acceptability that will be examined in depth in a future chapter (Baldwin,
Another 203). Setting, and particularly the public/private divide, construct possibilities for
societal hierarchies to be reinforced through the possibility of insult.
Examples of homosexual familial confrontations are nearly absent in Baldwin, with the
exception of Ida alluding to Rufus’ desirability to men and women while failing to speak for
Rufus’ agency in that desire, but Dixon approaches this fraught social interaction with Ruella,
whose brother Phillip makes known his homosexual relationship with Abdul while they are in
prison (Another 83; 138). While Ida does not discuss Rufus’ sexuality while he is alive, and
distances herself from it in his death, Ruella takes a more accepting approach of her brother. Ida
approaches this moment when she presses Eric about his friendship with Rufus, searching for a
reason why no one stopped Rufus from committing suicide; Ida is separated from her brother by
her heterosexuality, which she experiences not as privilege but as a form of distance, however,
that privilege does not exist for Eric. Eric expresses guilt about failing to be a good member of
Rufus’ community by not being available to him, in the end, and Ida’s response is:
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“Oh.” She looked at him from very far away. “You may have wanted more form
him than he could give. Many people did, men and women.” She allowed this to
hang between them for an instant. Then, “He was terribly attractive, wasn’t he? I
always think that that was the reason he died, that he was too attractive and didn’t
know how—how to keep people away.” She sipped her drink. “People don’t have
any mercy. They tear you limb from limb, in the name of love. Then, when you’re
dead, when they’ve killed you by what they made you go through, they say you
didn’t have any character. They weep big, bitter tears—not for you. For
themselves, because they’ve lost their toy.”
“That’s a terribly grim view,” he said, “of love.” (Baldwin, Another 265)
This is one of only two passages in which Ida discusses Rufus’ sexuality; here, Rufus’
bisexuality makes him capable of being destroyed not by one sex, but by two. Ida sees Rufus as a
passive object who sustains but not participates in homosexual acts. In the other instance Vivaldo
says, “I just don’t see why it should matter to you […]. So [Eric] likes a roll in the hay with a
man. So what?” to which Ida responds, “He wanted a roll in the hay with my brother, too. […]
He wanted to make him as sick as he is,” suggesting that if Eric had succeeded in sleeping with
Rufus, he would make him sick as well, asserting both fears of contamination and insult against a
homosexual lifestyle (Baldwin, Another 323). Arguments of and anxieties around moral
contagion speak to the fears surrounding vice, villainy. and homosexuality, in which being black,
poor, or homosexual—or being in contact with those who were black, poor, homosexual, or not
“from the right side of town” or “from a good family” increased the likelihood of a social status
transmission of devaluation. The sickness Ida speaks of is not physical, but mental and societal,
which leads a character down a path towards villainy. As Ida speaks through her grief, she
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accuses the very same Eric of not being a better friend to Rufus; Eric is expected to be closer to
Rufus due to their homosexual identities and Ida less so due to her heterosexuality despite her
familial bond. Baldwin infers through Ida Eribon’s notion that the ties of the homosexual
community—again, safer and more public in urban settings—are stronger than familial ties. This
distance in Vanishing Rooms is physical, as Phillip and Abdul may achieve close proximity in
prison while Ruella, despite her tacit support of their union, may only visit them from the
outside. The absence of familial discussion, support, or dissention is clear in Baldwin and while
Dixon complicates this briefly in Vanishing Rooms, the fact remains that the further away from
whiteness and heterosexuality a character is identified to be, the more likely they are in these
novels to be rejected from various forms of generational wealth or community; like most villains,
they appear distanced, alone, or othered.
Homosexuals can occasionally pass as heterosexual or asexual in a heteronormative
society, in ways that other identity markers cannot so easily be obscured, adding to the affect of
slipperiness that surrounds homosexuality in popular culture, as homosexuals decide whether or
not to “out” themselves to each new person in any social interaction. A homosexual is a person
who, Eribon writes, “is never done with the necessity of choosing to be himself or herself in the
face of a stigmatizing society,” and therefore publicly or privately self-identifies/confirms their
identity—perpetually—throughout their lives as a part of a social performative script constructed
for homosexuals and omitted for heterosexuals (113). Ahmed utilizes the metaphor of a road or
pathway to describe heterosexuality: a well-worn path becomes easier to use and more difficult
to diverge from, so much so that the road’s existence is no longer questioned but understood as
normal, natural, and/or easy, from which constant divergence becomes wearing on its traveler,
thereby assuring its positionality as status quo. It is easier and often safer to remain silent about
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one’s homosexuality because that silence implies the path of heterosexuality, even though a
future outing could be understood as deception. Heterosexuality, whiteness, and patriarchy work
to make themselves synonymous with being, so as to minimize the amount of emotional or
intellectual labor involved with questioning themselves; these shortcuts aid the travelers along
these paths. Heterosexuals don’t have to think about their own heterosexuality, its
announcement, or the warmth of its reception; the affluence of whiteness is the ability to not
have to think about one’s race as a race; men have eschewed thinking critically about gender
inequality or the ways in which they hold societal and financial power made unavailable to
women. Questioning the ways in which these paths have been paved involves emotional and
intellectual labor that its users may avoid. Holders of absolute privilege do not like to be
questioned about their absolute privilege, and seldom care to share their privileged status, which
they have understood as their innate and rightful path. Those who converse the paths of racial
minorities, of being gendered female, or of homosexuality are subjugated, and when they are
presumed as leaving their given paths and passing or masquerading as white, male, or
heterosexual, they become subject to social punishment.
Further, Eribon’s conception of insult suggests that despite the relative safety implied
within intimate relationships—i.e. two individuals—there is always the possibility of emotional
harm; insult removes the possibility of privacy for the insulted. Eribon refers to insult as a “way
of looking me over and a way of dispossessing me,” which illustrates that to be insulted is to be
seen—recognized—and then, attacked or forsaken (16). An example of this occurs when Metro
calls Jesse a “nigger” while they are making love, during a tender and vulnerable moment for
Jesse, who narrates:
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I kissed him. I kissed him everywhere: forehead, eyes, nose, lips, neck, nipples,
navel, and there. I held him tight. His penis responded to my caresses, and I
kissed it again and again. Metro held me, his thighs tight, his fingers knotting my
hair. His moan, my moan, some kind of song from his deep chest and mine. But it
wasn’t a song and his chest wasn’t filling with desire or love that could hold
safety and assurance for us. It wasn’t that, but his teeth edging like a razor on one
word: “Nigger.”
I froze. My stomach churned with sudden fear and heat. I reached for the
light. I couldn’t say anything. I looked at him. My words were slow in coming.
“What did you say?”
“I said, ‘nigger.’”
“You mean that, Metro?”
“You wanted it low, didn’t you? You wanted it dirty. Yes, I meant it.”
“But I don’t understand what you mean.”
“You wanted to ride the rough train, huh? Well, ride it, nigger.”
“You goddamn son of a bitch.”
“No, I’m Metro, remember. You call me that. You want it low. You want
me to take you there. Down under. Well, down under you ain’t nothing but a
nigger. A coal-black nigger.” (Dixon 113-4)
Metro brings a public insult into a private sphere, looking Jesse over and dispossessing him in
spite of their intimacy, thus suggesting to Jesse that nowhere is he safe from emotional harm.
The ability for multiple identities to be insulted reinforce a white heteronormative patriarchy
which elevates itself beyond reproach; both Metro and Jesse are homosexual, an insultable
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identity, but only Jesse is insulted based on his lack of whiteness. Similarly, either could one day
refer to the other as a “faggot,” despite both claiming a homosexual identity. Eribon writes that,
“in insult, it is one’s inner sanctum that is threatened, one’s heart of hearts, what the spiritual
tradition calls the ‘soul.’ If a well-targeted insult provokes such a strong echo in the
consciousness of the person at whom it is directed, it is because this ‘soul’ has been created
through socialization in a world of insult and inferiorization,” suggesting that insults are
reiterative utterances that are effective only through socialization designed to subjugate or other
a person or persons (66). Insulting names are insulting because society has stigmatized them as
such, and through public repetition have survived. Thus, insults carry the weight and tradition of
societal norms within them. When they are leveled in private spaces they become more
damaging because they remove a perception of privacy while decreasing the ability of public
dissent or amplification aimed towards the insulter. Cvetkovich writes, “[…] sexual trauma
seems to be in danger of invisibility, especially due to the gendered divide between private and
public spheres,” and Metro sexually traumatizes Jesse by insulting him, in this instance based on
his race rather than sexual orientation, in a way that is publicly invisible, allowing Metro’s insult
to remain unchecked (30). Metro is Jesse’s chosen family, and he offers support for Jesse’s
homosexuality, but he insults his race. An insult is damaging to the recipient, but it is also a
performance that usually prefers an audience to reify decanting social strata—you are this and
therefore I must not be this and as this warrants public shaming whereas I do not; my social
stratum must be above yours in our shared social hierarchy. Without public amplification, within
the private sphere, insult works primarily to remind the recipient that in no space may they feel
safe or unguarded, and it secondarily reminds them that in a society of two, they may consider
themselves to be at the bottom of a dichotomous social hierarchy. In other words, insult is a
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public facing negative socialization, made worse when administered privately because of the
ability for it to seep more deeply into the consciousness of the recipient and/or lower their
standing to the lowest possible place, to the point of achieving invisibility. Jesse has imbibed a
socially traumatic insult; he knows what it means to be called a “nigger,” and ultimately
represses this sexually traumatic exchange with Metro. It resurfaces as a flashback dream, further
emphasizing the trauma of the moment: nowhere is Jesse safe from insult (Dixon 114). Rufus is
insulted by his sister Ida for his homosexuality, and Jesse is insulted by his lover Metro for his
race. For identities that represent a minority perspective—those that cannot claim a trifecta of
white, heterosexual, and male—the threat of insult is perpetual in both public and private
spheres.
The public/private division has long been utilized to reinforce traditional gender norms
that have kept white women hidden from the public sphere under the proviso of safety and white
men in positions of societal power within a public collective, but in examining this division, one
also sees a reinforcement of heterosexuality as privately sacrament and publicly sacrosanct,
while homosexuality is relegated to abhorrence. Both public and private spaces are understood in
heterosexual terms—visibly and invisibly—which therefore moves to omit homosexuality.
Berlant describes privacy as:
[…] simultaneously, a theoretical space imagined by U.S. constitutional and
statutory law; a scene of taxonomic violence that devolves privilege on certain
actual spaces of practical life; a juridical substance that comes to be synonymous
with secure domestic interiority; and a structure of protection and identity that
sanctions, by analogy, other spaces that surround, secure, and frame the bodies
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whose acts, identities, identifications, and social value are the booty over which
national culture wages its struggle to exist as a struggle to dominate sex. (381)
Berlant’s fascination with privacy revolves around a paradox: the public space is a heterosexual
space, but the private space is, too; national culture has differentiated them by a level of
heterosexual explicitness, where public spaces are covertly heterosexual and private spaces are
overtly so. Referencing a public memo about oral and anal sex drafted by Daniel Richman, a
clerk for Supreme Court justice Thurgood Marshall, Berlant notes that, “but in almost referring
to heterosexuality, that sacred national identity that happens in the neutral territory of national
culture, Richman almost made the ‘sex’ of heterosexuality imaginable, corporeal, visible,
public,” thus alarming his readers by his near reference to heterosexuality, which is meant to
remain above the reproach of discussion (382). Heterosexuality is not up for debate; it is the path
with the affluence to not be questioned or called upon to explain itself. Berlant emphasizes that
while sex is understood as automatically heterosexual and both as a public and private norm,
American national culture demands silence about its pervasiveness. Berlant is “telling a story
about preserving a boundary between: what can be done and said in public, what can be done in
private but not spoken of in public, and what can, patriotically speaking, neither be done nor
legitimately spoken of at all in the United States,” which could be understood as heterosexuality,
heterosexuality, and homosexuality, respectively (383). This trichotomy moves to accomplish
several aims, namely: it normalizes heterosexuality; it distances homosexuality, leaving space for
insult; and it invites national discourse and conceptions of nationhood into sexual discourse and
vice versa—heterosexuality becomes patriotic while homosexuality becomes a threat to the
national imagination. Cvetkovich notes that “the natural and the strange or perverse apply to
sexuality and nationality equally,” allowing an additional venue for insult to stick to some
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(homosexual, foreign) but reflect off of others (heterosexual, patriotic) (151). Puar extends
Berlant’s idea to include race, writing, “more important, the private is a racialized and
nationalized construct, insofar as it is granted not only to heterosexuals but to certain citizens and
withheld from many others and from noncitizens,” suggesting that the private is a constructed
space—a paradise—a fabricated place or zone of respite meant to provide the impression of
safety for a select few whom are most often white and heterosexual (124-5). Characters like
Rufus, LeRoy, and Phillip exhibit fewer instances of privacy in Another Country and Vanishing
Rooms compared to characters like Cass, validating Puar’s point. Further, they also correlate
with public good standing, or whiteness and heterosexuality dominating public spaces.
Heterosexuality becomes a signifier of a good or upstanding citizen when compared to
homosexuality. Hartman writes:
In the twentieth century, the unregulated movement and assembly of black folks
remained a matter of public safety. Gatherings that were too loud or too unruly or
too queer—or venues like hotels and cabarets that welcomed black and white
patrons; black-and-tan dives frequented by Chinese men and white girls or black
women with Italian paramours or women who preferred dancing with each
other—were deemed disorderly, promiscuous, and morally depraved. (Wayward
Lives 247)
To be black, gendered female, or homosexual was to require public regulation for fear of moral
depravity; private spaces that held gatherings like those Hartman proposes were horrifying to
civil society, because they were spaces where villainous behavior could fester. For Jesse and
Metro, Metro’s insulting of Jesse reminds him of Jesse’s promiscuous moral depravity, but not of
his own. Whiteness similarly becomes a signifier of a good or upstanding citizen, whereas
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blackness or any other racial identifier becomes a signifier of foreignness; even when those black
or brown bodies have spent their entire lives within the cultural and/or physical sphere of that
nation (e.g. African-Americans like Rufus raised entirely within the United States), they are
rejected as non-representatives or dangerous members of that citizenship. Lacking good standing
or citizenship is a tenement of villainy. Privacy requires status and/or wealth; the act of removing
privacy places a character into a prison, low income housing, homelessness/the state of being
unhoused, or an immigrant detention center, simultaneously perpetually public while physically
or mentally divested from public consciousness like public heterosexuality itself. This is true in
tandem with Puar’s assertion that, “if we are to examine just one other coordinate of
disenfranchisement, such as homeless youth, we see that LGBT youth constitute 25 to 40 percent
of the total homeless youth population, an indictment of private liberty at home if there ever was
one,” illustrating that disenfranchisement affects heterosexual and homosexual youth differently;
heterosexual youth do not live under the threat that their heterosexuality will cast them out of
their homes, stripping them of their privacy and security (124). Further, private and public are
not dependent upon literal, structured space(s)—they may be sociological or cultural in nature; in
Studio 54: The Documentary, film critic Bob Colacello states of the late 1970s New York City
night scene, “gay clubs were some of the first clubs that had disco music. But disco was black
music, and it came out of black clubs. The beautiful models, the girls, would go to the gay clubs
with the gay designers and hairdressers and makeup men, and then the straight guys would want
to meet the models, so they would go to these clubs, and it all started blending,” suggesting that a
lack of privacy left a social group—Blacks—vulnerable to appropriation, and in the case of disco
culture multiple strains thereof. The public/private divide is a social construct that has benefited
and legitimized certain identities in certain spheres, namely whiteness, patriotism and
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heterosexuality in public and private, while restricting and illegitimating others, such as
blackness, foreignness, homosexuality, often using the tools of (in)visibility and citizenship to
reinforce its own power structure.
Prisons fall into a separate category for Berlant, as a location that is neither public nor
private. A prison is a place to send unsavory citizens: debtors, Blacks, homosexuals, foreigners,
and any who challenge the structure of the American white heteronormative patriarchy by
breaking the laws created and reinforced by the American white heteronormative patriarchy,
which is then examined in Vanishing Rooms. Dixon explores the proliferation of race and
incarceration with Phillip, Ruella’s brother, who is in prison on drug charges. Gladwell in his
essay “The Crooked Ladder” discusses how the American “War on Drugs” coincided with an
exodus of a European immigrant community-economy (i.e. mafias) and an influx of a black
community-economy (i.e. gangs) that encouraged the incarceration of the black community, and
thereby the extra-legal black community-economy, which Phillip is written into. Before the “War
on Drugs,” mafiosos could enter a crime syndicate or family, rise in the ranks, launder that
money, and—if they survived this lifestyle outside of the law—retire as their spouse and children
reaped the benefits of their savvy. As demographics in American cities shifted and these outside
of the law pathways became dominated by African-Americans, the federal government
accelerated its crackdown on crime, thereby reducing the likelihood that black gang members
may one day retire, leaving their family well attended. Phillip wrote to Ruella from prison,
“being heroic and black ain’t easy. ‘Specially if you a man. Ain’t nothing here but men. black
men, Puerto Rican men, even one or two white boys” (Dixon 77). Dixon, through Phillip, calls
into question the relationship between heroism and blackness, by revealing the lack of legal
economic availability to the black community and the increased punishment of the extra-legal
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black economy that narrows the possibility for black citizens—and in particular black earners—
to be upstanding citizens, which then increases the black population in the American prison
system. Further, Dixon is calling into question the relationship between heroism and black
masculinity, in a patriarchal society that preferences men as earners; Phillip notes that prison is
full of black men, with the occasional white boy, signifying that whiteness can outgrow the need
for incarceration. White men, who are financially viable, are amassing wealth outside of the
prison, while black men are not. Their heroism, Phillip is arguing, makes them sacrificial to the
prison-industrial complex. If you are not a hero, or even an law-abiding citizen within the
framework of laws and policing practices that embolden some while restricting others, then what
are you? What could you aspire to become? This extends to black women as well. Hartman
writes in Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments of Esther Brown in the 1910s:
She didn’t need a husband or a daddy or a boss telling her what to do. But a
young woman who flitted from job to job and lover to lover was considered
immoral and likely to become a threat to the social order, a menace to society.
The police detective said as much when he arrested Esther and her friends. […]
The modes of intimacy and affiliation being fashioned, the refusal to labor, the
ordinary forms of fathering and assembly, the practices of subsistence and making
do were under surveillance and targeted not only by the police but also by the
sociologists and the reformers who gathered the information and made the case
against them, forging their lives into tragic biographies of crime and pathology.
(235-6)
Black women who were not at work or at home—who dared to have a publicly leisurable life—
were accused of vagrancy and prostitution and were arrested. Prisons are patriotic institutions in
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the United States; no other country incarcerates people at the level that Americans do (World
Prison Population List). That the black community is represented in overwhelming proportions
in prisons is a marker of that patriotism; it reaffirms the privilege of privacy as a racial construct.
There is no place where an individual who is in a minority may be completely and
unquestionably safe. Social structures that create majority and minority power dynamics prevent
those who are in the minority from having a space in which to rest. On a national level, AfricanAmericans have been relegated to prisons where they live lives that are simultaneously publicprivate without the comfort of freedom or privacy. Berlant explores the heterosexuality of public
and private spaces, removing any setting for homosexuality. Eribon explores nuclear
relationships in which one’s racial minority may place oneself into the majority of the household
but one’s sexual identity revokes that union and therefore safe haven. Baldwin and Dixon
explore this phenomenon thusly: even one’s closest sibling, or lover, may dispossess the ones
they love because of their minority identity—and the threat of that insult lives deep within every
minority identifying individual.

Hierarchy and Miscegenation in Male Homosexual Acts
Referring to Leo Bersani’s essay “Is the Rectum a Grave?,” Cvetkovich writes, “Bersani
recommends getting fucked for its capacity to produce ‘self-shattering,’ which is not strictly
reducible to the physical experience of being penetrated but is a more profoundly psychic
experience,” and that self-shattering speaks to a struggle of identity with men who perform
homosexual acts throughout Baldwin and Dixon that allow participants to insult fellow
homosexuals and further self-shame a homosexual community by establishing a theoretical
divide between the shattered (i.e. bottoms whose sexual acts are synonymous with feminine roles
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in heterosexual encounters) and the whole (i.e. tops whose sexual acts are synonymous with
masculine roles in heterosexual encounters) (61). To be homosexual or perform a homosexual
act comes with a rationalization absent in heterosexual acts on a sliding scale from a more
perceived masculine heterosexual role, e.g. topping or receiving oral sex, to a more perceived
feminine role, e.g. bottoming or giving oral sex, that favors heterosexuality and shames
homosexuality in the identical societal structure that favors sexually active men and shames
sexually active women. Heterosexuality is in the room, defining sex, even amongst homosexuals.
Cvetkovich continues, “Yet the fact that men like to get fucked only seems counterintuitive (or
‘queer’) if it is assumed that everyone really wants to be ‘masculine’ and on top or that the
trauma of penetration must necessarily be negative,” highlighting the suggested preference for
societal, hierarchical power that comes with the positionality of masculine heterosexuality (63).
To emphasize that power, there is also the continued public/private divide that makes masculine
derived homosexual acts performed in group or public settings (masculine spaces) more
legitimate than private or intimate ones (feminine space). Throughout Baldwin and Dixon, there
is a pervasive exertion for men who socially participate in homoerotic acts to redefine them as
masculine or non-homoerotic, and therefore normal. “That’s different, Lonny. We was on top”;
“[…] we picked up this queer, a young guy, […] he was scared green […] there were seven of
us, and we made him go down on all of us and then we beat the piss out of him and took all his
money”; “I must have been a bitch. They got their pussy, didn’t they? Faggot pussy. They didn’t
care: Pussy is pussy, a nut’s a nut. They would find any way to crack it” (Dixon 62; Baldwin,
Another 112; Dixon 158). These are all representations of homosexual rape, in which the
aggressors (in each case plural, reinforcing a fraternity of masculinity and legitimizing the
violence as communal and societal) use force to achieve their own sexual gratifications, which
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are defined as masculine or non-homosexual, and justify their homoerotic acts by participating in
traditionally masculine sexual roles that can be extended to heterosexual encounters; the final
quote comes from Lonny, who is absolving the aggressors of his own rape. The aggressors
therefore can continue to classify themselves as heterosexuals, their behaviors justified as an
extension of their male privilege or power, and may continue to insult or shame their homosexual
sex partners as weaker, interchangeable, sexually duplicitous by virtue of multiple sexual
partners in quick succession, and even as invalid citizens in the national, public space. Writing of
nationality and sexuality Puar examines the public reception of a gay man who thwarted a plane
hijacking:
Indeed, exemplary of this transference of stigma, positive attributes were attached
to Mark Bingham’s homosexuality: butch, masculine, rugby player, white,
American, hero, gay patriot, called his mom (i.e., homonational), while negative
connotations of homosexuality were used to racialize and sexualize Osama bin
Laden: feminized, stateless, dark, perverse, pedophilic, disowned by family (i.e.,
fag). What is at stake here is not only that one is good and the other evil; the
homosexuality of Bingham is converted into acceptable patriot values, while the
evilness of bin Laden is more fully and efficaciously rendered through
associations with sexual excess, failed masculinity (i.e., femininity), and faggotry.
(Puar 46)
Bingham, who is homosexual, performed a patriotic act and as a consequence of these two
conflicting identities received a “homonational” reception that convulsed to reframe his
homosexuality as a heroic, replete with cis-gender masculine norms that might suggest his
wholeness, while Osama bin Laden, who is heterosexual, who is patriarchic and patriotic, and
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who further is Caucasian by definition of ethnicity (i.e., Indo-European, which includes Arab
groups and persons of North African ancestry) receives a reframed negative reception because of
his opposition to American society, and that negative reception is both racialized and sexualized
as the opposite of heroic. It becomes clear that it is not one’s true sexuality, race, gender, or even
national origin that provides or prohibits power; it is the stigma or perception of a sexuality, race,
gender, or national origin that provides or prohibits power. One may be homosexual or perform
homosexual acts but be perceived as heterosexual and therefore of a greater status. In Another
Country, when Vivaldo is having sex with Eric, the following memory surfaces:
It was his first sexual encounter with a male friend in many years, and his very
first sexual encounter with a friend. He associated the act with the humiliation and
the debasement of one male by another, the inferior male of less importance than
the crumpled, cast-off handkerchief; but he did not feel this way toward Eric; and
therefore he did not know what he felt. (384)
Through Vivaldo, Baldwin exhibits this societal norm: with two men performing homosexual
acts, one is perceived as dominating the other and the two will not become or remain equal from
their union. The male who dominates is the most masculine, wherein lies the most power and
happiness, and that affect perpetually allows subjugation and insult of an equal or forced
homosexual participant, who receives the stigma of homosexuality regardless of their actual
sexual identity. But Baldwin subverts this idea by opening the door to the possibility in
Vivaldo’s mind that one could feel more than domination or self-shattering in a homosexual
union. This examination of a capacity of love for another human being that does not have at its
root a sense of societal competition and aggression and/or ownership is unique and rare in
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Baldwin’s works. The hierarchal sexual distinctions in the homosexual community exist
primarily to benefit the white heteronormative patriarchy.
The unhappiness that Baldwin elevates to the fore surrounding his Black characters has
been read as a form of self-hatred that marks Baldwin as a “lover of whites,” who seeks to
miscegenate intellectually and physically his characters in direct opposition to writers like
Norman Mailer (Stockton 159). Stockton writes, “the (predictable) sign of this war is his
character Rufus Scott (in Another Country) who, in double-duty miscegenation, ‘let a white
bisexual homosexual fuck him in his ass, and who took a Southern Jezebel for his woman, with
all that these tortured relationships imply,” and such physical miscegenation extends to Ida and
Vivaldo, and Eric and LeRoy; further still intellectually, with Cass and Ida, and Rufus and
Vivaldo (159). Stockton writes:
Here we find the switchpoint between black and queer more directly shaped by
authors who think about the “problem” of miscegenation. This is a highly
embodied switchpoint. It is embodied by black and white men who engage in
homosexual miscegenation, even if it only occurs in their thoughts. Intimately
sharing their signs with each other, if not always their actual bodies, they engage
in (what they consider) shameful attractions and struggle with their attraction to
shame. Frequently, they are awarded with violence, against their bodies or their
minds. This sort of shame, we are going to be told, can fester in the mind like a
rotting corpse. (150-1)
Nowhere is this clearer than when Vivaldo recounts several bisexual ménages à trois with Rufus
in passing, that brings to his memory objectifying a fellow military enlister’s black penis while
abroad in Munich (Baldwin 134). “Somewhere in his heart the black boy hated the white boy
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because he was white. Somewhere in his heart Vivaldo had feared and hated Rufus because he
was black,” Baldwin writes, sublimating Vivaldo and Rufus to representatives of their respective
races, but underneath this hatred was an attraction, and a shame (134).

Conclusion
This chapter is an examination of the intersection of multiple identities in Baldwin’s Another
Country and Melvin Dixon’s Vanishing Rooms at a historical time in which the civil rights of
Blacks and homosexuals weighed on the forefront of American consciousness. Quite notably,
there are hierarchies within hierarchies. Eribon writes:
We should add that if “subversion” is always partial, this is partly because a
subject’s position within relations of domination is never simple. There are
always multiple hierarchizations, sometimes contradictory among themselves: a
gay man may be in a dominated and vulnerable position within the hierarchy of
sexualities while being well positioned to dominate in terms of his sex, his class,
his ethnicity—that is, he could be a man, a well-to-do-man, a white man, and so
on. To take another example, a black woman will perhaps feel more oppressed
because she is black than because she is a woman and may therefore feel more
solidarity with black men than with white women—and thus more inclined to
struggle against racial domination and racism than against masculine domination
and sexism. We need to try to conceive of the ensemble of systems of domination
and oppression together as a totality, to think of these systems in their multiplicity
and with all of their articulations. (127)
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It is the multiplicity and totality of hierarchies and dominations in a classification obsessed
society that this chapter aims to illuminate; illustrating a spectrum of intersectionalities in which
two or more persons’ shared identities in their sexuality, race, gender, or national origin is
overshadowed for some by a perpetual threat of insult meant to subjugate and elevate but never
equivocate, demonstrates the intricacies of the white heteronormative patriarchal social fabric—
often shortened to white supremacy—which attempts to obfuscate itself by normalizing its
practices and laying claim to visible public and private spaces, thus remaining in power by
dividing and conquering all other minority groups by encouraging insult, and by creating paths to
vilify any willful identities that rise to question this constructed social structure. By continuing to
debase whole groups of persons, this societal structure has nurtured pathways for people to not
only fail to succeed, but to fail to have the option of succeeding by virtue of their identity
markings—the inability of Ida to dream, the inability of Rufus to live, and the inability of Jesse
and Metro to have a safe and loving relationship; none of these were possibilities, and all of them
received insults by virtue of one of their identities from another who shared a same identity,
which aides in their depression. These minority groups have come to police themselves by
examining other difference and identities within their groups, which serves to benefit the white
heteronormative patriarchy, and perpetuates what is at its core, a new chapter of slave narratives.
Instead of operating pathways of success for these identities, this societal structure has given way
to a negative manifest destiny of what Ahmed refers to as “affect aliens” who are not favored by
this society, who are discouraged from questioning this society, and whose only pathway for
expressing ambition is in becoming a willful villain who is a danger to this white
heteronormative patriarchal society—a person who does dangerous or villainous things,
including miscegenation, unsanctioned violence, or who moves against traditional femininity by
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rejecting motherhood or valuing career over marriage. Rufus, Lonny, and Metro, who do not
accept their lowered ceiling of ambition and who then turn to drug or alcohol abuse as aims to
alter a reality that has rejected them, are further punished either by the state (prison) or by their
own psychosis, resulting in death.
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3. Detaching Homosexuality from Villainy: My Friend Dahmer, 8-Bit
Theater, and My Favorite Thing is Monsters
Monsters are our children. They can be pushed to the farthest margins of geography and
discourse, hidden away at the edges of the world and in the forbidden recesses of our mind, but
they always return. –Jeffrey Jerome Cohen

In this chapter, I examine three graphic narratives that demonstrate a literary awareness of the
conflation of homosexuality and villainy. My Friend Dahmer by Derf Backderf is a graphic
memoir that portrays homosexual serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer in his youth. Backderf makes
attempts to separate Dahmer’s villainous murder drive from his homosexuality, however he falls
short by solidifying the ways in which heterosexuality is normalized in their society, forcing
homosexuality to remain abnormal. 8-Bit Theater by Brian Clevinger is an online comic that
mimics video games and parodies the traditionally homosexualized villain as benign and affable
rather than malicious and deranged. By presenting a homosexual villain whose kindness outstrips
his misanthropy, and by presenting an ambitious and cutthroat kidnapped princess, readers are
invited to rethink tropes of villainy and victimhood by questioning the ties between villains and
villainous behavior. My Favorite Thing is Monsters by Emil Ferris invites viewers to consider
monstrosity as an additional tenement of othering, particularly complex as those who are
depicted as monsters are valorized, including two homosexual characters, Karen and Franklin.
The literary trope of the conflation of homosexuality and villainy is so pervasive it
crossed medium boundaries into graphic narratives and video games. With the upswell of
popular culture consumed through visual forms of art in the latter half of the 20th century leading
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into the 21st, it comes as no surprise that this trope entered video game and graphic art mediums.
And the antiestablishment or underground sentiments of these communities more easily
questioned the tropes that they had inherited from literature. Graphic narratives more apparently
embraced the separation of villainy and homosexuality. My Friend Dahmer by Derf Backderf
attempts to absolve homosexual serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer of his homosexuality as an impetus
for murder but fails to consider the (heterosexual) societal pressure placed on Dahmer which he
then internalizes; 8-Bit Theater by Brian Clevinger portrays an affable homosexual villain
thereby complicating the readers’ relationship with villainy and viciousness; and My Favorite
Thing is Monsters by Emil Ferris presents homosexual saviors who are monsters but who are not
monstruous. These three narratives navigate conceptions of homosexuality and villainy that
complicate the traditional trope of conflation.

My Friend Dahmer
Derf Backderf’s graphic narrative My Friend Dahmer is an autobiographical graphic narrative
about homosexual serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer during his high school years, in which graphic
artist Backderf frequently interacts with Dahmer and could not have predicted Dahmer’s future
killings. Backderf suggests that Dahmer’s homosexuality is not a cause or conflation of villainy,
however he overlooks the extent to which Dahmer is ostracized because of his internalized
homophobia, a subset of Dahmer’s cruel optimism. While Backderf describes a suppression of
homosexuality that alludes to Dahmer’s further ostracization, he rationalizes that Dahmer’s
homosexuality is not integral to Dahmer’s misanthropy. Backderf points to rampant alcoholism
and social isolation that encourages Dahmer to be left “alone, with only the voices in his head
[…] which would now grow louder and louder” (143). It is society’s abandonment of Dahmer
that nurtures this misanthropic behavior. Rather, in regards to Dahmer’s homosexuality,
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Backderf narrates, “He kept his homosexuality hidden from everyone. That was the norm. Many
of our classmates were gay, and not a single one came out in high school. But Dahmer had
another secret, a terrible secret. In Dahmer’s fantasies, his lovers… …were dead. Dead men.
Corpses,” creating a stark division between homosexuality and necrophilia (54). Below
Backderf’s narration, Dahmer is imagining the jogger he covets is rigid on Dahmer’s bed, fully
clothed, and deceased, the result—in Dahmer’s imagination—of cruel optimism, but if this
fantasy is made true, Dahmer becomes a murderous gay villain (54).
What the gay rights movement and constructions of villainy have in common is that both
identities are working to change a white, patriarchal heteronormative society; what varies is the
motive, the degree of radicalism, and violence committed to do it. These differences are
immense. Nevertheless, as homosexuality was perceived as antithetical to an American
heteronormative society (heteronationalism) throughout much of the twentieth century,
homophobia became a socially sanctioned activity, grown in fear of loss of culture—a cultural
death. Within the umbrella of villainy at its more extreme is the potential for murder, and serial
killings—a physical death. To a heteronationalistic culture, the threats of change embedded in
the civil rights movement—including the sexual revolution—and in serial killers are both a form
of death, and therefore both homosexuality and villainy act as a danger to a contemporary society
that has convinced itself—in the face of perpetual human evolution—it should remain in stasis,
and in the case of conservative cultures move towards a reversal of progression. Schildcrout,
author of Murder Most Queer, an examination of this intertwined identity in American theater
writes, “both the homosexual and the serial killer have occupied this position of ‘monster’ in the
public imagination, and the ‘gay serial killer’ has been a particularly compelling and problematic
monster, especially since the early 1990s, when the conflation of homosexuality and homicidal
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violence found new resonance in popular culture,” reifying the conflation between
homosexuality and villainy and signaling its resurfacing in various media representations (156).
Schildcrout continues:
Homophobic discourse symbolically connects serial killers with queer people,
equating their crimes with sexual lust. Serial killers usually do not murder for
financial gain or out of emotions like love or hate. Rather, they possess a
pathological, even physical urge to kill that must be satisfied on a regular basis.
As Joyce Carol Oates put it in her 1994 profile of Jeffrey Dahmer, the serial killer
operates “with no apparent motive for his monstrous crimes except the
gratification of desire.” The homophobic imagination equates this murderous
desire with homosexual desire, viewing it as physical lust, removed from the
romantic or social ideals attributed to heterosexuality. Both homosexual and
murderous “lusts” are imagined as abnormal, unhealthy, monstrous desires that
exist because of a lack of proper morality. And both are subject to much
speculation and debate about causation: what internal or external forces make
someone gay, and what makes someone a psychopathic killer? (157)
Backderf’s next lines in the graphic narrative My Friend Dahmer continue Schildcrout’s search
for causation: “what spawned this perverse sexual hunger? What deep, fetid part of his psyche
gurgled up this miscreant desire, so powerfully voracious it immediately devoured him whole?”
(55). Backderf alludes to the overlapping of homosexuality, perversity, and violence in this
consideration; this perverse sexual hunger that is fetid and gurgling. Backderf ultimately
suggests that what Dahmer fanaticized about is “lying down next to his unconscious body,”
“fondling him,” and “having ‘total control’ over him,” and allows the reader to come to their
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own conclusion about the connections between murder and homosexuality in this passage (58).
At no point does Backderf state that Dahmer’s homosexuality lives outside of his urge to murder
men; it is possible that neither Backderf nor Dahmer could fully separate the same-sex
preference and the murder drive. Nor does Backderf attempt to psychoanalyze Dahmer in
retrospect or in his memory as a high school student—it could be an easy association to suggest
that the only way in which Dahmer could engage in homosexual acts in a heterosexual society
without fear of repercussion was to completely control his lovers; Backderf does not engage in
such psychological conjecturing that would provide a clear and unequivocal separation between
the two, or even conflate the two entirely. But the reader may surmise that Backderf’s assertion
that other classmates were also gay and that they came out later limits the possibility that the
miscreant desire in Dahmer is caused by same sex objectification. Backderf does show signs of
conflating the two elsewhere in what may be read as ignorance or negligence. However, by
specifically refusing to accept outright and/or by questioning homosexual desire as a causation of
Dahmer’s murders, Backderf constructs a rift between an embedded homophobia that encourages
the labeling of homosexual desire as monstrous.
Backderf utilizes three graphic techniques that heighten the complexity of his portrayal of
Dahmer as villainous, in his psychopathy but not his sexuality, that permeate his work: Backderf
escalates Dahmer’s antipathy through his eyeglasses, which early film reproductions overlook;
Backderf separates the diegesis and mimesis; and Backderf inserts two photographs into his
illustration that highlight Dahmer’s self-loathing and lack of belonging. However, in examining
these final two graphic techniques, the reader may discover that Backderf’s heteronormativity
overshadows his examinations of Dahmer’s homosexuality in significant ways.
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Backderf’s illustration of Dahmer’s eyes and eyeglasses signify Dahmer’s disassociation
with society as the memoir progresses. Through graphic illustration, Backderf visually depicts
Dahmer’s separation from society by presenting his eyeglasses as reflective shields rather than
windows through which an exterior world may be observed and absorbed. Earle writes:
Of all the photographs of Jeffrey Dahmer that were published after his arrest and
during his subsequent trial, several have particularly captured the public
imagination but none more so than his arrest photograph. […] The single item
missing from this photograph are his spectacles, present in almost every
photograph of Dahmer during his childhood and adolescence, as well as in the
majority of photographs taken in court and prison. The fact that he is not wearing
spectacles in this photograph is most likely a simple omission, characteristic of
arrest photographs. However, though the majority of photographs show him
wearing them, in all four of the films made about his life and crimes, the Dahmer
character rarely, if ever, wears spectacles. […]
Spectacles are used in My Friend Dahmer, not only to maintain the
realism of Dahmer’s appearance (all of his high-school photographs show largeframed spectacles), but also in various guises as frames, mirrors and veils to
conceal and reveal Dahmer’s eyes at strategic points throughout the narrative.
[…] The clouding of Dahmer’s spectacle lenses represents points within the text
at which he allows his own self-creation to overcome that which is socially
expected of him and become the key focus of his life. As I show, this clouding of
lenses—and thus removal of eyes—becomes more and more prominent as the text
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progresses and Dahmer moves further from the social ideal into the seeming
antithesis of the serial killer. (Earle 435-6)
Perhaps due to Earle’s notation, when Marc Meyers directed My Friend Dahmer three years after
Earle’s publication, Dahmer (Ross Lynch) wears glasses. In the 2017 film, the tint of Dahmer’s
glasses occasionally obscures his eyes from the viewer, but not to the extent that Backderf
illustrates in the memoir; instead, Dahmer’s increasingly lumbering gait works to express his
dissention into psychopathy on screen. Further, the hidden nature of his homosexuality—further
examined in the graphic narrative below—is expressed in two scenes absent in the graphic
narrative: first by his distraction from public heterosexuality as his male friends examine
pornographic material in a grocery store as shoppers peruse in the background and Dahmer
makes farm animal noises while jumping up and down behind a partition, and later as Dahmer
seeks out the jogger he covets—a doctor—who examines him as a new patient to his practice for
a hernia as a part of a standard physical checkup; in the next scene, Dahmer is at home, in the
dark, masturbating to this memory.
The separation of diegesis and mimesis in the graphic narrative My Friend Dahmer is
vital as the diegetic narration is cognizant of Dahmer’s homosexuality and necrophilia, while the
mimetic constructs an understanding of the societal exclusion that leads to Dahmer’s villainy. El
Refaie parallels the diegetic of the film notion of the meganarrator—Groensteen’s recitant—
alongside the mimetic monstrator, the individual(s) who create the imagery that accompany the
text of the narration (56-7). El Refaie writes, “diegesis refers to the verbal storytelling by a
narrator, while mimesis is the act of showing a story, for instance in drama, the opera, or film”
(55). While the majority of My Friend Dahmer is drawn in Backderf’s signature artistic style, he
employs two photographs in mimesis in order to represent an unquestionable reality and
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therefore establish a baseline for truth. More specifically, by juxtaposing photograph and a
quoted phrase by Jeffrey Dahmer, Backderf encourages readers to doubt Dahmer’s narrative and
believe presented photographic evidence, which parallels with Backderf’s diegesis. The memoir
begins with a photograph and seemingly, a lie; on page 8, just before the Preface, is a
photograph—Jeffrey Dahmer at his high school in 1978, mouth agape, posture convulsed—and
above it, as though in epigraph, is the quote: “‘When I was a kid, I was just like anybody else.’ –
Jeff Dahmer” (Backderf 8). Backderf is more than coopting the authority of photography as a
proxy of veritas; he is challenging the statement that Dahmer presents about his childhood as a
falsehood, making this image with its accompanying text antithetical in that the photograph and
the diction that precedes it are contradictory. While the diegesis here is a direct quote of Dahmer,
it arrives from a contemporary or present Dahmer looking back over his childhood in the same
way that Backderf does throughout the memoir; Backderf’s contemporary diegesis pairs with a
retroactive mimesis of graphic iterations constructed throughout the memoir (55). The reader
sees photographic evidence of Dahmer pretending to have cerebral palsy in a photograph on a
page where Dahmer attempts to normalize his childhood and therefore this unusual behavior
through a statement meant to mask how far outside of community norms and understandings he
existed. The positionality of this is quite significant: the reader enters this graphic memoir with
the understanding that Dahmer’s recollections are unreliable.
However, a queered reading of My Friend Dahmer quickly dismantles the theory that
Dahmer is lying and therefore an unreliable diegetic. Dahmer is projecting an insult onto the gay
community, which for him and the heteronormative community is normal, further echoed by his
lack of belonging and erasure in the second photograph within My Friend Dahmer, considered
below. Backderf writes in the Sources section beyond the Epilogue, “Dahmer’s descriptions of
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his youth, in his own words, are more reliable than any other source. Once caught, Jeff was
remarkably forthright with the police, unlike most serial killers […]. Dahmer was truthful and
coherent,” which suggests therefore that Dahmer’s own words about his childhood which
Backderf chooses to begin the graphic narrative with are true (200). Rather than a lie meant to
mislead reporters, authorities, or a rewriting of history to convince himself, what readers see on
this page is Dahmer cruelly parodying his family’s homosexual interior decorator, Stan Burlman,
whom Dahmer’s friends—including Backderf—prank phone call and otherwise mock and
parody (100). Eribon writes:
Insult is more than a word that describes. It is not satisfied with simply telling me
what I am. If someone calls me a “dirty faggot” (or “dirty nigger” or “dirty kike”),
or even simple [sic] “faggot” (or “nigger” or “kike”), that person is not trying to
tell me something about myself. That person is letting me know that he or she has
something on me, has power over me. First and foremost the power to hurt me, to
mark my consciousness with that hurt, inscribing shame in the deepest levels of
my mind. This wounded, shamed consciousness becomes a formative part of my
personality. (16)
Here, I argue, Dahmer is insulting Stan Burlman as a way to gain power over his own life. By
insulting someone else who is homosexual, Dahmer is able to distance his own homosexuality
from the detection of his friends. As noted in a previous chapter, Eribon writes, “Mistakes can
have painful consequences. The experience of physical violence or the obsessive awareness of its
threat are so common in gay lives that they are mentioned in almost every autobiography and in
numerous novels with gay male characters,” which readers see not only in Dahmer’s being
bullied by boys in varsity jackets, but in Dahmer’s bullying of classmate Ray, who Backderf
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later in diegesis but never in mimesis announces as homosexual too, in tandem with his death
(Eribon 18; Backderf 121-3; 207; 88-9, Figure 1). Backderf fails to consider that Dahmer is the
recipient of violence due to his homosexuality and therefore Dahmer is enacting violence upon
other homosexuals, as is permitted and at times encouraged in a rigid heteronormative society; it
holds the possibility of self-preservation or protection. This heteronormativity is so powerful that
even Backderf incidentally comments on it. Backderf writes, “But what struck me most about
Dahmer was that stony mask of a face, devoid of any emotion. […] He wasn’t on my radar
screen. […] He was now. I was fifteen. And like most fifteen-year-olds, the hormones had
kicked in big-time. I thought about girls from dawn till dusk,” while mimetically illustrating
himself asserting the male gaze, objectifying a faceless female passerby. This suggests that, by
not being female and therefore objectifiable, and/or by not reinforcing the power structure of the
male gaze by joining or reinforcing Backderf’s objectification, Dahmer fails to matter to
Backderf unless he is making a spectacle of himself by mocking someone else (51, Figure 2).
The second photograph in My Friend Dahmer is one in which Dahmer sneaks into a National
Honor Society photo, for attention, and is blotted out by a teacher (Backderf 116-7). Backderf
considers this to be a “symbol of Dahmer’s wasted youth,” but does not emphasize the ways in
which this erasure of Dahmer’s face acts as a symbol of banishing Dahmer from the rest of
society, adults and teenagers alike (117, Figure 3). Dahmer, in essence, is executing an extreme
form of internalized homophobia, which Backderf does not seem to recognize.
Backderf’s argument is that it was the lack of support from adults who ushered or at
minimum aided Dahmer’s misanthropy, and in so doing Backderf overlooks Dahmer’s
homosexuality as an impediment to that support system. In searching for an answer as to who or
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what made Dahmer a serial killer, Backderf provides social isolation and the answer, but fails to
consider ways in which homophobia worsened that isolation. Backderf writes:
I’m often asked why I never spoke up. Why I didn’t try to get Dahmer help. You
have to remember, this was 1976. You never “narced” on a classmate. It simply
wasn’t done. Besides, my friends and I, we were just clueless small-town kids,
wrapped up in our own lives. And none of us had a hint about what was really
going on in his head. A better question is… …where were the damn adults? (667)
This shifting of blame speaks to the power of societal pressure that Backderf found himself in.
The affect of assistance and care were such that adults are meant to intervene on Dahmer’s
dangerous path towards murderer without the input from his classmates/cohort, and by failing to
do so, Backderf places the onus of Dahmer’s misanthropic upbringing entirely upon them. As
children in 1976 in Midwestern America, “clueless” and “wrapped up in their own lives,”
Backderf and his friends benefited from a heterosexual culture that Dahmer did not, that
Backderf expected adults in Dahmer’s life to reiterate to him to create happiness. Eribon writes:
Being true to oneself is doubtless easier for heterosexuals. This is not to claim that
heterosexual lives have no rifts in them or that all heterosexuals are people who
live with a happy sense of self-adequation. Yet, perhaps a certain stability is
ensured by family life, along with the powerfully heteronormative context of
professional life and, when you get right down to it, the entire sexual order that
makes heterosexual behaviors seem legitimate and “normal.” (114)
Legitimacy and normalcy are heterosexual, while homosexuality is illegitimate and abnormal,
furthering Dahmer from the rescuing of his anti-social behavior by others in his life. Backderf’s
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diegesis quotes Dahmer’s interview with Nancy Glass for Inside Edition in 1993 in which
Dahmer states, “I had normal friendships in high school,” which begins a chapter wherein
Backderf narrates that “the kids that did notice Dahmer……had little but contempt for him,”
providing a mimetic between the ellipses of two high school males slamming Dahmer into a
locker, with one out of frame shouting, “outta my way, ‘dumber’!” (28; 31). Paradoxically, the
violence sanctioned publicly by heteronormative masculinity becomes normal, whereas the
violence Dahmer begins to exhibit privately becomes abnormal. Dahmer, through Backderf,
exhibits this darker part of himself early in the novel when he invites a gang of teenage boys who
disbelieve him about his hut where he dissolves animals in jars of acid and states, referring to
one of those jars, “it interests me. What’s inside a body,” and this assertion works to alarm the
reader, who likely understands the foreshadowing of this statement in Dahmer’s career as a serial
killer, and to create a separation between Dahmer, whose fascinations and social nature is
simultaneously macabre and introverted and the other boys around him, who are always an
extroverted collective, some of whom performing socially cruel acts against Dahmer (23).
Dahmer’s private musings are alarming, whereas the gang of boys act as a normalizing
masculine force. Believing this hut and these jars to be acts of bravado, the boys disbelieve him
until he proves that he is being truthful—at which point they call Dahmer a “freak” (Backderf
26). Further, homosexuality is abrasive within a heteronormative family structure in which the
happiness of all individuals is dependent upon the ability to couple heterosexually, now or in the
future for children, for themselves and/or their offspring, in order to perpetuate the same
patriarchal heteronormative family structure. Dahmer’s homosexuality is never discussed with or
amongst the adults in his family; Backderf represents Dahmer’s emotional needs as unfulfilled
by his parents, and by his high school teachers who misread his loitering as productiveness.
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Dahmer is presented as seen and unseen by those around him; the simulacra of productive
student and entertainer/class clown, coupled with a teenage toxic masculinity that foregoes
empathy or emotional labor prevent a connection that could possibly have alerted someone to the
dark path that Dahmer navigates. Backderf’s defense and assertion that adults are the only ones
who have a vested interest in a safe society amounts to the saying, “Boys will be boys,” wherein
young men are freed from any emotional responsibility to those around them.
Dahmer’s social status is perpetually in flux, but what remains clear is that Dahmer is an
outsider or prop. Readers see Dahmer’s inability to make lasting friendships as a part of his path
towards sociopathy through Backderf’s illustrations that prove more complex. Schildcrout writes
of Dahmer’s antisocial positioning:
This odd detail from Dahmer’s youth is also depicted by the writer and artist Derf
Backderf in My Friend Dahmer, his autobiographical graphic novel about being
high school classmates with Jeffrey Dahmer in Ohio in the 1970s. Backderf and
his friends encourage Dahmer in his strange act, and in one incident they pay
Dahmer to give a “command performance” at a shopping mall, twitching and
shouting at unsuspecting patrons. The teens laugh at Dahmer’s grotesque
shenanigans, but once the show is over they don’t invite Dahmer to be part of
their evening plans. The incident highlights how Dahmer, as an awkward outsider,
performed a comically exaggerated version of his “freakishness” in order to win
the attention of his peers; but this attention does not translate into actual
friendship, and Dahmer remains nothing more than an amusing yet creepy
spectacle for the other teens. (161)
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And truly, Dahmer is the center of attention even as he is isolated from his peers; Backderf
writes in the Epilogue, “there were a dozen or so guys in the [Dahmer] Fan Club at any given
time, rotating in and out. In this story, I winnowed it down to the four principals for the sake of
the narrative,” suggesting that there were many teenage eyes on Dahmer, none of whom were
“narc”ing to adults (205). Backderf goes as far as to note that “My cartoon Dahmer was so
ubiquitous, he became something of a bizarro school mascot!” while commenting later that
Dahmer’s being bullied is what Backderf felt was a “regular occurrence” (118; 210). Dahmer is
fetishized but never accepted among his peer group; he is neither welcomed into the group nor
completely isolated from the group, so long as he proves entertaining for them as an actor or
victim. The result is that Backderf places Dahmer in what he refers to as the lower-caste of his
high school society, with other misfits and sore thumbs, one of whom is Figg. Backderf writes,
“Figg was the last of the lower-caste psychos (some of whom were serious drug users) with
whom Dahmer stayed in contact after high school. These friendships, if they could be called that,
would all peter out by the end of the summer. […] This was the last friendship Dahmer would
have in his life,” calling into question Dahmer’s ability to maintain healthy relationships with his
peers (218). Backderf downplays for the sake of a cleaner narrative, the amount of peers who
surround Dahmer—while deeply questioning the lack of adult supervision in Dahmer’s life—and
makes clear to the readers that he is bullied, without examining the social structures amongst
teenagers gendered male that would lead to Dahmer’s ostracization.
At the crux of Dahmer’s homosexual and more sinister drives lies what Berlant has
coined “cruel optimism,” and Backderf’s illustration thereof signifies that Dahmer’s
homosexuality is neither the cause nor result of his misanthropy, aiding in the separation of
villainy and homosexuality, in spite of Backderf’s overlooking of how heteronormative
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masculinity ostracizes Dahmer. Through Dahmer’s struggles with deciding to take a life, or
not—via mimetic by Backderf—the reader may derive Dahmer’s struggles with cruel optimism,
rather than his homosexuality as the impetus or part of a generalized homogenous evilness that
drives him to murder. Berlant writes that cruel optimism, “names a relation of attachment to
compromised conditions of possibility whose realization is discovered either to be impossible,
sheer fantasy, or too possible, and toxic. […] Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an
attachment to a problematic object in advance of its loss,” which Backderf applies to Dahmer
through illustration (94). Dahmer’s case is Berlant’s theory in the extreme—Dahmer covets
homosexual acts with the dead, thereby giving him complete control and perhaps disallowing
him from becoming the victim of homosexual violence as long as he remains the victimizer,
because there is no place, private or public, in which Dahmer feels safe. Eribon writes:
Feminism […] has shown that not only the categories of public and private but
also the reality of public and private spheres function to assign roles; as places,
they create a division of labor between the sexes (the public sphere for men, the
private sphere for women—although within it they will find a private life of their
own denied to them). Similarly for the division between sexual orientations:
public space is heterosexual and homosexuals are to stick to the space of their
private lives. One might notice, for instance, that all the forms of masculine
sociability (the life men lead with other men), along with being fundamentally
misogynist, are also based on the exclusion of homosexuality. (102)
Eribon writes in parallel to Berlant; while never citing Berlant, Eribon revives in this passage a
lighter ideological and spatial version of Berlant’s “Live Sex Acts,” used to consider the works
of Baldwin and Dixon in chapter 2. Notably, Eribon suggests that private spaces can become
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homosexual spaces while Berlant articulates with more accuracy the ways in which heterosexual
societal expectations creep into private spaces creating implied heterosexual spaces. By marking
public spaces as heterosexual, both theorists make clear the possibility of encouraging the
homosociability of men bullying homosexuals. With public spaces marked as overtly
heterosexual, and private spaces marked as covertly heterosexual, society has structured itself in
a way that makes it easier for Dahmer’s social circle to exclude Dahmer’s homosexuality.
Dahmer’s potential internalized homophobia as evidenced by Backderf intentionally or
otherwise is not a means to an ends that fully explains Dahmer’s murderous spree. While
internalized homophobia plays a significant role in a queer reading of Backderf’s My Friend
Dahmer, the separation between villainy and homosexuality that Backderf attempts is
nevertheless an important distinction from previous writers about Dahmer and his life, who had
continued to compress homosexuality into a self-loathing evilness that validated self-harm.
Schildrcout writes:
In his analysis of narratives about serial killers, David Schmid argues that true
crime writers inevitably focus on some “deviant” aspect of the killer’s life as an
explanation for his or her murders, since the public needs to be able to exclude the
killer from the real of the “normal.” But they enforce a double standard when it
comes to sexually motivated crimes. So true crime writers represent Ted Bundy,
who murdered and engaged in necrophilia with numerous women, as “an
aberration that told us nothing about heterosexuality at all,” while they attribute
Jeffrey Dahmer’s crimes to homosexuality itself. Indeed, Schmid finds in these
narratives “the assumption that extreme violence is a normal part of
homosexuality.”
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In their attempts to explain the murders of Jeffrey Dahmer, many true
crime writers place the blame on internalized homophobia—that is, the gay man’s
loathing of his own homosexuality. While this assertion may be correct, Schmid
maintains that true crime writers use it to support, rather than challenge, the
homophobia of their readers, since they never address the origin of the loathing.
The implication, then, is that “to be homosexual is so disgusting and traumatic
that of course one would murder again and again in order to assuage one’s guilt
about being gay.” […] Schmid challenges true crime writers to examine the social
origins of this homophobia, thus implicating American society itself as the source
of Dahmer’s self-loathing. (157)
Schildcrout’s suggestion through Schmid that true crime writers offer internalized homophobia
as a motive is lost or missing in My Friend Dahmer, further separating the graphic memoir from
the true crime writer genre; Schildcrout does not offer Berlant’s concept of cruel optimism as a
motive, but given its emphasis on desiring the unachievable, for which both murder and
homosexual desire apply in 1970s Midwestern America, cruel optimism may offer a more robust
examination of Dahmer’s fate. Earle notes of My Friend Dahmer, “this is the story of a serial
killer that is about neither the crimes, nor the chase, because we already know the story. If the
life and crimes of Dahmer were not already well known, Backderf’s comic would not work to
the extent it does. My Friend Dahmer is the ‘prequel’ so to speak, and every action is
overshadowed by our knowledge of what comes later” (435). Rather, “this comic tells the story
of those who knew Dahmer during his adolescence and the first murder, to recreate the
claustrophobic small-town environment in which these two men grew up and to show, to some
small degree, that the man we assume is a monster to the core was once an ordinary boy,” who
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did not express desires for the unobtainable in a white heteronormative patriarchal society (Earle
430). In the wake of the continuously unanswered question of what makes a person a murder,
monster, or by projection of continued success a villain, Earle writes, “What makes My Friend
Dahmer so compelling and disturbing as a text is that Dahmer really does appear to be an
‘Average Joe’; [Backderf] proves the point that ‘evil is unspectacular and always human’” (435).
Backderf does so no more clearly than in the Epilogue, in which he first hears that someone he
went to school with is a serial killer and when asked to guess, Backderf guesses Figg first;
Dahmer is his second guess (224).

8-Bit Theater
8-Bit Theater by Brian Clevinger utilizes the tropes of villainy as conflated with homosexuality
that flourished in literature and film and proliferated the naissance of a new form of media: video
games. Offered as a web comic using sprite video game aesthetics, Clevinger presents a
traditional white patriarchal heteronormative world—normalized in video games played by
millions of children—that he then subverts in unique and interesting ways to empower gender
equality and question the ties of villainy and homosexuality. 8-Bit Theater showcases
considerate monsters, villainous royalty, and a campy homosexual villain, all of which forces the
reader to rethink the traditional structure of heroes and villains in video game plot.
A sprite video game is a two-dimensional animated cartoon constructed of tiles or pixels
and is centered around the mobility of a character or set of characters who advance across the
screen to achieve a goal or accomplishment; a quest. Sprite games were early in video game
development, and the gender and racial disparities were strong, reinforcing white men as heroic
saviors, women objectified as rewards or relegated to supportive roles (e.g. healers), and erasing

107
or stereotyping non-Caucasian races; even when developed and distributed in majority non-white
nations, they emphasized a proximity to whiteness by illustrating characters with Eurocentric
features. They reinforced heterosexuality through quests that gravitated towards a heterosexual
coupling: a blue collar worker and his brother set out to rescue a kidnapped princess held captive
by an anthropomorphic turtle in his castle; a lone country boy begins a quest to save the kingdom
by saving the princess who has been kidnapped by a prince; a lone country boy begins a quest to
save the kingdom after he finds a mystical, speaking sword that has chosen him, reifiying his
right to conquest and subjugate creatures presented as monsters throughout the countryside—
heroism performed to save the nation through sanctioned violence—with the expected reward of
fame, and heterosexual coupling. This woman typically does not have the option to express any
agency in accepting or denying her suitor (an anachronism in 20th Century America that pushes
the video game back to a different time and place—a fairy tale land), and offers riches as that
rescued woman is often royalty; she signifies the height of value. She is never not white.
Clevinger begins to bend these tropes by creating an expectation of villains and monsters
who lack menace or animosity. While still depicted and understood by the reader as villainous or
monstruous through physical attribute, Clevinger creates enemies to the heroes that have such a
depth and emotion that, when presented, allow the reader to sympathize or empathize with the
villains and monsters. Cohen writes, “the co-optation of the monster into a symbol of the
desirable is often accomplished through the neutralization of potentially threatening aspects with
a liberal dose of comedy: the thundering giant becomes the bumbling giant,” which Clevinger
readily uses (50). The first encounter the Light Warriors, or presumed heroes of 8-Bit Theater,
face is with a thundering giant whose attempt to attack Fighter is thwarted by Fighter simply
running away; the giant’s response is to say, “Hey…” as a drop of sweat appears on his forehead,
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denoting his confusion or incompetence; his bumbling (5). This prepares the readers for an even
more comical interaction with a “random encounter,” or a pop up of enemies that occurs at
mathematical odds as characters move through a video game world (10-14). Six monsters appear
in front of Fighter and Black Mage and insist upon being fought. Fighter and Black Mage begin
an argument with each other, to which the following dialogue takes place:
Monsters: We ain’t got all day, y’know.
Black Mage: Sorry guys, just one second.
Monsters: Make it quick.
Fighter: Those monsters are gonna eat us alive!
Monsters: Human flesh? Raw?
Monsters: Oh, heavens no.
Monsters: How barbaric!
Monsters: What does he think we are, monsters?
[Beat.]
Monsters: Well, yeah, we are monsters. But we’re not monsters about it. (12)
Failing first to attack at will to gain the upper hand, these monsters have demonstrated the
morality that is pervasive throughout comic books and video games wherein henchmen who
have arrived en masse attack the protagonist one at a time, or solely in defense. Clevinger takes
this further—these monsters’ monstrosity is then neutralized by the propriety in their disgust of
eating human flesh. By stating, “Well, yeah, we are monsters. But we’re not monsters about it,”
they establish the dissonance between their physical identity of Monster, a creature outside of
humankind whose orientation as “Monster” begins within the protagonist and resonates outwards
towards themselves. They separate their non-human identity from malicious acts, both of which
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are understood as monstruous. This separation prepares readers to encounter villains who are not
villainous (i.e. committing horrifying and dangerous acts against a white heteronormative
patriarchal humanity). Clevinger presents a world in which the monsters and villains have room
to become likeable, even affable, eroding the expectation of white heteronormative patriarchal
order that understands all monsters as monstruous and all villains as villainous.
Garland is such a villain in 8-Bit Theater. By being affable, homosexual, and villainous,
Clevinger uses Garland to lambast the expectations of queer villainy and therefore of a
traditionally white, heteronormative patriarchic hegemonic order. How Garland chose a path of
villainy is left unclear. However, Eribon’s notations on Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de
Beauvoir’s un/intentional homophobia that flattened homosexual characters into a stereotype can
shed some light; Eribon writes that Sartre and de Beauvoir, “lump homosexuals (because they
keep so many ‘secrets’ about themselves, because they pretend, because they seem so rarely
capable of choosing authenticity) with those who practice ‘bad faith,’” which makes it easier to
conceive of a secret carrying homosexual as someone capable of nefarious plotting with a motive
to change society, to murder someone and subsume their identity, or to participate in seedy
sexual activities in dirty, broken down buildings, interchangeably (109). Garland may be deeply
homosexual, but he is neither nefarious nor malicious with any real efficacy, failing to be of “bad
faith.” Garland’s villainy or evilness is expressed predominately through his clothing and its
affect, and not his actions. Gazing into a mirror, he states, “Ah yes, the ol’ bad guy outfit still fits
like a charm. Not many arch-fiends can say that,” suggesting a move towards villainy both
through his fascination/attention to clothing and the precise kind of clothing that he wears (53).
However, Garland fails almost immediately to instill fear in the reader when, in response to
Princess Sara, who has been eavesdropping and who states, “By Bahamut’s flame, what are you

110
doing?” Garland’s responds with, “Eek!” (53). A parody of the “Hang in There, Baby” cat poster
can be seen in the background, wherein the cat has been replaced with an impish demon. This
poster is later replaced by Princess Sara in an attempt to manifest a greater level of fear in the
Light Warriors in preparation for their arrival, who are there to rescue Princess Sara; in her
redecoration of Garland’s lair, she has replaced it with a menacing picture of Garland that he
believes, “doesn’t even look like him” (107). This replacement speaks to Stockton’s examination
of clothing in Beautiful Bottom, Beautiful Shame. Stockton writes:
Perhaps unbeknownst to the one who wears it, a beautiful black cape, for instance,
may be read as a stigmatizing skin. In other words, there is a reason that blackness
(in the form of characters and/or signs) appears in these novels. It is a hint of the
dangers of clothes that are highly complicated, highly specific, not so benign,
semiotic cloth skins. (64)
Garland falls completely—obliviously—into Stockton’s categorical construction: Garland fails
to read his career of so-called vice and villainy as stigmatizing, in spite of an appearance that
suggests to the readers his dangerous persona; his cape is purple instead of black, signaling his
homosexuality, but the message is the same as he works to maintain his “slim nefarious figure”
and never takes off his helmet, thereby remaining masked in his semiotic sartorial (53). Garland
is both homosexual and a villain, and yet he fails to enact the vicious misanthropy that readers
expect of this combination; if Garland is a homosexual villain and he’s not so bad, then either
homosexuality or villainy must not be as ruthless as previously thought. Later, White Mage—the
lone female character who saves the world from total annihilation and who rescues the Light
Warriors time and time again during their typical quests—views another cat poster on Garland’s
wall in which a kitten stands in a coffee mug and she states, “We are clearly dealing with a
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deranged individual,” believing Garland to be such a wicked and maleficent individual that the
posters act as parody rather than inspiration, a farce to the reader who understands otherwise
(133-A). Clevinger underscores this with the blind violence that Black Mage, a supposed Light
Warrior and hero whose face also remains hidden by his oversized wizarding hat, is willing to
inflict upon the world. Rather, Garland finds himself reaching out to others and building a social
network, albeit of other failed villainous characters, who are similarly disappointed by his lack of
malfeasance, and who team up with the idea of using their combined strength to overcome the
Light Warriors. Clevinger satirizes this video game trope: heroes challenge enemies such as low
level bosses who are anthropomorphized or metaphorical monsters, who (after defeat) return to
challenge the heroes again at a later point, echoing Jeffrey Cohen’s second thesis in his
manifesto on monster culture that the monster always escape. Nevertheless, they are built to
succumb to the hero(es), returning to the subjectivity of their Monster title. Garland’s bumbling
and benign nature is effective enough as a villainous masquerade to the Light Warriors, whom
readers discover are just as bumbling themselves, having assumed the identities of the true Light
Warriors (87). Garland’s homosexual villainy becomes familiar and sympathetic rather than
dangerous to the reader, thereby eroding the expectation that his homosexuality is the root to his
malice.
Princess Sara is more effectual in evilness than Garland, her kidnapper, in an archetypal
twist that challenges a longstanding and well-documented gender imbalance in comics. By
tutoring Garland in evil, Princess Sara becomes both an expert and the true villain opposite of
Garland’s ersatz villainy, in an illustration of feminist power. Considering the role of women and
comics, El Refaie writes, “women had traditionally been excluded from the English-language
comics industry, with all titles, even those explicitly directed at young girls, written and drawn
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almost exclusively by males,” referring to the extent of which comics have been a male
dominated and generated art form (31). In the Introduction to their Gender and the Superhero
Narrative, Goodrum, Prescott, and Smith note that, “Not surprisingly, for much of the medium’s
history, female characters have played an ancillary role to the male protagonists” (16). Hemovich
considers the legacy that Princess Sara enters:
Gender stereotyping and misogynistic undertones have a long-standing tradition
in video game culture. The kidnapping of Mario’s love interest, Pauline, in
Donkey Kong was among the first video game to invoke the “damsel in distress”
paradigm and was a familiar trope already firmly embedded across other popular
media platforms in 1980s television and film. The theme continued, most notably
with the subsequent advent of Princess Peach to the Mario Bros. franchise; she,
the only female character, is captured thirteen separate times [Birdo, a secondary
anthropomorphic female character, was introduced in Super Mario Bros. 2 in
1988; she weaponizes the eggs she lays against the protagonists, connecting her
lack of nurturing motherhood to monstrosity]. Princess Zelda from the iconic
Legend of Zelda series faced similarly restrictive characterizations in that the male
protagonist, Link, must repeatedly rescue her throughout the entire franchise.
(207-8)
Princess Sara in 8-Bit Theater is introduced as a damsel in distress character who, through this
familiar trope, is expected and expecting to be saved, but nevertheless exhibits an autonomy that
is missing in Hemovich’s examples of 1980s video games. 8-Bit Theater fails the dated but
nevertheless benchmark Bechdel Test (there are more than two women in the comic, but they do
not talk to each other about a subject other than men); however, Clevinger makes significant
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strides by placing women in positions of power by turning the “damsel in distress” paradigm on
its head; Puar writes, “although feminist postcolonial studies have typically theorized women as
the bearers of cultural continuity, tradition, and national lineage, in the case of terrorism, the line
of transmission seems always to revert to the male body,” and in Princess Sara the reader sees
the bearer of cultural continuity, tradition, and national lineage at its pinnacle as the continuation
of the nation, but they also see a female body that emanates terrorist transmission (98). In
Garland’s castle, Princess Sara’s first line to him is, “God you’re bad at this,” deflecting
immediately any tremor of distress (52). When Garland threatens her with harm by summoning a
demon to do his bidding, she asks, “What’re you gonna have him do? Poke me in the ribs?” to
which Garland replies, “Oh heavens no. I’m nefarious, not cruel,” reiterating Clevinger’s
separation of Monster and monstrosity while advancing the strength of Princess Sara (52, Figure
4). Clevinger, exploring Rebecca Solnit’s terminology, “mansplaining,” after Princess Sara has
been “rescued” (i.e. realizes that she is losing the false flag battle against the Light Warriors and
makes herself found) and is returning to the castle, presents the following scene in which Red
Mage turns to Fighter and says:
Red Mage: Okay, now let me make sure I’ve got all this straight. We’re up
against a giant […]. And now you and I have to brainstorm an ingenious plan
of attack.
Princess Sara: Ahem. I am here too, y’know. I could you help with your little
attack plan. Seems like you need the help, really…
Red Mage: Please, Princess Sara. The Light Warriors are talking now.
Princess Sara: You’d better hope to whatever God you follow that this giant kills
you before I have the chance to do it more painfully.
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Fighter: Did you say something, Princess Sara?
Princess Sara: Oh heavens no. What could I possibly contribute to your man-talk.
Other than logic, reason, and a clear and decisive path to certain victory, but
I’m sure you nimrods have enough testosterone to headbutt your way through
to something not entirely unlike success. (152)
Rather, it is Princess Sara alone who defeats the giant (155-6). Through her actions and through
her speech, Princess Sara defies the concept of the damsel in distress by asserting her ambitions
for power, control, and violence. Previously, she is the one who approaches Garland as he
watches The Golden Girls in his suit of evil armor in front of an image of Garland’s certificate of
completion from “Barry’s Correspondence School of Arch-Villainy,” and states, “y’know, I’ve
been kidnapped about half a dozen times and this is by far the most inept job I’ve ever seen,”
referring to the lax security that includes an unlocked front door and a wide open back door,
allowing her to so freely meander through Garland’s castle, and in light of this Garland asks her
to assist him in improving his kidnapping abilities, to which Princess Sara replies, “well,
ordinarily I don’t like assisting foul servants of the dark in their vile plots to rain destruction
upon all the world……but if something’s worth doing, then it’s worth doing right,” to which
Garland exclaims “Yaaay!” and Princess Sara thinks, “Sucker” (54). Clevinger in this comic
constructs a dialogue between kidnapper and kidnappee in which the kidnapper is not enforcing
or reinforcing a situation of absolute power; Garland begins this scene by enjoying a
homosexual-friendly comedy show about the camaraderie of four elderly women, in front of an
academic certificate in evilness that was achieved via correspondence, and when he asks for
Princess Sara’s assistance rather than punishing her for his own ineptitude in failing to imprison
her it becomes clear to the reader that Garland is ineffectual as a villain in large part due to his
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affability, and Princess Sara enacts more agency than a kidnapped princess trope might permit.
Similarly, when Princess Sara later asks Garland if he plans to burn the forest down to remove it
of the forest-imps that have been plaguing his castle, she has inexplicably changed into more
villainous attire (Garland’s response to Princess Sara’s suggestion—“Oh gosh no! Think of all
the innocent little animals who would lose their homes! That’s just plain mean”—furthers the
inverted dichotomy of malicious capacity) (78). Her new clothing signifies her transition to the
side of villainy, to which she is more effective than Garland. Sara Ahmed writes:
What passes through the passing around of happy objects remains an open
question. After all, the word “passing” can mean not only “to send over” or “to
transmit,” but also to transform objects by “a sleight of hand.” Like the game of
Telephone, what passes between proximate bodies might be affective precisely
because it deviates and even perverts what was “sent out.” Affects involve
perversion, and what we can describe as conversion points. (“Happy Objects” 38)
Garland asked Princess Sara for tips and assistance in her kidnapping, but the affect created an
opportunity for Princess Sara to usurp Garland’s kidnapping and various evil plots in their
entirety; Garland transmits his villainy to Princess Sara, who perverts it into a truer and more
malicious form. This meeting point is of note because before it, Princess Sara had not considered
attacking her own kingdom although readers discover that Princess Sara’s father is an inept and
vacuous leader, and Princess Sara’s competence would benefit her nation if her were father
usurped (161-163). Princess Sara commits to evil and villainous means with the intent of saving
her kingdom from her father, a patriarch whose self-described qualifications for his role end at
nepotism (163). Princess Sara therefore becomes what Sara Ahmed would refer to as a “willful”
character or as possessing Willfulness, as discussed in a previous chapter; Princess Sara’s
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exasperation and mock fragility can be understood through Sara Ahmed’s warning, “these
experiences are wearing: you come to understand how you are judged as being wrong for
pointing out a wrong” (Living 73). Sara Ahmed writes:
It is important, however, that we not reduce willfulness to againstness. There is a
family of words around willfulness (stubborn, obstinate, defiant, rude, reckless),
which creates a structure of resemblance (we feel we know what she is like). This
familialism also explains how easily willfulness is confused with, and reduced to,
individualism. We need to resist this reduction. The reduction is how willful
subjects are dismissed. (Living 83)
Princess Sara may be received as an individual working against her father, or as an individual
filled with negative emotions or commentary, but through Sara Ahmed’s conceptualization of
willfulness, one may look deeper into Brian Clevinger’s representation of Princess Sara as a
substantively more nuanced positioning of good versus evil and hero versus villain/damsel.
Brian Clevinger’s prolific online comic 8-Bit Theater engages in dismantling several
video game narrative tropes including the conflation of villainy and homosexuality by
humanizing monsters through comedy, propriety, kindness, and motive. Actual monsters fail to
perform monstruous acts. Villains treat their captors with consideration and friendship. And a
princess uses darkness and villainy with the intent to better her society. By providing
homosexual villains who lack the maliciousness standard of this title, and by simultaneously
offering a multiplicity of villainous motives including those whose results are meant to be
positive and impactful for a society, Clevinger destabilizes the automatic connection between
homosexuality and villainy, thereby successfully challenging this paradigm.
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My Favorite Thing is Monsters
My Favorite Thing is Monsters by Emil Ferris presents what become queer heroes, rather than a
singular queer villain. By depicting actual monsters as characters throughout the graphic
narrative, Ferris connects to a wealth of cultural information specific to each form of
monster/creature, while conveying a general sense of difference from cultural and societal norms
that allows readers to underscore these characters’ humanity despite their inhuman appearance.
Karen Reyes, like Dahmer and Garland, begins My Favorite Thing is Monsters friendless.
Her inability to be social with her classmates is another signifier of her homosexuality and
therefore potential villainy—she is ridiculed and on the path of misanthropy. Eribon writes of
social exchanges, “in all such conversations the gay [individual] will feel excluded. [They] will
have the experiences of being ‘different,’ but will be obliged to hide this difference on pain of
being excluded from the group,” and that difference is visually constructed on a page where
Karen, who has the visage of a weregirl, carries upon her back what appears as a heavy speech
bubble full of her classmates—who are not depicted as monsters—framed as though in a
yearbook, ridiculing her for her difference (103). However, by the end of this initial volume,
Karen has developed several friendships, including those of a ghoul and a Frankenstein-monster
character.
Emil Ferris brings the discussion of monstrosity to the forefront, provided that so many
central characters are intentionally illustrated as monsters. Ferris highlights individual and
specific societal woes through the monsters that are chosen for each character. Maahen Ahmed
writes of monsters:
In accordance with their Latin root, monstrare, they point toward something: the
Other, abnormal fantasies, or ordinary desires, since desire itself is the ultimate
other that one strives in vain to absorb in oneself. Yet, monstrare also implies
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teaching and is thus related to the monster’s other etymological root, monere,
which means to warn. Here, good comics monsters teach us about the romantic
inclinations forming and driving their characterization and the medium of comics
itself. (3)
Ferris uses various monster identities to point towards something, to teach, and to warn, crafting
simultaneous narrative critiques about society that are more often than not interwoven. Sandy’s
spectral persona, e.g., points towards her severe malnutrition caused by her low economic status;
Ferris further teaches readers how invisible the poor can become in a society that rewards
capitalistic success, and warns readers not to overlook the humanity in others, by demonstrating
how characters are incapable of seeing Sandy. Karen’s brother’s slight resemblance to Count
Dracula foretells his youthful lothario tendencies, diametrically opposed to Sam “Hotstep”
Silverberg’s mummified visage that speaks of his age and unfinished business related to love
and/or lost possession(s) and—prior to the advent of equal rights—“his wife” is answerable to
both conceptions. Later, this chapter will examine Karen’s weregirl identity and Franklin’s
Frankenstein’s monster identity. The intersectionality of the monster identity is well
documented, thereby creating an important area of examination. Cohen writes:
The monster is difference made flesh, come to dwell among us. In its function as
dialectical Other or third-term supplement, the monster is an incorporation of the
Outside, the Beyond—of all those loci that are rhetorically placed as distant and
distinct but originate Within. Any kind of alterity can be inscribed across
(constructed through) the monstruous body, but for the most part monstrous
difference tends to be cultural, political, racial, economic, sexual. (41)
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Maahen Ahmed writes, “Gender, queer, and race studies have also turned to monsters as
figurations of social identity constructions and mechanisms of othering. This vast scope implies
that the cultural work done by monsters, while rich, remains unwieldy and difficult to sum up”
(4). While most monsters discussed in this work are metaphorical, Ferris’ work presents
monsters embedded in longstanding cultural myth, further overlaying meaning and intentionality
in their reading. These monsters are seldom monstruous, but through their Othering bring to the
fore their wants and desires in a rich cultural, political, racial, economic, sexual, and gendered
tapestry.
Ferris illustrates Karen with a weregirl depiction and a trenchcoat and fedora, illustrating
the complexity of her identities. By presenting with multiple identities, Karen resists the flat
interchangeable depiction that homosexuality and villainy had once carried. Eribon writes:
Authenticity is to be found in the decision to assume the burden of being what one
is: to be gay not simply as it were en soi (which is to say according to the gaze of
others, of society), but rather pour soi (that is, having assumed the identity for
oneself as a project of freedom). That social gaze establishes for all gay people,
even ones who are not out, the en soi of homosexuality: the image and the “role,”
the “discreditable” identity, assigned to them. (111)
Further, Eribon notes, “indeed, much of the difficulty with ‘authenticity’ for a gay person lies in
the difficulty in identifying with an ‘identity’ that is necessarily plural, necessarily multiple: it is
an identity without identity, or, better, an identity without an essence—an identity to be created,”
(111). Rather than the compression of a homosexual culture enforced by heterosexual norms,
homosexuality requires the acceptance of a plurality of identities. Sara Ahmed writes:
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The queer child might be described as an unconventional child, who has to
struggle against her family to come out. In the case of a brown migrant family, the
family is imagined as a dead weight: there is an expectation that her family will
be more oppressive, less tolerant; less supportive of her freedom. To be directed
toward happiness is to be directed away from your family, who come up in the
national imaginary as what or who are holding you back or holding you down.
And then custom and culture become things that this brown queer child has to
leave behind; happiness is assumed to require getting out. Translation: happiness
becomes proximity to whiteness. (Living 52)
While Ahmed may likely be speaking of her own intersectional experiences as a homosexual
raised in Australia within a Pakistani familial household, these words are transcribable for Karen,
who is partially Indigenous and whose adolescent sexuality complicates the relationship between
her and her brother, who demands that she see herself en soi rather than pour soi.
Karen’s lycanthropic visage is a prescient visual example of Eribon’s distinction. Readers
familiar with the folklore of lycanthropy understand the specific means of Othering that Karen
underscores, which include questions of domesticity, hospitality, duality, and—to use a minority
identifying phrase—passing. Werewolf lore speaks to a domestic failure in which a host
cannibalizes expected guests. Cohen writes, “Lycaon, the first werewolf in Western literature,
undergoes his lupine metamorphosis as the culmination of a fable of hospitality,” originating this
monster’s myth in Lycaon, King of Arcadia, who invites Jupiter into his home, serves him his
servants’ body parts as a meal, and as punishment is turned into a wolf who retains traces of his
former shape; neither fully human nor animal, Lycaon expresses a bifurcated nature that others
the shifter regardless of their human or animal company (45). This duality to monster myths is
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common, and Maahen Ahmed reminds one that, “the monster not only defines but also questions
notions of the human and humanity. It consequently offers insight into practices and effects of
othering,” using its role as outlier, other, or in a rare perception guardian to uphold a mirror to
the societal structure of humanity and allow humans to see themselves and their interactions with
one another through what they are not (6). Cohen writes:
Every monster is in this way a double narrative, two living stories: one that
describes how the monster came to be and another, its testimony, detailing what
cultural use the monster serves. The monster of prohibition exists to demarcate
the bonds that hold together that system of relations we call culture, to call horrid
attention to the borders that cannot—must not—be crossed.
Primarily these borders are in place to control the traffic in women, or
more generally to establish strictly homosocial bonds, the ties between men that
keep a patriarchal society functional. (46)
Ferris’ decision to depict Karen as a weregirl is profound. In Karen’s perspective, she has the
benefit of walking amongst society while hiding this deeper part of her dual nature that only
surfaces occasionally, while the opening scene of the book in which the community arrives to
attack Karen brandishing domestic weaponry (irons, telephones, etc.) speaks to lycanthropy’s
root in Lycaon and his failure to successfully serve others—a role that quickly became feminized
in the patriarchal West as domesticity became feminized in the patriarchal West, which Karen
may be understood as rejecting. Karen’s duality is born out of the need to pass in her society;
needing to present as heteronormative so as not to be ostracized further by her classmates and
family, she then represses what is illustrated as the monster within her, pour soi, which
transforms visibly during moments of high emotion such as when she is feeling threatened or
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when she kisses the girl she is attracted to, Missy, in a stairwell. Ostracized by society, with a
monster’s appearance, Karen is not malicious and does not require slaying by a heroic figure for
the safety of humanity.
Similarly, Ferris uses Franklin, illustrated as Frankenstein’s monster, as a means to
further explore a separation of homosexuality and villainy. Frankenstein by Mary Shelley is a
queer coded text that Ferris uses to challenge the notion of homosexuality as monstruous to
society with the potentiality for villainy. Franklin is introduced to the reader as an interrupter of
sexual assault and therefore as a savior to Karen. Karen depicts herself as having transformed
into a complete werewolf with sharp claws hovering over the heads of four boys who the readers
later understand as bullies; Karen, teeth bloody over their dismembered bodies, says, “Ok, all
right! This wasn’t exactly how it went this morning…it was more like this…” before reverting
back to a weregirl wherein she is first bullied—pushed around, spit upon—and then threatened
with sexual violence; beneath the elevated tracks, these classmates give orders to “spread her
legs…and hold them down,” and Karen “knew it was [her] last chance” to resist them by fighting
back, which prompts her attackers to transition from sexual violence to physical violence
(Ferris). Karen narrates before the attack, “right that minute I knew the bullies wanted to hurt my
soul in a way that they hoped would turn my body into a coffin” (Ferris). “How about a stick
instead of a dick?” they ask, “Huh freak?” (Ferris). The aggressors—plural, reinforcing as with
My Friend Dahmer a fraternity of masculinity and legitimizing the violence and insult as
communal and societal—attempt to use force to achieve their own sexual gratifications, which
are defined as masculine and therefore their right in public as well as private spaces. Before they
can hit her, Franklin grabs the hands of two of the boys and the first line spoken to him is, “Ya
dumb nigger! Let go a me now!” (Ferris). As noted in a previous chapter, Eribon writes, “in
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insult, it is one’s inner sanctum that is threatened, one’s heart of hearts, what the spiritual
tradition calls the ‘soul.’ If a well-targeted insult provokes such a strong echo in the
consciousness of the person at whom it is directed, it is because this ‘soul’ has been created
through socialization in a world of insult and inferiorization,” to which both Karen’s (“freak”)
and Franklin’s (“dumb nigger”) souls have been attacked (66). This scene is one of sexual,
physical, and emotional violence, which Franklin ends by rationalizing the outcomes of an attack
on Karen (i.e. that her older brother would seek revenge) that convince her bullies to flee. It is
clear that despite Franklin’s scarred face, ominous demeanor, and blackness, Karen does not fear
him. Rather, Karen narrates, “Franklin helped me stand up […] his hands fluttered all around me
straightening my clothes, dusting me off and pecking at me like a pair of pretty brown neat-freak
birds,” as Franklin’s hands multiply and sprout angelic wings (Ferris). Rather than being defined
as an onlooker or stalker and entering the narrative with an affect of danger, as a villain, Franklin
arrives as a heroic rescuer.
Ferris’ representation of Franklin—depicted as Frankenstein’s monster—is more
artistically influenced from the 1931 film than the novel by Mary Shelley; Baumann writes,
“much of the most iconic visual imagery associated with the Frankenstein story comes not from
Mary Shelley’s novel but from James Whale’s film,” to which Monsters pays homage (93).
Shelley’s character Viktor Frankenstein created a “monster,” or perhaps mythic humanoid, who
is a parody of beauty and the act of parodying subsequently makes him grotesque; the creature
does not pass, despite being comprised of several individually beautiful parts (53). The failure to
pass is perhaps not lost on James Whale. Baumann writes of the director:
Whale was gay, and openly so, a rare thing in a Hollywood straightjacketed by the
recently enacted Motion Picture Production Code of 1930. His undeniable and
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eternal contribution to the story of Frankenstein is a profound understanding of
what it means to be persecuted and despised for merely existing, a feeling that he
channeled into the representation of the monster as a sympathetic and
misunderstood creature who just wants to be loved by his creator and find a mate
who is like him. (Baumann 89)
Baumann suggests that the “story is at heart about men procreating without women, and the
passionate hatred that binds man and monster together is often charged with an erotic energy”
(93). Despite Viktor’s amorous zeal for Elizabeth, Frankenstein is a queer coded text, and this
reading has been elevated in film. Cohen writes, “The monster embodies those sexual practices
that must not be committed, or that may be committed only through the body of the monster”
(47). As monsters inhabit realms of the imaginary, they come to embody possibilities and paths
that are closed or forbidden by a white heteronormative patriarchal society; one of those paths is
homoerotic and/or homosexuality itself. Ferris utilizes parts of this history in the depiction of
Franklin.
There are two substantial differences in Ferris’ reincarnation of Frankenstein’s creature
through Franklin. Ferris reinvents this mythic humanoid with subtle differences that further
promote his digression from potential villain. “In Shelley’s version,” Baumann writes, “the
monster is destructive because he had no one to guide him—evil, she suggests, comes from a
lack of nurturing,” and Franklin comes from a nurturing household and nurtures Karen (93-4). In
Whales’ film Frankenstein, apathy is what makes the creature murderous: a little girl befriends
the creature, and the creature—failing to empathize or recognize the fragility of life in the little
girl—kills her. Considering this scene, Baumann writes:
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But the point is that the innocent eyes of children do not see a monster, a tradition
that continues in film, perhaps best represented in The Monster Squad (1987), in
which the Frankenstein monster betrays his monster kin (Dracula, the Wolf Man,
etc.) to team up with a little girl and become her beloved protector. This is a major
departure from Mary Shelley’s vision. (94)
Ferris follows the 1987 dark comedy’s depiction of an empathetic creature, suggesting that
associating the affective looks of whiteness and masculinity with a character is not a reliable
method of determining upstanding character or goodness (Figure 5). This shallowness is
particularly important because of its implementation on children: in order to more quickly
understand who is the hero, and who is the villain, children are encouraged to view visibly darker
or gender nonconforming individuals as suspicious others; this trope is then challenged in later
20th century film and literature. The second difference is that Ferris overlays Frankenstein’s
creature onto a Black young man, inviting questions of race (and insults of race) onto this
creature. Ferris is neither the first to represent a Frankenstein’s creature inspired character as
empathetic, nor as African-American—Blackenstein was produced in 1973. And Baumann
writes, “many versions of Frankenstein—not the least of which is Mary Shelly’s novel—have a
homoerotic dimension to them,” which signifies that a homosexual reading of Frankenstein’s
monster is equally nothing new (93). But also in Frankenstein’s monster does one read
alienation, anti-social behavior, and even a strain of misanthropy; and a simultaneous desire to be
loved and accepted. In Frankenstein’s monster, one also reads the very making of a villain. That
this villain is then heroic in Ferris’ My Favorite Thing is Monsters, highlights the separation
between homosexuality and villainy.
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Conclusion
This chapter is an examination of the growing separation of villainy and homosexuality as
represented in three graphic narratives in the 21st century: My Friend Dahmer, 8-Bit Theater,
and My Favorite Thing Is Monsters. While some characters are more literal monsters than others,
the label applies in each, as each graphic work represents a homosexual character who must
navigate their homosexuality as a profound and vilifying difference from the heteronormative
societies in which they live. Cohen writes of monsters:
Monsters are our children. They can be pushed to the farthest margins of
geography and discourse, hidden away at the edges of the world and in the
forbidden recesses of our mind, but they always return. And when they come
back, they bring not just a fuller knowledge of our place in history and the history
of knowing our place, but they bear self-knowledge, human knowledge—and a
discourse all the more sacred as it arises from the Outside. These monsters ask us
how we perceive the world, and how we have misrepresented what we have
attempted to place. They ask us to reevaluate our cultural assumptions about race,
gender, sexuality, our perception of difference, our tolerance toward its
expression. They ask us why we have created them. (52)
As homosexuality and villainy both are so monstruous to a white heteronormative patriarchal
society, their subsequent depictions may more easily be understood if they are veiled as
monsters—humanoids, or creatures, who are both human and Other, related to here yet not from
here, or terrorizing to the status quo of society for reasons that appear unclear to that society,
which then must perform the emotional labor to understand itself and its cultural norms in order
to squarely place the monster outside of itself. Cohen writes of the placement of monsters:
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The habitations of the monsters (Africa, Scandinavia, America, Venus, the Delta
Quadrant—whatever land is sufficiently distant to be exoticized) are more than
dark regions of uncertain danger: they are also realms of happy fantasy, horizons
of liberation. Their monsters serve as secondary bodies through which the
possibilities of other genders, other sexual practices, and other social customs can
be explored. Hermaphrodites, Amazons, and lascivious cannibals beckon from the
edges of the world, the most distant planets of the galaxy. (50)
These habitations—which more and more become cityscapes in the American imaginary—will
be explored in the next chapter on films and homosexuality. However, through these graphic
narratives one may see a growing separation between homosexuality and villainy.
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Figure 1: My Friend Dahmer
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Figure 2: My Friend Dahmer
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Figure 3: My Friend Dahmer
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Figure 4: 8-Bit Theater
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Figure 5: My Favorite Thing is Monsters
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4. Homosexuality and Villainy in Film
Hollywood feels like it should be ours, and hence, Hollywood becomes carried with gay
subculture like something of a subcultural phantom limb. Hollywood “needs” to be on our side
because our collective sense is that it has always been there. And yet, was it not a limb we never
actually possessed? […] If Hollywood was ever really “ours,” it was largely—if not
exclusively—because we “read” it that way. This has produced a historical affective attachment,
and yet one that may be fundamentally unsustainable. – Alex Evans

In this chapter, I consider the ways in which a film can be understood as a homosexual film. I
consider marketing, the concept of the auteur, and the audience. Further, I examine two aspects
of homosexuality and film: homosexual spaces through setting and the trope of road tripping,
and villains in 1960s-1990s Disney films. I argue that the trope of road tripping creates a sense of
adventure, propelling the plot, through removing characters from homosexually-friendly
urbanscapes and transplanting them onto suburban- and ruralscapes. A byproduct of this trope is
that gender performance that does not match a person’s sex is seen as unnatural in more bucolic
settings, and this enhances the perception of villainy that these characters produce for locals. An
examination of villains in late 20th century films demonstrates the ways in which ambitious
individuals who overperform or blur their gender identity are quickly and unequivocally
villainized in films that also establish hetero-romantic relationships as normal and desirable.
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Authenticity and Purpose
The definition of a gay film remains as fluid as the definition of homosexuality itself,
complicating readings of films as homosexual, or not. The conception of the auteur gives an idea
of validity in measuring the queerness of a work, such as when the director, producer, or featured
actor(s) are homosexual, but this concept is expressly limiting when examining works of
cinematography. Griffin writes, “[…] defining one’s self according to sexual orientation was not
yet totally commonplace by the time Walt Disney began producing cartoons. Many still
considered ‘acts of sodomy’ simply as sinful actions and not indications of a personality type,”
and considers the intersection of capitalism and marketing products towards a homosexual
consumer as a more effectual naissance of clear and unequivocal homosexual identity in film
(76). The business of film is—at its core—a business, and once executives realized that money
could be made announcing the subculture of homosexuality in film, they set about doing so.
Evans writes:
Despite having played an extraordinarily central role in the lives of pre-liberation
gay men, acting as what Brett Farmer has called “a veritable lingua franca,” by
the 1980s, Hollywood was the subject of stinging attack and abandonment by its
erstwhile paramour. […] Drag and, more generally, cross-dressing were of course
the focus of some excitement in the early 1990s. In the academy, drag became a
central totem of Queer Theory, just as the broader political and cultural movement
known as “Queer” used cross-dressing as a central strategy in its “in-your-face”
activist deployments. In cinema, a broad range of films, from the mainstream to
the margins, explored transvestism in all its forms: from overtly gay subcultural
drag to feminist reincarnatory gender-bending to straight male angora fetishes.
What is perhaps most remarkable about drag’s cinematic ubiquity at this point is
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the sheer variety of cultural, artistic, and industrial positionings attached to this
range of cinematic products: from the independent, art-house, lyrical film-making
to be found in Sally Potter’s Orlando to the populist Disneyfied sentimentality of
Mrs Doubtfire or the quirky farce of The Birdcage. (41-2)
In spite of the fact that the homosexual community identifies so strongly with the imaginary
escapism that film is adept at constructing, the industry had presented a cold shoulder.
Hollywood had turned its back on the homosexual community—Evans refrains from stating it,
but by the 1980s, the AIDS crisis was in full swing in America—and by the 1990s Hollywood
had re-remembered the gay consumer. Griffin originates this moment in the 1970s, when lesbian
and gay activists led a national protest of Florida orange juice, which presented homophobic
Anita Bryant as its spokesperson at the time, and Bryant was decruited, but similarly showcases
its true advent in the 1990s when alcohol companies—the foundation of gay bars—launched
targeted marketing campaigns to the gay consumer (228). Evans writes of these marketing ploys,
“this is a factor of which lesbian and gay audiences tend to be only too aware, however, and
hence, it was noted of the sudden queer surge that ‘[t]here is uniform agreement that Hollywood
producers are choosing to do drag-themed projects for reasons relating more to the wallet than
the soul,’ as reviewer Erika Milvy put it” (44). Marketing has been one of the ways that a film
has been considered homosexual, but it has not been universally accepted.
The conception of the auteur, or attaching to a film an artistic author whose intellectual
imprint is unique to that person, challenges rather than affirms the definition of a homosexual
film. Given that films are productions that can have multiple artistic inputs, it can be more
difficult to identify an individual “author” whose life experiences ground the film in an
“authentically” homosexual perspective. The ideological shift away from the auteur in film
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studies celebrates the teamwork aspects of films, for example by the high production value
works attached to household names like Steven Spielberg, Joss Whedon, and Michael Bay who
do not create these works by themselves; however, it makes it more difficult to identify a work as
minority identifying outside of the film’s plot. Is a film woman-led because the screenplay is
written by a woman, produced by a woman, or because it was directed by a woman? In the case
of homosexuality, Evans echoes Medhurst in arguing for a return to the idea of the auteur,
writing, “although auteur models of cinematic criticism had generally been judged in film theory
to be ‘superseded’ by the poststructuralist turn, gay spectators might still quite reasonably use
their knowledge of queer authorship in their fashioning of particular responses to the text” (43).
Griffin uses the idea of the auteur to examine the Disney oeuvre, writing of illustrator Andreas
Deja, who illustrated characters such as Triton (Ariel’s father) in The Little Mermaid, the titular
character in Hercules, and Gaston from Beauty and the Beast:
Deja’s acknowledgement of the effect his sexual orientation has on his work
marks a new era in reading subtext into Disney. His comments give legitimacy to
reading these characters through a “gay sensibility” because they have been
“authored” by an openly gay man, regardless if the “homosexual author” is the
formal overseer of the entire project. Yet, as the influence of “muscle queens” on
some of Deja’s work indicates, the “authorial” position allows a specific reading
influenced by a specific sociocultural identity—not a free-floating “queer”
reading. (170)
Deja used his knowledge of gay life and culture to inform his artwork in films that were meant to
be for children and therefore sexless. As discussed later, these films are full of heterosexual
inferences, which makes them not sexless but full of heterosexual messaging. Deja, who was
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open about his homosexuality and using homosexual sources and references, allowed viewers to
rethink the films that he had worked on as homosexual based on the concept of the auteur.
Previous to Deja, Griffin points to Howard Ashman, playwright and lyricist, whose musical
imprint on Beauty and the Beast retroactively encouraged a widespread analyzation of the film as
social commentary on the AIDS crisis. After Ashman’s death of complications related to AIDS,
Beauty and the Beast was then subversively read as a film that examines AIDS via the curse
placed on Prince Adam (aka, Beast) that caused great consternation among the townsfolk, even
though Ashman had little influence over the plot of the film. Ashman’s auteur sensibility can
further be found in The Little Mermaid. Griffin writes:
[Ursula’s] campy nature is due at least in part to the words that Ashman gives her
to perform. In The Little Mermaid, Ashman provided Ursula with a solo number,
“Poor Unfortunate Souls.” In the number, Ursula uses various methods to
convince Ariel the mermaid to sell her soul—from looking penitent and saintlike
to shimmying madly with excitement. [The ballad] is an unmistakable sendup of
the campy female impersonation number.” (174)
Ashman, who is also openly homosexual, provided the character of Ursula a song that requires a
undulation along the scale from feminine to masculine and back again. Because of Ashman’s
homosexuality, this is understood as a gay influence. The idea of the auteur provides a valuable
lens through which to consider films through affinity, such as a film by an African-American
auteur; Goodrum writes, “calls for diversity in comics run alongside, and sometimes intersect
with, those in film and television. As movements such as #OscarsSoWhite have shown, many
audience members want more than just a token display of diversity” (8). Auteur is a way for
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readers to conceptualize films that have traditionally been understood as heterosexual or sexless
as homosexual.
However, for the sake of this chapter, I am interested in films that lend themselves to
Griffin’s “free-floating ‘queer’ readings.” While auteur examinations of films are a useful way to
queer them, any film that is received by an audience may be read as homosexual, heterosexual,
or both. To wait for a film employee to announce their homosexuality in order to identify a film
as homosexual is to ignore the cultural reception of films as storytellers of culture.

Homosexual Road Tripping
Location is an important aspect in homosexual life, and in this section, I examine films that
utilize the “road trip” trope to emphasize this importance. With films Too Wong Foo, Thanks For
Everything! Julie Newmar (1995); The Adventures of Priscilla, Queen of the Desert (1994); Boys
on the Side (1995); and Transamerica (2005), viewers consider the ways in which the city—
setting for vice, crime, and homosexuality—is left to travail the heteronormative countryside.
Homosexuals often have difficulty living in the more conservative rural landscape of
America, and therefore find themselves gravitating towards metropoles like New York, San
Francisco, Chicago, Los Angeles, or Boston, or even international destinations like Paris,
London, and Berlin that have longer histories of homosexual acceptance or culture. Eribon
writes, “[…] the impulse to find an ‘elsewhere’ is, for gay people, linked to a kind of malaise, to
an uncomfortableness in their very being. The impulse to flee is a way of escaping that feeling.
Geographic distance, the search for different locations, the effort to inscribe oneself in a new
space, are all conditions for reconstructing oneself,” which homosexuals must do after learning
heterosexual cultural norms (254). But this very malaise and discomfort presents a friction that
serves well within a film plot trajectory: a homosexual city dweller living a comparatively
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discriminatory-free lifestyle identifies a reason to travel across a rural or suburban landscape in
which heterosexuality is either embedded or suppositioned, interact with people whose moral
values are diametrically opposed with theirs, and win the community over in order to continue
their odyssey to their final destination—most often, another urban locale. This theme has the
unintentional side effect of furthering the association of nature, or what is deemed “natural” even
in the most inhospitable biodomes, with heterosexuality.
The city acts as an origin point or a destination point; a place to dream about or reach
towards; a place that constitutes a where, as compared to suburban and rural locations that
represent a nowhere, past, a thoroughfare between two cities, or more aptly a destination with
conservative moral values. Eribon writes:
Those who seek to leave their birthplaces and the places where they spent their
childhoods in order to live in more welcoming cities are numerous. Marie-Ange
Schiltz writes, speaking of recent studies, that “in comparison to studies of the
general population, it seems that the departure from the family household and the
attainment of economic independence are much more precipitous among young
homosexuals. This flight surely leads, in most cases, to large cities.” (19)
Cities, in spite of their dirty and criminal reputations, are read as warmer and safer than the
families that some of these homosexuals grew up in. In an earlier chapter, I examined the ways
in which families, even racial minority ones who experience regular forms of insult in a white
heteronormative patriarchal society, may pressure individuals within that family to adhere to
those exterior pressures of heterosexuality or face ridicule, insult, or rejection and expulsion
from the home. This outplacing of homosexual lives does not only appear as disaffected or
unhoused youths. Birdsall writes:
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Woven into [James Beard’s] American Cookery is a kind of secret record of
twentieth-century gay migration to cities from across the country and beyond its
shores. Shaw with Egg Dressing traveled from Iowa to Los Angeles along with
Bob Balzer, the queer wine writer and high-end grocer. Lemon Cake Pudding was
an old recipe Frank Hearne (Emil Kashouty’s partner) brought to New York after
fleeing family in Texas. Lebanese American Emil lent James a handful of his
mother’s Middle Eastern recipes: Lentil Soup with Chard and Lemon (Adas bi
Haamud) and Kibbeh Naye. James chronicled dishes queer exiles kept alive.
(311)
Birdsall’s choice of words—fleeing and exile—is exemplary, as these homosexuals were exiled
within their nation-state (and Beard himself would be “exiled” from his alma mater for his
homosexuality) and fleeing towards the cities. These metropoles were centers of culture, then,
because individuals from the countryside made them so, and their relative safety is metaphorical
if not literal. Eribon writes of the traditionally foreigner-welcoming urban landscapes, “this
explains why a true mythology of the city developed within gay culture, within the collective
homosexual imaginary, from the end of the nineteenth century onward (and perhaps even
earlier). Paris, London, Berlin, Amsterdam, New York, San Francisco: these became wonderful
symbols of a certain freedom […],” due in no small part to the multiplicities of cultures that
created a more inviting space to a homosexual identity (20). James Baldwin, offering a speech in
Chicago in 1963, received the following question from an attendee: “Mr. Baldwin, why [is it] the
American artist—in general—has always retreated and has divorced himself from the American
political life and sociological experiences of this country, and they invariably end up in Paris or
some corner of Eastern Europe instead of fighting and steering this country towards her destiny,
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which is coming?” The attendee, in 1963, was likely unaware of Baldwin’s homosexuality or
would not have addressed it so publicly, in an auditorium, but instead crafted a question
addressing Baldwin’s identity as an artist—a steward of culture—whose absence from America
spells a specific kind of cultural dread, by then referred to as a “brain drain,” after the mass
emigration of scientific thinkers and intellectuals leaving central Europe due to the events related
to World War II. This attendee overlooks the inhospitality that American political life and
sociological experiences may sometimes offer a person whose identity precludes them from
white heteronormative patriarchal hegemony. Baldwin replies:
Well, I’ll try to repeat the question. The question is essentially, “Why have
American artists taken so little responsibility over the cultural and political life of
America, and why have so many of them fled to Europe?” That’s a hard question
to answer, too […]. But I’ll tell you what I think. One of the reasons American
artists flee to Europe is again a very obvious fact, I think, but so obvious that it’s
unnoticed. The principle, the root reason—I think—is that man is a social animal;
now that sounds like A, B, C, but if one says “Man is a social animal,” then one
has got to ask oneself questions about the society in which he operates, in which
he’s creating; the principles which govern that society—that’s the work of every
writer in that society—the principles which govern and still govern American
society are mainly utilitarian. So that, a writer at some point in his life, has to flee
from this cacophony of football players, and popularity contests, and success, in
order to sit down someplace where he can find out what he thinks.
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[…] All American artists have been through this. Nathaniel Hawthorne
wrote his publishes from London, in 1861; I quote, “United States may be fit for
many excellent purposes, but they are not fit to live in.”
Baldwin’s answer is that these artists—for Baldwin has constructed a dichotomy of artists and
football players so that the conception of an artist carries with it an omitted reference to
sensitivity and non-assertive masculinity, and below this stratum a reference to effeminacy and
therefore homosexuality—seek a society that accepts them for who they are, and receiving this
acceptance, they are granted the safety to create the cultural artifacts whose absence so concern
the attendee. Within this argument, there is a clear distinction of “here” and “there,” with the
former most often standing for suburban and rural landscapes and America, while the latter most
often stands for an urban landscape or an international somewhere; hence, “Paris or some corner
of Eastern Europe,” which more likely means Berlin, Vienna, or Moscow but whose cultural
relevance is flattened to a not “here.” Further, the cultural understanding that homosexuals who
are not born and raised within urban settings must move themselves to these locales spikes the
public perception that homosexuals may be conflated with the foreigner; they are more
frequently not from “here,” wherever “here” may be. Eribon writes, “of course the city is also a
social world, a world of possible forms of socialization. Along with anonymity, it provides the
possibility of surmounting loneliness,” for which the homosexual is driven to overcome, in a
patriarchal society that structures itself upon their omission and oppression (21). Nevertheless,
this is a dangerous thing to do, as Sara Ahmed notes, “to be identified as a stranger is to be
identified as not being from here, or not being entitled to be here; you are identified as someone
who endangers who is here,” regardless of whether that “here” is urban, suburban, or rural (117).
Homosexuals are drawn to urban landscapes not because they are urban, but because they offer a
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more accepting socio-cultural lifestyle, in which they may find fellow homosexuals and friends
with whom they may share the secret of their sexuality without fear of ostracization, and may
even find a life partner.
Homosexual characters who move across the rural landscape are suspicious and
susceptible to extra policing. These characters, by blurring strict gender lines, become villainous
to a white heteronormative patriarchy. Road tripping is a trope in films that speaks to the spaces
in which homosexuals are villainized. In To Wong Foo, three men who perform in the New York
drag artistry scene decide to try their luck in a drag competition in Los Angeles—Vida Boheme
(Patrick Swayze) and a reluctant Noxeema Jackson (Wesley Snipes) take on protégé Chi-Chi
Rodriguez (John Leguizamo), selling their two airplane tickets and purchasing a used car to
transport them from one metropolis to another; in Priscilla, drag queens Anthony Belrose (Hugo
Weaving) and Adam Whitely (Guy Pearce) invite reluctant Bernadette Bassenger (Terence
Stamp), a transexual, to drive across Australia from Sydney to Alice Springs for a drag show
contract. Reentering rural and suburban spaces, the drag queens become spectacles by nature of
their outlandish gender performance. Cohen writes:
Given that the recorders of the history of the West have been mainly European
and male, women (She) and nonwhites (Them!) have found themselves repeatedly
transformed into monsters, whether to validate specific alignments of masculinity
and whiteness, or simply to be pushed from its realm of thought. Feminine and
cultural others are monstruous enough by themselves in patriarchal society, but
when they threaten to mingle, the entire economy of desire comes under attack.
(47)
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These characters, then, become feminine culturally othered monsters on the move across
America, creating anxiety in the societal consciousness. In To Wong Foo, this is represented in a
scene where a police officer, Sheriff Dollard (Chris Penn), pulls their car over for a routine
traffic violation but crosses a professional boundary by flirting and groping Vida Boheme, at
which point he discovers that her genitalia is male and feels, that he has been tricked; his
romantic interest in Vida not based on her personality, but on her female heterosexual
presentation, or more aptly, Rigney writes “the construction of a woman’s body is related to
issues of power and control,” to which Sheriff Dollard hyperpolices by his access to power as a
white heterosexual man (7). More to the point, he then takes it upon himself to pursue Vida,
Noxeema, and Chi-Chi well outside of his jurisdiction to punish them; his pursuit is extrajudicial,
and yet he feels vindicated in this chase. The reason Sheriff Dollard feels vindicated is because a
gender transgression is worse than a traffic violation in a white heteronormative patriarchy, and
anyone who appears to flaunt those norms must be reminded, at any cost, of their failure to
adhere to those norms. Fear remains a powerful tool in maintaining the social order. Rigney
writes of Boys Don’t Cry, a film wherein a transexual is violently assaulted in middle America,
“The film suggests that the source of Brandon’s demise is his outrageous confidence in his
ability to pass as male. His crime is a crime of arrogance: to violate gender norms while not
expecting punishment. This attitude arises out of a culture that regularly and publicly punishes
those who do not fit into the conventional categories of male and female or masculine and
feminine,” for which these drag queens do not by failing to present physically according to the
gender assigned to them at birth (14). At the core of Dollard’s anger is a searing homophobia and
a fear that Vida will trick other heterosexual men along her journey. Examining Priscilla, Queen
of the Desert, Simpson writes:
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Priscilla is a curious example of a film which is both very “gay” and very
straight. Raucous drag queens, fierce frocks, blue language, and a hilarious
collision of Sydney Culture with Outback Nature—but no homosexuality, thank
you very much. Only Terence Stamp’s sour and feisty transsexual Bernadette (i.e.
a “woman”) is allowed a hint of a sex life.
Evans notes that both films are “road movies,” and although filmed concurrently, To Wong Foo
continues to have a remake or rip-off reputation, making it appear less artistic but its central idea
more financially viable; “what is most prized in ‘the industry,’” Evans writes, “is financial
certainty, and remakes often seem to offer such a possibility” (42). Priscilla is an independent
film, and received a warm reception for its subject matter and exotic (to American and European
markets) landscapes. Priscilla, as suggested by Simpson, presents a “gay” film of homosexuals
interacting predominately with nature and with heterosexuals; this road trip is across Australia
rather than the United States, pitching an “exotic” local to American audiences. Hartman writes:
My colleagues had turned into pranksters […]. Road trips have a way of doing
that to people. Venturing out from the known world, wandering for days on end,
and arriving at unheard-of places fueled the desire to leave our old selves behind
and tricked us into believing it was possible. The more ground covered, the more
liberated you became. All the moorings fell away. (Lose Your Mother 213)
Road trips allow the restrictions of society to fall away, and for a feeling of renewal or
reinvention to occur for the road trippers, but they also become dangerous when the individuals
in the vehicle must interact with local, traditional, and/or conservative individuals who find their
towns or states threatened by foreign interlopers. Road trip films reinforce the divide between
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safe spaces and dangerous spaces for homosexuality, which then illustrate the locations in which
homosexuals may be vilified.

Heterosexual Romance and Homosexual Villains in Disney Films
Late 20th century Disney films have represented a stark reinforcement of homosexuality
conflated as villainy in their portrayal of characters to children, such as The Little Mermaid
(1996), Aladdin (1992), and 101 Dalmatians (1961). This is well documented; what I use this
for, here, is to retroactively reinforce the conflation of villainy and homosexuality and/or their
intentional uncoupling throughout the other works that I have examined previously.
Several Disney films which are intentionally marketed to children have a G (for General) rating,
which precludes any nudity or displays of sexuality, nevertheless display clear and unequivocal
depictions of heteronormativity that allow their protagonists to be read as heterosexual, and their
heterosexual lifestyle as good or natural. By presenting heterosexuality as normative and
attached to the protagonist(s), the performances of the villains in these works become more
easily homosexual as a means to affirm just how important heterosexuality is to these societies.
Karin Martin and Emily Kazyak state through their research that, “[…] by elementary school,
children understand the normativity of heterosexuality. That is, by elementary school, children
have a heteronormative understanding of the world,” and use this knowledge as the impetus to
study the heteronormativity in top grossing G-rated Disney films to examine whether or not
children are learning about the affect of heterosexuality through these films (316). They are. In
fact, several films they examined presented heterosexual coupling as the crux of the plot. They
write, “In The Little Mermaid, for instance, the entire narrative revolves around the romance
between Ariel, a mermaid, and Eric, a human. The same is true of movies like Beauty and the
Beast, Aladdin, and Santa Claus 2. There would be no movie without the hetero-romantic story
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line for these films,” which present heterosexuality to children in settings of romance or nature,
as “characters in love are surrounded by music, flowers, candles, magic, fire, ballrooms, fancy
dresses, dim lights, dancing, and elaborate dinners. Fireflies, butterflies, sunsets, wind, and the
beauty and power of nature often provide the setting for—and a link to the naturalness of—
hetero-romantic love” (Martin and Kazyak 323-4; 325). By contrast, there are no sweeping
romantic scenes of two princesses or princes kissing read as wholesome or natural. Awareness of
gender through transgression is dangerous, because it emphasizes the privileges that accompany
maleness, and further denotes that these privileges are not “natural” or inherent based on gender,
but are rather based on gender performance. A part of what makes drag queens comedic is the
illogical abdication of male power; a part of what makes drag kings threatening is the seizing of
male “power.” Crossdressing, therefore, is a common feature of Disney films, but is used
predominately to the comedic effect of men crossdressing as women. As all elements of nature
become heterosexualized, even vast and sweeping landscapes, they are read by children (who
become adults) as safe havens for heterosexuality and spaces absent of homonormativity.
Heterosexual desire, then, paradoxically propels the plot while portraying itself as innocuously
absent because of its imprint onto natural settings and storylines; (heterosexual) love is magical
and important while also predestined and expected. Sara Ahmed writes, “we might also describe
the domination of children as a primary technique for the domination of people. As Eli Clare
puts it, ‘What better way to maintain a power structure—white supremacy, patriarchy,
capitalism, a binary and rigid gender system—than to drill the lessons of who is dominant and
who is subordinate into the bodies of children’” (73). The binary and rigid gender system, meant
to reinforce a heterosexual pairing, begins its training in children.
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Villains then become the individuals who, opposed to heterosexual heroes and heroines,
fail to heterosexually couple, whose queer identity arises from their exaggerated gender
performance. One of the lessons children may learn from Disney films is that they may act
within their gender identity, but transgressing it would align them with dangerous individuals.
By failing to identify with the gender assigned to them by others—the gender usually assigned to
them by virtue of their sex—children risk aligning themselves with the villains rather than the
protagonists. In adulthood, this appears as an affinity or a self-identification. Griffin writes:
The fascination that many gay men have with Disney villains is precisely over
how they theatrically perform their gender roles, to the point where the
“naturalness” of their gender can be called into question. Although the vengeful
Queen in Snow White and the evil sorceress Maleficent in Sleeping Beauty are
ostensibly gendered female, they both wear clothing that completely covers
almost every inch of their bodies, including cowls or hoods that cover their heads.
Only the hands and face are exposed, leaving the rest of the body cloaked. […] In
other words, these villainesses look like drag queens. (97-8)
Maleficent and the Queen in Snow White—Queen Grimhilde—both wear a substantial amount of
black and purple, as well as floor length capes that are designed to keep their bodies in mystery.
These two villains wear an extreme amount of makeup (if anything identifies a villain, it is a
strong, high-arched eyebrow), further covering themselves up and thereby creating a parody of
femininity by that extremity, compared to princesses who have more “natural” appearing make
up. Neither Maleficent (Figure 6) nor Queen Grimhilde (Figure 7) expose any hair, another
identifier of gender. Eribon writes, “throughout the ages, homosexuality has given rise to a
proliferation of devalorizing and degrading images, especially caricatures (but also images from
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film or television, which often simply provide in different ways images close to those from the
tradition of caricature),” to which Maleficent, Queen Grimhilde, and Cruella applies (70).
Beyond their clothing, these three are active and willful in their actions—they are only demur
when they are attempting to deceive, and are otherwise ambitious, masculine, and extreme in
their actions—and they are older women who are single. Who have failed to heterosexually
couple. This is what makes them true villains. Maahen Ahmed might refer to these villains as
monstruous, writing, “as deviations—as too much or too little of something, […they] signal the
shunning of norms and give form to the impossible,” or the unnatural (3). None of these villains
announce themselves as homosexual, but Griffin refers to these villains as “gay-tinged” as their
sexuality is never made clear. With few exceptions they fail to couple heterosexually; what
becomes clear is that whomever they might be, they are not the characters viewers are invited to
emulate. That they also fail to perform their genders successfully is no mistake. Ursula (Figure 8)
from The Little Mermaid, for example, is modeled after drag queen Divine (Figure 9), who
shaved half of his head to make more room for his expansive eyebrows. At Ursula’s root is this
extremity of gender performance. Cruella de Vil (Figure 10) from 101 Dalmatians is another
such example of a gay-tinged villain; an aggressive careerwoman who attempts to keep Anita
Radcliffe in her employ (and away from a role as housewife), she will stop at nothing for the
sake of her own career, including developing a line of dog fur coats. Adams writes:
Her masculine attributes could not be more exaggerated, as Leonard Maltin notes
in his book, The Disney Films. Maltin states that Cruella “revels in the stylistic
exaggeration of reality” with a “bony and angular” face. He calls her design a
“caricature.” But a caricature of what? A stylistic exaggeration of what reality?
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Certainly not the ideal of femininity. Perfectly flat-chested, Cruella struts around
in two-tone hair, drives a mile long convertible like a bat out of hell. (183)
Cruella, in overperforming aspects of masculine gender performance, becomes a caricature of a
businessman. Villains in Disney films represent their homosexuality through their overperformed
gender performances. Like Tom Ripley in The Talented Mr. Ripley, Cruella has an attachment to
clothing (referring to her new coat as “my only true love, darling”) as a means of representing
herself. These villains exaggerate their gender performance, and by exaggerating reaffirm their
villainhood.
These films promote themselves in an air of asexuality, thus further damning
homosexuality as inappropriate or too adult for children, as they simultaneously reinforce
heterosexuality. Homosexual children must learn and later unlearn heterosexuality, and later
learn homosocial behaviors whereas heterosocial behaviors are abundant in these films. Martin
and Kazyak write:
Parent-child relationships are portrayed as restrictive, tedious, and protective. The
child is usually escaping these relationships for the exciting adolescent or adult
world. […] Cross-gender friends are often literally smaller and a different species
or object in the animated films, thus making them off limits for romance. […]
Same-sex friendships or buddies are unusual for girls and women unless the
friends are maternal […]. The lead male characters, however, often have comical
buddies […]. These friendships are often portrayed as funny, silly, gross, and fun
but certainly not as serious, special, powerful, important, or natural. For example,
in The Lion King, Timon (a meerkat), Pumba (a boar), and Simba (a lion) all live
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a carefree life together in the jungle as the best of friends, but Simba quickly
deserts them for Nala, a female lion, once he is an adolescent. (326)
The ability for lead male characters to have friends while lead female characters do not speaks to
Adrienne Rich’s “Compulsory Heterosexuality.” Rich builds on Nancy Chodorow statement,
“heterosexual preference and taboos on homosexuality, in addition to objective economic
dependence on men, make the option of primary sexual bonds with other women unlikely—
though more prevalent in recent years” (636). This is further evidenced in cross-gender friends;
because these films work to promote heterosexual coupling, or hetero-romantic love, they must
be clear about who is romantically invested in whom; the result of which is that cross-gender
friends become forbidden or taboo, further reinforcing a binary gender divide.

Conclusion
Several of these villains are constructed or traced to homosexual auteurs, however, the effect on
children remains that homosexuality is vilified. Although illustrators like Deja and writers like
Ashman were openly homosexual and were creating homosexual characters based on their
worldview, by nevertheless marketing them as villains children learned how not to behave.
Griffin, writing of their lives at Disney, speaks of paradoxes and tensions wherein open
homophobia would be displayed and some departments would become so queer identified that
when one heterosexual person was fired they joked that it was sex discrimination (136). Deja and
Ashman constructed and/or wrote for heroes and villains alike, but whether or not the villains
continuing to be read as homosexual or gay-tinged played on their conscious is left unclear.
Perhaps, as Baldwin suggests, they weren’t given time to think in their perpetuation of the
American dream of capitalism. This speaks to how pervasive heterosexuality has become. Even
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in films that are inherently sex-less, gender performance, romantic coupling and heterosocial
desire (e.g. the increased amount of male gaze eye popping that encourage children to understand
that the female body is meant to be objectified) all work to make heteronormativity/sexuality
possible, and homonormativity/sexuality impossible.
This chapter works to consider the ways in which film has perpetuated the conflation of
homosexuality and villainy. By examining the concept of the auteur, one may consider the ways
in which a film may be considered authentically homosexualized, however even this is not a
reliable method as it still removes some forms of agency in the team based art of film. By
examining setting and migrations in the gay community, this chapter shows a low hanging fruit
from which Hollywood managed to pluck road trip films, removing homosexuals out of their
homes in metropoles and back in the countrysides from which they had been exiled. Finally, this
chapter examines gay-tinged villains in Disney films that are meant to be devoid of sex at all.
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Figure 6: Maleficent from Sleeping Beauty

Figure 7: Queen Grimhilde from Snow White
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Figure 8: Ursula from The Little Mermaid

Figure 9: Drag queen Divine, Harris Glenn Milstead
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Figure 10: Cruella de Vil from 101 Dalmatians
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5. Conclusion
This work began as a quest for homosexual literary role models in 20th century American media.
The impetus of this work came from reading Philip Kennicott’s essay “Smuggler,” in which
Kennicott notes that there is a whole generation of homosexuals who grew up without any
positive representations of themselves in literature, and a desire to verify Kennicott’s thesis. As
Beverly Daniel Tatum expresses in Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria
the importance of seeing someone who looks like you succeeding in a career, so too, I argue that
need is expressed in the homosexual community; it is the searching for the path that is not
communally shared with heterosexuals. That search has been, through the conflation of
homosexuality and villainy, fraught with peril and danger in ways that reinforce the benefits of
heteronormativity.
The conflation has also made it more difficult for heterosexual readers to find role models
who are homosexual; homosexual heroes do not exist for homosexuals alone. Even though the
conflation that persisted throughout the 20th Century has begun to separate, the remnants of that
connection must be examined with the same critical lenses that consider the after effects of the
women’s liberation movement, the civil rights movement, and the labor movement before that—
all of which were students of the ones that came before: what rights have been gained, and where
there is still room for improvement. Most importantly is the realization that any gains achieved
will continue to be under threat as long as they challenge a system that privileged a white,
heterosexual patriarchy.
There are several books and projects that can expand on the ideas expressed in this work.
Included here are some of the literary works I would reach for to next continue this research. I
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have grouped them here to reflect works that I would place in conversation with. These represent
future articles or book chapters.
Beneath the Wheel by Hermann Hesse, Strange Brother by Blair Niles, Maurice by E.M.
Forster, and “Smoke, Lilies and Jade” by Richard Bruce Nugent are three early 20th century
works that may be examined together. Both Beneath the Wheel and Strange Brother feature a
sympathetic lens towards homosexuality, and both novels end in tragedy. Forster worked to give
Maurice an intentionally positive ending, but the novel would not be published until after his
death in 1971. Nugent’s short story does not make homosexuality villainous or punishable by
tragic death, and Nugent as an author fell into the backrow of prominent Harlem Renaissance
writers—that those two statements are the result of causation would be a part of this analysis’
thesis. With Beneath the Wheel, Strange Brother, and “Smoke, Lilies and Jade” the authors
attempted to de-vilify homosexuality, but were met with an unaccepting readership.
Examining the conflation of villainy and homosexuality throughout James Baldwin’s
works is a fruitful research area. Baldwin’s sensitivity to affect becomes clear across his fiction,
non-fiction, drama, and speeches. In addition to Another Country (1962), Giovanni’s Room
(1956) is another mid-century novel in which there is a conflation of villainy and homosexuality.
The ruination of Giovanni is a specific study of a homosexual villainous act in which Baldwin
demystifies the repercussions of Giovanni’s murder and cruelly optimistic relationship with
David. The Fire Next Time (1963) holds two particularly strong arguments about love and
sensuality: the lack of love promoting the vilification of African-Americans, and a plea to
expand sensuality beyond (hetero)sexuality. Several Baldwin scholars, such as Ernest Gibson,
Arnold Rampersad, and Edward Pavlic, may be advised. Baldwin remains a central focus in my
work.
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The Handmaid’s Tale by Margaret Atwood (1985) is a dystopian novel that centers
Adrienne Rich’s compulsory heterosexuality as vital to the patriarchal political nation-state,
making heterosexual coupling patriotic and the failure for women to produce offspring terroristic
and punishable. By making the (dis)ability of women to give birth integral to the novel through
heterosexual sex, Atwood inspired a graphic novel and television series in which homosexual
characters are portrayed as villainous by virtue of their homosexuality. Atwood alarms the reader
by compulsory heterosexuality—it is what makes the novel dystopian—and therefore makes
heterosexual patriarchy villainous rather than homosexuality. The Handmaid’s Tale, its sequel
The Testaments (2019), The Handmaid’s Tale: The Graphic Novel adapted by Renée Nault
(2019) and the television series adapted by Bruce Miller (2017) all offer literary and popular
culture critiques on compulsory heterosexuality and by proxy the villainizing of homosexuality.
American Psycho by Bret Easton Ellis, 1991, and its subsequent film adaptation in 2000
would be a continuation of this work. Obsessed with his physique and clothing, Patrick
Bateman—like Tom Ripley in The Talented Mr. Ripley by Patricia Highsmith—murders Paul
Owen and assumes his belongings and apartment to further his own desires. However, Patrick’s
murder drive is not as connected to homosocial desire as Tom’s; he is substantially more vicious
in his misanthropy, to the point of psychopathy. Patrick maintains a heterosexual façade, even
rebuffing homosexual advances from colleague Luis Carruthers, but his echoing of Tom is stark
enough to create grounds for examination. American Psycho does not clearly fall into the
purview of the conflation of homosexuality and villainy, but it does raise many similar questions
of perception, clothing, and space/identity usurpation.
Middlesex by Jeffrey Eugenides (2002), The Book of Salt by Monique Truong (2003),
and The Borrower by Rebecca Makkai (2011) are all books that portray homosexual characters
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who challenge the villainy-homosexuality conflation, and Makkai’s The Great Believers (2018)
which is set throughout the 20th century all the more so. Middlesex and The Book of Salt offer
homosexual protagonists who must navigate hostilely heterosexual worlds that other and
displace them. Yet, by failing to turn to the vices of villainy or to accept the definitions that the
heterosexual world places upon them, these characters do not end in tragedy—like Rufus in
James Baldwin’s Another Country—but rather in success. The Borrower features a protagonist
who kidnaps a runaway child (whose mother was forcing him to go to an anti-gay camp) and
goes on a road trip with him; not only does the book ask the reader what is good parenting of a
homosexual child who is susceptible to insult, but it also uses literature to examine the value of
literature in historicizing. It is a book with a librarian protagonist who navigates her relationship
with her kidnapee through books by sharing with him books that feature homosexual
protagonists. The Great Believers is a novel that connects the trauma of absence from World War
I with the AIDs crisis of the 80s that could be analyzed using Ann Cvetkovich’s An Archive of
Feelings and Saidiya Hartman’s Lose Your Mother. It is a novel about homosexual loss and
sorrow that humanizes rather than vilifies homosexual lives; while it could stand alone, it could
also be paired with Cloud Cuckoo Land (2021) by Anthony Doerr, which features a homosexual
librarian in rural America who saves several children from an ecoterrorist act. These novels from
the 2000s challenge the conflation of homosexuality and villainy.
What Belongs to You by Garth Greenwell (2016) and Less by Andrew Sean Greer (2017)
may offer another literary analysis because of their divergent illicit homosexual relationships.
Read together, these two novels normalize and legitimize a range of homosexual relationships
and behaviors. What Belongs to You features a hustler who meets the protagonist in a public
place for sex and continues to extort him for financial gain. Less, on the other hand, is almost
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conservative in its sex-less approach to the protagonist’s romantic and emotional bonds with his
love interest. Gritty and commercial, What Belongs to You and Less both portray homosexual
relationships in ways that complicate the zeitgeist surrounding villainy and homosexuality; What
Belongs to You validates relationships formed in homosexual cruising spots, while Less sanitizes
homosexuality in ways comparable to hetero-romanticism seen in Disney films.
To continue my work with graphic narratives, there are further examinations that could
be made with My Favorite Thing is Monsters by Emil Ferris, which contains other homosexual
characters whom I did not examine in this work, just as with 8-Bit Theater by Brian Clevinger; I
did not begin to discuss Red Mage’s cross-dressing and ambiguous bisexuality, which features
periodically in 8-Bit Theater, nor Black Mage’s villainy and racialized otherness. There are also
The Essential Dykes to Watch Out For by Alison Bechdel (2008), Fun Home by Alison Bechdel
(2006), Blue is the Warmest Color by Jul Maroh (2013), Girl with Slingshots by Danielle
Corsetto (2004), Finn and Charlie are Hitched by Tony Breed (2009), and Honor Girl by
Maggie Thrash (2015) which all act to separate villainy from homosexuality through creating
homosexual protagonists who develop meaningful and positive same-sex relationships. Fun
Home is the most renowned of this list, and offers the most complicated navigation of the
homosexual-villain conflation, as Bechdel’s father’s homosexual acts are intertwined with
seedier activities like supplying alcohol to minors and engaging in sexual activities with his
students. Fun Home could be paired with Mariko and Jillian Tamaki’s Skim (2008), which also
features a homosexual relationship made even more taboo by a student-teacher dynamic. The
older academic and younger coming-of-age relationship subtrope is reaffirmed by Call My By
Your Name by André Aciman (2007). This does not speak directly to villainy, but does speak to
the illicit nature of homosexuality in a heterosexual society; in these graphic narratives, an adult-
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minor teacher-student sexual relationship is overshadowed by the homosexuality of those
relationships. There are a substantive amount of graphic narrative works that speak to the
analysis of the villainous homosexual trope.
These chapters are the beginnings of examining the deeper connections of affect,
homosexuality, and villainy throughout the 20th century. By examining the ways in which these
tropes are presented and recrafted, it becomes easier to identify them when they are relied upon
again to establish a dichotomy of good and evil or hero and villain. This is just the tip of a great,
big villainous iceberg.
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